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ABSTRACT
The case for proactive market interventions to stimulate accelerated development
and adoption of cleaner advanced fuel/vehicle systems continues to gain momentum
globally. World population growth, rising national wealth, persistence of auto-centric
land development patterns, and the growing popularity of truck-based platforms have
reversed the trend toward lighter vehicles, higher fuel efficiencies, and cleaner emissions
that began in the 1970's. Since 1984, fuel efficiency has stagnated and even declined as
oil prices moved to historically low levels. Lack of consumer demand for fuel economy
served to shift investment toward other measures of value such as performance and
utility. The convergence of car and truck markets has further impeded progress on the
fuel economy front.
Industry continues to come under intensifying pressure from international and
domestic concerns regarding adverse vehicle emissions impacts on public health,
environmental degradation, global climate change, and national security vulnerabilities
stemming from dependence on foreign oil. In response, the world's major auto
conglomerates have embarked on a variety of strategies to deliver cleaner vehicles to
market. Strategies span in-house and strategic partnering efforts across a range of both
available and developing technologies in fuels, batteries, fuel cells, electric hybrids, and
improvements to current internal combustion engine (ICE) designs.
This thesis intends to examine a set of representative technological solution
pathways that address two key questions for decision-makers: (1) whether market
adoption of advanced fuel/vehicle systems can occur under plausible conditions, and (2)
what industry strategies and public interventions can best leverage innovation to achieve
the accelerated adoption of technologies beneficial to sustainability goals? To answer
these questions, the work employs a system dynamics-based model in order to simulate
the complex dynamics surrounding this issue. The model provides a useful framework
for comprehending the relative directional impacts of varying industry strategies, public
interventions, and external market and cultural forces that affect potential outcomes.
The work suggests that plausible adoption scenarios are realizable within a thirty-
year time horizon, but that forces deleterious to the innovative capacity of established
domestic firms may significantly impede progress. I outline these forces, explain their
origins, and recommend industry strategies and public interventions that appropriately
address these obstacles.
Thesis Advisor: John D. Sterman, Professor of Management
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
STRATEGIES FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF ADVANCED FUEL/VEHICLE
SYSTEMS TO THE MASS MARKET
By Eric C. Cahill
Submitted to the System Design & Management Program and the Engineering Systems
Division in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of Master of Science in
Engineering & Management and Master of Science in Technology & Policy
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Many of the concerns the world faces today with regard to degraded air quality,
diminished quality of life, worsening public health, and global climate change find their
roots in the highly inefficient factors of production, land development patterns, and
transport methods spawned by the Industrial Revolution. Today, virtually two-thirds of all
criteria pollutants responsible for urban smog, ground-level ozone, and global warming
originate from motor vehicles. These include the poisonous exhaust gases of internal
combustion engine processes such as carbon monoxide (CO), a deadly poison, carbon
dioxide (CO2 ), a known greenhouse gas (GHG), and ozone precursors that consist of
oxides of sulfur (SO), nitrogen (NO), hydrocarbons (HC), and particulate matter with
radii of less than ten microns (PMio). EPA estimates that mobile source emissions
represent a "significant risk" to human health posing "the greatest potential threat to public
health in the largest number of urban areas." Many of these are either presumed or known
human carcinogens (Wang et al, 2000).
Ozone (03), a key molecular compound for shielding the Earth's surface from
damaging ultraviolet radiation, exists naturally in the high atmosphere. At ground level,
however, ozone poses a dangerous threat to humans and wildlife. According to the
American Lung Association (ALA), "Ozone is capable of destroying organic matter,
including human lung and airway tissue. It essentially burns through cell walls, and it is
capable of doing this at... levels frequently encountered in many U.S. cities" (Doyle 2000).
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that the number of U.S.
asthmatics has nearly tripled, from 6.8 million in 1980 to 17.3 million in 1998. Currently,
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more than 5 million American children suffer from asthma. In 1999 alone, 200 children
under the age of 15 died of this condition (Wang et al, 2000).
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
I consider this work a study of the dynamics of innovation, applied to the challenge
of delivering technological solutions to the problem of automotive emissions in the U.S.
marketplace. The greater portion of this effort focuses on the intersection of industry
practice and government policy. My objective is to develop and advance a set of product
planning strategies and regulatory frameworks for achieving accelerated development,
introduction, and adoption of advanced fuel/vehicle system platforms that reach
mainstream consumer markets. This objective is predicated on the assertion that informed
policy requires a thorough understanding of the dynamics of innovation behind the
solutions called upon by social imperatives.
This thesis intends to examine a set of representative technological pathways that
address two key questions for decision-makers: (1) whether market adoption of advanced
fuel/vehicle systems can occur under plausible conditions, and (2) what industry strategies
and public interventions can best leverage innovation to achieve the accelerated adoption
of technologies beneficial to sustainability goals? Part I of the thesis addresses the first
question and employs a system dynamics-based model to simulate adoption patterns. Part
II focuses on addressing the second question and reaches beyond the limitations of a single
model to invoke an additional set of frameworks for analysis. Although the author
recognizes that any lasting solution will involve a balance of multiple transportation modes,
the work concedes that personal transport will remain the preferred mode of transit in the
North American marketplace. Therefore, I limit the scope of analysis to an exploration of
the technological solution space for achieving the goals of sustainable mobility.
This work advances the thesis that informed industry strategy and government
policy demands a thorough understanding of the role and dynamics of technology
innovation in addressing the problem of mobile source vehicle emissions. It does so from
a systemic perspective based on the participation of multiple and diverse stakeholders and
an integrated assessment of available and developing technologies. This analysis is
further predicated on the notion of "sustainable mobility" as it pertains to the passenger
- 11 -
vehicle (specifically low occupancy vehicles, i.e. cars and light duty trucks) element of
mobile source emissions. In the context of this thesis, sustainability refers to the effort to
balance human demand for personal transport with the capacity of our environment to
sustain human quality of life. It represents the author's arbitrary translation of the term as
interpreted from recognized literature on the subject (i.e. Ashford, Ehrenfeld, Lovins, and
Hawkens).
PART I: ASSESSING THE OPPORTUNITY
METHODOLOGY
Central to my research is the extension of a market adoption model based on
system dynamics tools to examine potential pathways for the introduction of advanced
automotive powertrain technologies to the mass market. To do so, I have borrowed a
reference adoption model based on technologies estimated to be available to consumers
in the year 2020 (Weiss et al, 2000). The model, as I have revised it, modifies the set of
demand attributes to more accurately reflect the consumer purchase decision (see the
comparison of model logic flows in Chapter 3) while normalizing the set of potential
technologies to a current, rather than an evolved, baseline vehicle - in this case a mid-
size ICE-based sedan - supported by the market and energy infrastructure of today
(Ogden 2001 & Wang 2000). Thus, the model simulates adoption of competing
fuel/vehicle system technologies should automakers choose to bring them to market in
their current state of development.
The revised model also incorporates "aging chain" and "co-flow" structures to
facilitate the tracking of key metrics of interest over time (see Views 15-20 in the
Appendix). Since the model allows the user to simulate a variety of strategies and market
conditions, explicit delineation of these critical outputs enables the decision-maker to
witness downstream impacts of any particular strategy/policy formulation. The author
hopes that the inclusion of these structures in the revised model will improve our ability to
predict the consequences of alternative policies, eradicate perverse incentives, and provide
a framework for valuing consequences to enable trades that lead to better policy choices.
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The revised model incorporates several policy levers to test the impact of various
industry strategies and public interventions. These include a fee-bate program that serves
to redistribute externality costs by rewarding cleaner vehicles and taxing "dirtier" ones.
The user can activate or deactivate the fee-bate program via a built-in switch. Additional
levers include the ability to impose a gasoline tax, or pursue a public ad campaign to
educate consumers and stimulate awareness of cleaner alternative vehicle technologies.
Using these levers, the study establishes a set of scenarios, each representing a deliberate
strategy for achieving successful penetration of cleaner vehicles to market relative to
today's dominant propulsion mode, the internal combustion engine (ICE). Although
many fuel/vehicle system combinations are possible, I examine four representative
technology platforms in the scenarios presented here:
(1) Gasoline-powered ICE Domination Scenario
(2) Gasoline-powered Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV) Competition Scenario
(3) Direct hydrogen-powered Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEV) Scenario
(4) Grid-dependent Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) Scenario
FINDINGS
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter 4 outline the basic assumptions ascribed to each of
the scenarios considered. Inputting these scenario variables into the revised model yields
the results illustrated in Summary Tables 1 and 2 and in Summary Figures 5 through 7 on
the following pages. These illustrations map scenario results to key sustainability
metrics. I refer the reader to Figures 1 through 4 on the following pages for illustrations
of the individual adoption patterns witnessed in the simulation of the scenario set. The
patterns that emerge provide useful feedback to decision-makers regarding the relative
success of strategy and policy regimes in achieving sustainability objectives.
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Summary Figure 7 - Average Fuel Economy of New Internal Combustion Engine
(ICE) Vehicles as a function of gasoline prices.
The model attempts to account for potential ICE development by vested industry
interests. It achieves this by establishing a desired fuel cost per mile (3 cents/mile),
congruent with consumer expectations for range and fill-up costs based on incumbent
ICE platforms. Summary Figure 7 provides a graphic of the relative change in fuel
economy for each of the propulsion technologies over the simulation period. I include
only those scenarios that reflect different gasoline price thresholds. In the absence of a
fuel price increase, ICE-based platforms attain a 22% increase in fuel economy over the
thirty-year simulation period. Conversely, as we increase fuel price, automakers are
induced to commit greater resources to the goal of achieving greater fuel economy. At
$2.43/gal and $4.43/gal, automakers increase ICE fuel economy by over 47% and 85%,
respectively. The reader may interpret these data as gains derived from improvements in
engine efficiency, exhaust after-treatment, fuel pre-treatment (i.e. lean bum), or vehicle
light-weighting technologies over the simulation period.
The results from this very simple set of representative scenarios indicate that the
adoption of cleaner vehicles is possible under each of the strategies and conditions
considered. The author made every effort to keep the scenarios as simple, and as
plausible as possible. For example, gasoline price increases were kept to a minimum in
achieving the levels of penetration observed. However, there are some important
observations to note from the patterns that emerged in the above illustrations:
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Scenario 1- Laissez Faire
" In the absence of a concerted industry effort to "push" alternatives to the
market place, hybrid electric vehicles nevertheless account for over 6% of
the passenger vehicle fleet with over 17% share of new vehicle sales by
the year 2032. This is accomplished as well in the absence of government
policy interventions or increases in real gasoline prices.
" Despite an average fleet fuel economy increase of 22% over the same
period, American dependence on oil and the costs associated with
environmental damage continue to grow unchecked.
Scenario 2- Hybrid Electric Competition
* The combination of a concerted effort by industry and government to
introduce HEV products results in a much more significant level of market
penetration by 2032 (41% fleet adoption and 54% new vehicle share).
This is an extremely plausible scenario, requiring no real increase in
gasoline prices and no public ad campaign to stimulate awareness. Rather,
modest industry investments in marketing combined with a government
fee-bate program enable this market outcome.
" Inclusion of a public ad campaign, however, accelerates the adoption
pattern by approximately 7 years.
" In the longer-term (i.e. 10-30 years), however, this scenario fails to check
mounting environmental damage costs, despite significant gains in all
other key metrics. This result suggests that life-cycle considerations begin
to dominate with the emergence of the HEV as the preferred mode of
personal transit.
Scenario 3 - Fuel Cell Vehicle Transition
* A transition of the market to fuel cell technologies achieves sustainability
as defined previously. The program successfully halts and reverses the
growth of costs associated with environmental damage and energy
dependency.
* This transition is predicated on a significant commitment of resources by
both government and industry stakeholders, potentially coincident with
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external market factors (such as a 70% increase in real gasoline prices
and/or a gas tax) that benefit the technology's ascendance.
Scenario 4 -Battery Electric Vehicle Take-Off
" A transition of the market to fuel cell technologies achieves sustainability
as defined previously. The program successfully halts and reverses the
growth of costs associated with environmental damage and energy
dependency.
" This scenario is contingent upon significant commitment of resources by
industry and government stakeholders to overcome battery-dependent
range limitations that handicap widespread adoption in mainstream
markets. The scenario also requires coincident external market factors,
such as a 300% increase in gasoline prices to stimulate the necessary
demand.
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PART II: GETTING TO MARKET
The above scenarios establish that the opportunity exists for a meaningful level of
alternative fuel/vehicle system adoption under plausible conditions. The focus now turns
toward the remaining question of the research objective: What industry strategies and
public interventions can best leverage innovation to achieve the accelerated adoption of
technologies beneficial to sustainability goals? Implicit in addressing this question is an
examination of the capacity and willingness of firms to respond to the opportunity. Three
crucial impediments to innovation stand to potentially derail efforts by domestic firms to
bring alternative solutions to market: (1) the architectural challenges implicit in the
innovations demanded, (2) the embedded cultural resistance to innovation derived from a
long history of policy defection, and (3) the temporary advantage conferred by a value
pioposition centered around a best-product, rather than a customer solutions strategy for
achieving market leadership.
ARCHITECTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION
The author recognizes that established firms contend with a number of
encumbrances that can stymie innovation. A multitude of literature from such industry
experts as Abernathy (1978), Utterback (1990), and Christensen (1997) suggest that
established firms are the least capable of delivering disruptive innovations. Disruptive
innovations are distinct from incremental or evolutionary innovations in that they
represent radical departures from mainstream products, cater to a fundamentally different
consumer value proposition or market, and threaten the existing knowledge,
competencies, and dominance of established firms (Christensen, 1997). These authors
further contend that organizational rigidities, a product of firm success in delivering
established technologies, impede firms from delivering new technologies with initial
appeal to niche markets. Niche markets are crucial incubators for establishing a
profitable business case for new products, often by appealing to a divergent value
proposition that would otherwise languish in mainstream markets where customers
expect performance along traditional pathways. However, these early markets typically
represent an insignificant fraction of the established firm's normal streams of revenue and
thus often fall victim to the impatient and often hostile resource allocation mechanisms of
- 19 -
the established firm. Rather, argues Christensen, the vast majority of "next generation"
technologies find their champion via new entrants (Christensen, 1997).
In the auto and energy industries, decades of established process methodology has
forged and codified a very rigid set of communication channels, information filters, and
problem-solving methodologies necessary for development and delivery of complex
products (Henderson & Clark, 1990). But these same competencies make it difficult to
transition auto and energy interests to new generations of technologies, especially those
that are not only disruptive, but are fundamentally architectural in nature. Architectural
innovations are unique in that they change the way in which components of a product are
linked together, while leaving the core design concepts untouched. By this definition, all of
the alternative fuel/vehicle systems considered in Part I involve the reconfiguration of an
established system to link together existing components in new ways. The incorporation of
off-the-shelf technologies such as the electric motor, battery, or fuel cell will create new
linkages and spawn new interactions in the established product. This category of
innovation presents subtle challenges to established firms in that it preserves the component
knowledge of the organization while destroying the architectural knowledge base
(Henderson & Clark, 1990). The new behaviors also present significant liability risks to
the incumbent firm.
Where firms often stumble is in their failure to appreciate the systemic change that
the new arrangement of sub-systems or components creates. Instead, they tend to rely on
their old frameworks - their old architectural knowledge - and consequently miss the real
nature of the threat. One of the more revealing examples of this tendency is the attempt by
domestic automakers to meet the call for better fuel efficiency and emissions performance
via "conversions" rather than by blank sheet, ground up design efforts. To put it another
way, the effort is an attempt to shoehorn alternative systems into architectures designed at
the outset around the ICE. Their motivation for doing so is based on a misguided effort to
control costs and reduce risk. Firms may achieve this in the short term, but the long-term
danger implicit in such efforts is two-fold. First, new interactions spawn new system
behaviors that ultimately undermine the firm's established architectural knowledge.
Second, the effort fails to recognize or capitalize on the potential to realize an entirely new
or different value proposition that is either unexplored or unrealized in the mainstream
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market. This pitfall is well documented in the disk drive and semiconductor industries
(Christensen, 1997). It requires firms to think outside their traditional boundaries and
therefore to consider information that the firm has long since screened out as irrelevant to
delivering its traditional value proposition (Henderson & Clark, 1990).
The recent consolidation of global automakers, combined with the drive to
outsource sub-system development to second- and third-tier suppliers portends an even
greater erosion of architectural competencies at the OEM level as technologies evolve. The
automakers believe that the combination of industry disintegration and strategic partnering
(and other equity sharing relationships) with emerging system development firms will
sufficiently manage the risk presented by these technologies. OEM's rightly contend that
they can best leverage innovation and align incentives under arrangements that fully
segregate development activities from the larger organization. They are further motivated
to replicate the success of the mass-customization scheme of the "Dell Model," whereby
customers associate value with the total system integrator and provider. This explains the
flurry of acquisitions and equity sharing relationships with such fuel cell and electric drive
system firms as Ballard, Ecostar, Th!nk, and Excellsis.
But their strategy is misplaced. While the move isolates and protects the activity
from the hostile resource allocation mechanisms of the larger organization and aligns
incentives by matching the size of early potential revenue streams with the size of the
development activity, it also risks undermining the power of the established firm by
outsourcing critical competencies. The limited scope of the OEM value proposition -
delivering quality car and truck-based products to mainstream markets - precludes the
major U.S. automakers from comprehending the potential value of the sub-systems these
entities develop. The automakers believe that they are leveraging innovation and
outsourcing risk, but they are also outsourcing new architectural competencies. The risk
implicit to automakers is analogous to the power shift observed from hardware integrator
Compaq to semiconductor provider Intel in the early 90's and is best captured by the
famous "Intel Inside" marketing campaign - i.e. new architectural competencies emerge as
the dominant source of value in the established product. This vulnerability is further
magnified when the product in question is trending toward commoditization, differentiated
by price and brand only. The lesson for automakers is that the value of OEM competencies
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might erode over time in favor of those value chain members that possess the architectural
competencies demanded by a new and/or emerging value proposition that went undetected
on the "radar screen" of established firms. Ultimately, this portends a scenario where new
entrants displace U.S. automakers as the key players in the mobility sector. The second
critical impediment sheds some light on the reasons why auto and energy interests might
fail to "see" the faint warnings on the radar screen.
POLICY DEFECTION
The second crucial impediment to innovation via established domestic firms
stems from a rich industrial history of policy defection that began a half century ago with
resistance to the clean air demands of states such as California. Five decades later, the
modus operandi of the highly evolved political art form of delay and obfuscation have
served to cement an organizational culture averse to pursuing innovation derived from
alternative value propositions. This phenomenon is best explained by the "Shifting the
Burden" system archetype posited by Senge (1990). Figure 4 presents this archetype as a
figure eight. The top loop represents the short-term remedy to a problem faced by the
organization; the bottom loop represents the underlying "root-cause" solution. The figure
eight explains a wide range of behaviors where well-intended short-term fixes contribute
to worsening conditions in the long-term. This is because the tendency to go with the
"quick fix" also reduces any perceived need to find more fundamental solutions. Even
worse, over time a fundamental solution becomes increasingly difficult to both identify
and apply. First, once instigated, people come to rely on the symptomatic solution. This
is because the symptomatic solution begins a march down a path requiring still more
follow-on decisions that inevitably involve the commitment of expensive resources. This
commitment narrows design space and "locks in" downstream decisions to a
predetermined set of options. The further downstream into the process, the less likely
people are to challenge these assumptions, or to consider divergent solutions (Senge,
1990).
This structural shift, portrayed graphically in Figure 8, initiates "drift" in strategic
direction over time and comes at the cost of erosion in market share and competitive
position. Furthermore, once a firm embarks down this path it begins to cement and
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codify certain organizational structures for problem solving, communication channels,
and information filters that handicap the firm from pursuing fundamental solutions. This
drift also catalyzes a pattern of "eroding goals," whereby the gap between the firm's
goals and the current state of progress create two sets of pressures: to improve the
situation and to lower the firm's goals.
Lower goal for fuel
economy increase
Pressure to increase Strategic Drift
fuel economy
Fuel economy
increase actions
Summary Figure 8- Strategic Drift Effect of the "Shifting the Burden" Archetype
The shifting of the burden dynamic proves insidious in the subtle reinforcing
cycle that it fosters, placing increasing dependence on symptomatic solutions (Senge,
1990). In Figure 8 above, the effort by automakers to relieve regulatory pressure via
lobbying activities diverts attention and resources from the fundamental problem -
product waste and design inefficiencies. And so begins a gradual atrophy of the
organization's ability to identify, focus on, and pursue fundamental solutions to the fuel
economy and emissions problem. Consequently, pressures mount to direct resources to
further short-term problem solving. In the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
regulatory regime, automakers "game" fuel economy mandates, allowing them to hold to
the letter of the law at the cost of defecting from the intent of the law. For example,
domestic automakers actually added weight to certain medium-duty SUVs to deliberately
exceed the gross vehicle weight jurisdiction of CAFE truck mandates (Doyle, 2000).
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Doing so allowed them to sell an additional SUV and collect on the generous profit
margin for each medium-duty truck that successfully skirted the law.
THE BEST PRODUCT FALLACY
Automakers today face the classic prisoner's dilemma. Simply, the basis for
competition is such that they must continue to pursue high margin vehicle segments to
sustain profitability. This translates to reliance on luxury segments that exploit flatter price
elasticities in order to skim higher margins. It also translates to an unbalanced product
portfolio skewed toward low risk projects positioned to chase margins in established
segments. Alternatively, a balanced portfolio consists of a fair share of riskier projects
aimed at exploring, predicting, and meeting new consumer needs via testing of markets
with new product. A balanced portfolio enables firms to grow market share through
technology leadership and to capture first-mover advantages while erecting barriers to
imitation (Hax, 2001).
U.S. automakers instead find themselves trapped in a highly risk-averse business
model characterized by intense competition, thinning margins, and investor demands for
short-term returns to shareholder value that offer little financial tolerance for failure.
Recently, U.S. automakers have responded to sliding market share with a flood of fresh
product distinguished by a concerted revival of classic American design. Design, however,
at best conveys temporary advantage to the automaker for two critical reasons. First, the
strategy suffers from weak appropriability; competitors can readily imitate it and rapidly
bring it to market. A recent study by Merrill Lynch indicates that European and Japanese
producers will replace 100% and 91% of their volume with new models, respectively,
between now and 2005. U.S. automakers, on the other hand, will renew a mere 67% of
their product offerings (Fortune, Jan 21, 2002). Second, where complex manufacturing
relies upon a matrix organization, delivering superior product comes at the cost of
sustaining the functional proficiency of the firm. The symptom emerges in the form of
poorer product quality and performance. Consequently, the firm's share slips to design
imitators who enter with product of equal or better performance. The early 1990's
witnessed the phenomenal revival of Chrysler with industry leading product concepts such
as the "cab-forward" and Ram pick-up designs. But the firm ultimately succumbed to
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takeover by Daimler when a series of embarrassing performance-based product recalls and
competition from rivals mimicking their designs resulted in sagging sales and a vulnerable
financial situation. The lesson: best product strategy confers temporary advantage.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY STRATEGY
To achieve a system-wide and persisting competitive advantage, a firm must pursue
more appropriable strategies. This requires automakers to evolve industry structure around
an extended value proposition focused on delivering services rather than pushing product
(see Figure 9 below). Automakers can achieve this by forging deep customer relationships,
combined with a finer market segmentation that encompasses the broader value
proposition. The organization must consider its installed customer base a firm asset that,
like the firm's plant and equipment capital, returns a profit to shareholders. Doing so
enables firms to leverage its installed customer base to lower risk-based innovation barriers
and "lock-out" competitors who might attempt to imitate (Hax, 2001).
Traditional Products: Personal Mobility
" 2-door commuters
* 4-door sedans
" Hatchbacks
* Convertibles
" Blazers Tc
* Jeeps
* Light Duty Trucks
* Heavy Duty Trucks
" Sport Utility Vehicles
New Services:
" Commuting Solutions
e Military/Defense
* Fleet Solutions
" University Solutions
* Urban Solutions
* Disabled/Elderly
Solutions
" Hospital Solutions
" Youth Mobility
Solutions
Summary Figure 9 - Expanded Value Proposition: Personal Mobility Solutions
To successfully navigate the introduction of advanced powertrain technologies to
wary markets, automakers must concede that the product they are trying to sell will look
less like a traditional consumer durables market and more like a high technology market.
In other words, automakers should consider the traditional consumer market adoption
model (best characterized as "a car for every purpose and purse") in light of the
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Technology Adoption Life Cycle advanced by Geoffrey Moore (1991). To move beyond
the important but limited innovator segment - comprised of higher income, technology-
savvy environmentalists - to the lucrative mass market, requires delivery of a
"compelling application" to the non-technology-savvy early adopter segment. This
application would drive its acceptance over other, more established alternatives (for
example, the ability of a personal digital assistant to play MP3s). One might envision in-
vehicle fuel cell technologies, for example, enabling consumers to power their home or
workplace or to sell back power to local utilities. For military applications, one might
envision hybrid and fuel cell powered vehicles appealing to stealth and range
considerations.
The consumer durable/high-technology hybrid nature of automobiles means that a
hybrid approach to marketing is necessary in order to successfully move product up-
market from an initial niche to mainstream segments. Incumbent OEMs hold the key to
reaching the conservative Early Majority for several reasons. First, this group seeks out
references within its own group, creating a Catch-22 chicken-and-egg dilemma for
producers. Therefore, the way to reach the group is via a trust-based relationship focused
on service and support from proven technologies. To build this trust-based relationship,
OEMs should transform the value proposition from the product-centric consumer
durables model to a solutions-based consumer services model. For example, automakers
could, in concert with the value chain, manage system-of-systems activities that span the
spectrum necessary to deliver "total customer solutions." This includes leveraging
extensive OEM distribution and sales networks and core OEM process competencies in
vehicle integration with value chain members responsible for customer support. Most
importantly, OEM's should structure joint venture and/or acquisition strategies to pursue
development of potentially "discontinuous" product innovations and then leverage the
deep customer trust-base of the service strategy to work these higher risk innovations into
the market.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY POLICY
Despite the inherent difficulty for established firms, the barriers to entry in the
automotive market are significant. Consequently, industry and government interests must
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carefully consider innovation-based impediments in crafting a coherent strategy for
bringing advanced vehicle/fuel systems to market via established producers.
Achieving significant air quality improvements requires a multimedia approach to the
emissions issue. This means intervening to create economic incentives to enable desired
behaviors by affected stakeholders. A two front "war" is necessary. The first front involves
stimulating innovation in the most capable of industries and redistributing costs via programs
such as fee-bates to lower the entry price of cleaner technologies. The second front involves
regulatory interventions that catalyze technological innovation in the longer term to affect
more sustainable practices as well as the development of an infrastructure to perpetuate the
continued use of those practices.
Although the United States requires the use of state-of-the-art pollution control
devices, consistently low gas prices reduce the cost of vehicle ownership and thereby fail to
reflect the real cost, or externality cost, to society due to their increased usage. Therefore, little
incentive exists for consumers to modify behavior that is aligned with emissions and energy
dependence reduction goals. A good deal of the potential for vehicle emissions reductions
involves removing the fleet of "dirtier" vehicles from the road earlier. Unfortunately, the costs
imposed by the requirement for more fuel efficient vehicles has, in concert with factors such
as vehicle safety and crash worthiness, increased the real price of new cars, with consequences
that work counter to emissions goals. Higher purchase prices translate to lower turnover, as
consumers must amortize the higher cost over a longer period of ownership. Lower turnover
means the worse polluting vehicles stay on the road longer. To contend with this perverse
incentive, policies should work to increase the operating cost of the worst polluting vehicles,
including trucks, SUVs, and minivans, while simultaneously redistributing vehicle purchase
prices to reflect implicit externality costs. This can be achieved by levying an "emissions tax"
with annual vehicle registration and renewal. Authorities can then target these moneys, in
concert with point of sale fees, toward point of sale and registration-based rebates for
relatively cleaner vehicles.
In addition to policies that encourage diffusion of cleaner technologies, authorities
must incentivize behaviors beneficial to air quality in the longer term. Considerable air quality
gains can be achieved via the encouragement of higher-occupancy modes of transport. But
municipalities must provide transport mode choice to the public. This entails modification of
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zoning laws and permitting procedures to incentivize transit-oriented development. Moneys
collected from low-occupancy transit can then be redistributed to expand local metro and light
rail networks. Such efforts can go far toward mitigating the air quality impacts of urban
sprawl in the longer term.
Another key enabler for public intervention is education and awareness.
Contemporary acceptance of harmful motor vehicle emissions bears striking similarities with
early efforts to understand and eventually curb tobacco use. As evidence from the medical
community implicated tobacco products and exposure to second-hand smoke with increased
incidence of lung disease and cancer, organizations such as the American Lung Association
and the American Cancer Society unleashed a sustained blitz of media campaigns to alert and
educate consumers to the hazards of smoking. Grass roots lobbying efforts further succeeded
in enacting laws and local statutes prohibiting smoking in public places. The recent shift in
research focus to understanding the adverse health impacts of motor vehicle emissions may
portend similar developments. With mounting epidemiological evidence coming to the
public's attention, awareness campaigns that warn of the hazards of motor vehicle use may
emerge to educate consumers and stimulate demand for cleaner propulsion technologies.
In summary, policies should use a multimedia approach to both enabling innovative
capacity and to modify consumer and industry behavior over time. Authorities should
target interventions that co-optimize economic growth with tangential benefits to air
quality. Establishing a fee-bate policy regime that redistributes costs to reflect externality
impacts away from high emission vehicle use and toward the combination of low emissions
vehicles and infrastructure-building activities that support higher-occupancy modes can
achieve this. For example, federal support for expansion of light rail networks, combined
with tax incentives and development waivers that favor transit-oriented development,
works on two fronts. First, it can enable technological innovation that serves to "lock-in" a
more desired future by laying the mass-transit infrastructure network. Second, in so doing
the inherent architecture of the network encourages and shapes future behavioral patterns of
the consuming public in a direction beneficial to air quality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
"How stupid are we, the most technologically advanced culture in the
history of mankind, to live without an ozone layer??? We've got men,
we've got rockets, we've got Saran wrap. Fix it!!!" - Lewis Black,
Comedian
The intent of the research that follows is to adapt a model to simulate potential
adoption futures for a set of vehicles whose propulsion systems represent three distinct and
radical departures from today's dominant internal combustion engine (ICE)-based design.
This chapter will begin by presenting the problem scope and the main conceptual
frameworks for analysis. Part I consists of those chapters that attempt to determine the
extent of the opportunity for bringing cleaner advanced fuel/vehicle systems to market.
This section of the thesis leverages a system dynamics model for doing so. Chapter 2
provides a background of the reference market adoption model, Chapter 3 details the
revisions and extensions applied, and Chapter 4 describes the methodologies for selecting a
set of representative scenarios and presents the findings of these scenarios. I also critically
examine the results of this chapter to determine the degree to which the scenarios achieve
the objectives of sustainability.
Part II consists of those chapters dedicated to an assessment of the innovative
capacity and willingness of established domestic automakers to bring advanced fuel/vehicle
systems to market. Chapter 5 outlines the events and forces that created the complex and
intractable crisis that the problem of vehicle emissions represents today. The chapter also
attempts to outline the key industry forces, dynamics, and trends that will provide some of
the greatest challenges to stakeholders in their efforts to achieve meaningful policy
outcomes. To conclude, Chapter 6 invokes a set of relevant critical frameworks to
recommend a preferred strategy to industry and government stakeholders for achieving the
goal of sustainable mobility.
I consider this work a study of the dynamics of innovation, applied to the problem
of delivering technological solutions to the problem of automotive emissions to the U.S.
marketplace. Unlike many traditional studies of industry innovation in the high-tech arena,
this particular application involves unique complexities of much higher order for two
principal reasons. First, the solution need not depend solely on a technological fix. Rather,
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the provision of alternative transit modes, representing current state of the art, might
contribute a substantial portion of the requisite steps necessary for mitigating some of the
deleterious impacts of increased automobile usage. Thus, the emissions conundrum
presents a problem of individual consumer choice on the demand side of the equation. The
second distinguishing characteristic also falls under the demand side of the equation and
concerns individual consumer willingness to pay for advances that benefit the commons.
Later sections discuss this concept in further depth.
To summarize, this study attempts to identify, and offer strategies to control for, the
economic, cultural, and political risks associated with attempts to deliver innovations to
market that are uniquely characterized by (1) reliance on a purely technological fix, and (2)
an initial gulf between cost and the consumer's willingness-to-pay. I will also attempt to
suggest a policy framework that relies on high-leverage entry-points for public
interventions that can serve to narrow the gulf, seed demand, and grow the requisite
market. The analysis relies in large part on a systems dynamics-based model designed to
simulate the market adoption characteristics of a set of representative propulsion
technologies, should producers choose to make them available to American consumers
today. I rely on relevant scientific, economic, political, institutional, and technological
aspects of the problem to attempt to identify the key market adoption criteria, energy
consumption and emissions consequences, and to recommend product planning strategies
and policy intervention options for their mitigation. These are this work's ultimate
deliverables.
Of greatest concern to stakeholders is how the pollutant emissions of motor
vehicles contribute to the concentrations of ozone, particulate matter (PM), carbon
monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2 ), hydrocarbons (HC), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx).
To address these concerns, the following sections cite two key studies, the American
Cancer Society (ACS) study of over 150 U.S. cities (Pope et al 1995) and the Harvard Six
Cities Study (Dockery et al 1993), to characterize the nature, sources, and associated
impacts of criteria pollutants to human health. I distinguish between criteria pollutants and
secondary pollutants in that the former are known to have direct impacts to human health.
It is hoped that a multi-disciplinary approach to the complex problem of vehicle-related
emissions and energy dependence will yield greater insight to the dynamics involved. This
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insight will enable decision-makers to execute effective strategies and high-leverage market
interventions with the goal of improving public health and quality of life.
1.1 PROBLEM SCOPE
Many of the concerns the world faces today with regard to degraded air quality,
diminished quality of life, worsening public health, and global climate change find their
roots in the highly inefficient factors of production, land development patterns, and
transport methods spawned by the Industrial Revolution. Today, virtually two-thirds of all
criteria pollutants responsible for urban smog, ground-level ozone, and global warming
originate from motor vehicles. These include the poisonous exhaust gases of internal
combustion engine processes such as carbon monoxide (CO), a deadly poison, carbon
dioxide (CO2), a known greenhouse gas (GHG) contributor, and ozone precursors that
consist of oxides of sulfur (SO), nitrogen (NO), hydrocarbons (HC), and particulate
matter with radii of less than ten microns (PMIo).
Ozone (03), a key molecular compound for shielding the Earth's surface from
damaging ultraviolet radiation, exists naturally in the high atmosphere. At ground level,
however, ozone poses a dangerous threat to humans and wildlife. According to the
American Lung Association (ALA), "Ozone is capable of destroying organic matter,
including human lung and airway tissue. It essentially burns through cell walls, and it is
capable of doing this at... levels frequently encountered in many U.S. cities" (Doyle 2000).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) argues that repeated exposure to ozone
pollution for several months "may cause permanent structural damage to the lungs."
Furthermore, anyone who spends time outdoors during the summertime is at risk, because,
as EPA contends, "Even when inhaled at very low levels, ozone can trigger a variety of
health problems, including aggravated asthma, reduced lung capacity, and increased
susceptibility to respiratory illnesses like pneumonia and bronchitis" (Doyle, 2000).
Just within the United States the problem has reached epidemic proportions. Along
the belt of cities running along the Eastern seaboard region from Miami to Atlanta to
Baltimore to New York and Boston, many counties continue to fall short of the National
Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone. At least 100 million Americans reside
in areas that fail to meet EPA's eight-hour air quality standard for ozone. Contrary to early
-32-
III
industry arguments that the problems are of a localized nature, evidence clearly indicates
that the deleterious impacts of pollution favor no state, coast, or region of this or any other
country. During the summers of 1998 and 1999, ozone-limit violations occurred regularly
along the East Coast in cities such as Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New
York, North Carolina, Washington, DC, West Virginia, and Virginia. They also occurred
in Southern cities such as Atlanta, Austin, Dallas, and Houston, West Coast cities such as
Los Angeles and the majority of Southern California, and in Midwest cities such as
Cincinnati, Dayton, Milwaukee, and Toledo (Doyle, 2000).
1.1.1 EMISSIONS IMPACTS TO PUBLIC HEALTH
What are the costs of this invisible by-product of motor travel? Research Atlanta
estimates that about 1,000 additional persons each year will develop chronic bronchitis and
emphysema. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that the
number of U.S. asthmatics has nearly tripled, from 6.8 million in 1980 to 17.3 million in
1998. Currently, more than 5 million American children suffer from asthma. In 1999
alone, 200 children under the age of 15 died of this condition (Wang et al, 2000).
EPA estimates that mobile source emissions are responsible for 42% of the
production of 188 hazardous air pollutants (HAPS) that Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 requires the agency to monitor. EPA has labeled these pollutants a
"significant risk" to human health posing "the greatest potential threat to public health in
the largest number of urban areas." Many of these are either presumed or known human
carcinogens (Wang et al, 2000). Table 1.1 lists Cancer Unit Risk Estimate (CURE) values.
These data reflect the increased lifetime cancer risk caused by a continuous lifetime
exposure to a 1.0 microgram per cubic meter (ug/m3) increase in a given pollutant's
concentration.
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4 Air Toxics
Combined
Pollutant (mg mi) (m/mi)
EPA CARB
Vehicle Stage VOC Formaldehyde Acetaldehyde Butadiene Benzene CUREs CUREs
Feedstock 17.11 0.244 0.05 0.004 0.212 0.75 0.292
ICE Fuel 71.64 0.753 0.177 0.073 1.515 5.198 2.114
(CG) ehicle 207 1.000 0.384 0.496 5.947 24.348 9.097
otal 295.76 1.996 0.611 0.573 7.674 30.296 11.503
Feedstock 9.01 0.128 0.026 0.002 0.111 0.395 0.154
HEV Fuel 37.62 0.431 0.098 0.038 0.585 2.559 0.905
(FRFG2) Vehicle 148.2 1.246 0.367 0.482 3.559 21.881 6.678
Total 194.82 1.805 0.491 0.522 4.256 24.834 7.737
Feedstock 27.61 0.653 0.072 0.046 0.124 2,720 0.536
EV Fuel 5.79 0.061 0.056 0.002 0.092 0.275 0.123
(US Mix) Vehicle 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total 33.4 0.713 0.128 0.048 0.217 2.995 0.659
Source: Wang et al (2000)
Table 1.1 - EPA and CARB Cancer Unit Risk Estimate (CURE) values for ICE, HEV,
and EV-based platforms
1.1.2 IDENTIFICATION OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
In order to achieve the goal of improving public health and quality of life it is
necessary to aggressively target those pollutants that provide the highest leverage for doing so.
Of the five criteria pollutants cited earlier, PM10 and the ozone precursors pose the greatest
threat to human health. The most consistent findings of the ACS and Six Cities Study suggest
that particulates with a diameter of less than 10 microns (PMio) are most harmful to human
health, resulting in elevated hospital and emergency room admissions for respiratory problems
related to chronic bronchitis, asthma attacks, and restricted activity days. These studies
demonstrate evidence that for each I0-ug/m3 increase in PM1 o levels, an increase in daily
mortality on the order of 1% is expected. An independent reassessment of these results by the
Health Effects Institute's (HEI) US-wide National Morbidity, Mortality and Air Pollution
Study (NMMAPS) confirmed a 0.5% increase in mortality. These data are consistent with a
similar European APHEA study publicizing a 0.6% increase. Most susceptible are those with
pre-existing cardiovascular conditions, namely the elderly. Although unconfirmed, recent
evidence implicates PM10 as a contributor to the premature death of infants. These studies
also implicate long-term exposure to PM10 to relative increases in chronic mortality caused by
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respiratory or cardiovascular diseases. If confirmed to hold true, health impacts on the U.S.
population could be several orders of magnitude more severe than suggested by the acute
mortality figures illustrated here. The distribution of these health costs also raises significant
questions regarding environmental justice. The NMMAP Study also found that the less
educated segments of the population suffered disproportionately higher incidence of
cardiopulmonary disease and lung cancer (HEI, 2001).
More recently, scientists suspect that fine particulates of less than 2.5 microns
diameter (PM2.5 ) may also impact human mortality. The ACS and Six Cities Study found that
long-term average mortality rates were 17% to 26% higher among individuals living in
communities with higher levels of fine particulates, PM2 .5 , even after accounting for the effects
of risk factors such as cigarette smoking and medical history. Public health authorities have
used these data to quantify the shortening of the average American and European lifespan
associated with air pollution (US EPA 1999). Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide a basis for
monetizing the avoidance of adverse health incidence. The result suggests that benefits on the
order of a hundred billion dollars are possible. Although these data are sensitive to the value
ascribed to adverse health impacts, the evidence overwhelmingly supports interventions
necessary to achieve such gains.
Value of Selected Health Effects in the U.S.
Per person Annual Mortality $4,800,000
Per person Annual Chronic Bronchitis $260,000
Work-loss Day $83
Minor Restricted Activity Day $38
(Source: Harvard Six Cities Study)
Table 1.2 - Value of Selected Health Effects in the U.S
Cost Range
Accident Costs not paid by Responsible Party 13 49
Congestion Costs 34 146
Mortality & Morbidity from Mobile-source Emissions 19 284
Other Externality Costs 34 421
Totall Externality Costs (Billions of Dollars) 100 900
(Source: Delucchi, 1997)
Table 1.3 - Range of potential externality costs imposed by motor vehicle travel
Although its impact on mortality is less clear than PM1 o, studies have linked ozone
(itself a secondary pollutant), with decreased respiratory function and increased eye irritation,
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cough, asthma, and respiratory-related hospital and emergency room visits. NOR, a
greenhouse gas, and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) such as HC, react in the
atmosphere to form ground-level ozone. VOCs are typically less costly to control, but ozone
formation is NO sensitive. Furthermore, these pollutants affect the formation of secondary
PM2.5 (formed in the atmosphere via chemical transformations rather than directly as a product
of combustion). Since roughly half of PM2 .5 is secondary in nature, policies should focus on
the mitigation of NO, emissions to leverage reduction in both ozone and secondary PM2 .5
formation.
The transportation sector is the single greatest source of particulates and the ozone
precursors NO and HC. Within this sector, primary contributors include diesel tractor-
trailers, heavy-duty diesel trucks, and private autos. Outside this sector, point sources such as
electricity generation also contribute heavily to NOx formation; area sources involved in the
production, storage, and use of solvents and fuels also contribute significantly to HC
emissions.
Several global trends portend to worsen an already critical state of affairs. China,
India, and Latin America represent massive potential markets for the big automakers. With
the rising tide of global wealth, whole-scale adoption of current ICE-based technologies
would suffocate the planet's carrying capacity, i.e. it's ability to cleanse our environment
through the natural processes of surrounding ecosystems. Even worse, Americans have
grown fond of larger, more polluting truck-based platforms such as SUVs, Minivans, and
trucks. Table 1.4 illustrates that as of two years ago, trucks actually surpassed cars in annual
market share of fleet sales.
1975 1988 1996 2000
New Cars 80% 70% 60% 50%
New Light Trucks 20% 30% 40% 50%
(Source: Delucchi, 1997)
Table 1.4 - Market Share of New Cars and Light-duty Trucks by year
This trend is characteristic of a nation-wide shift from higher to lower efficiency
modes of transport. Poor coordination of land use development and infrastructure planning at
the metropolitan level as well as the exodus of city populations to suburbia, have contributed
to the unabated rise in practices that perpetuate and exacerbate air pollution mitigation efforts.
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In many western cities where the ascendance of the automobile predated land development
patterns, for example, rail transit simply doesn't exist. Thus, policy interventions should target
modes, behavior, and supporting infrastructure to affect desired air quality outcomes.
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1.2.1 SYSTEMS THINKING
"When a [great] problem arises... the safest policy is to delay dealing with
it rather than trying to do away with it, because those who try to do away
with it almost always increase its strength and accelerate the harm which
they feared might come from it." (Machiavelli 1979)
Machiavelli grasped the erosive nature of perverse incentives; that is, behavior
spawned by misaligned incentives that results in outcomes counter to that which the
intervener sought upon the outset. Preventing this behavior demands a systems-based
approach to complex problems. Throughout this analysis, I will approach the emissions
conundrum from a "systems" perspective. That is, not as an expert in any one field such as
economics, history, industrial science or engineering, but from a multi-disciplinary context
that brings the tools of all of these disciplines to bear on the problem. True, for the purpose
of this thesis I have limited my scope to examining the technology-based solution pathways
for vehicle emissions; I have already argued that other non-technology options exist.
Therefore, my recommendations will remind the reader that the options suggested here,
while hopefully salient, must be accompanied by complementary and coordinated actions
encompassing a spectrum of pathways on behalf of the set of key stakeholders.
The beauty of systems thinking is that it recognizes the importance of forces that lie
beyond the control, and often reason, of man. Since youth, man is trained to break apart
very complex problems and analyze the manageable chunks (Senge, 1990). History has
witnessed some of mankind's greatest achievements from this simple, engineering-based
approach: construction of the Panama Canal, Victory over the Axis Powers in WWII, and
the Apollo Space Program. Unfortunately, the approach has also yielded undesired and
often terrible results: Thalidomide, Nuclear Proliferation, Global Warming, and a host of
others. Some persistent problems such as poverty continue to elude solution.
We often witness these undesired effects when our endeavors necessitate our
involvement with what Sussman (2001) refers to as very Complex, Large-Scale, Integrated
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Open Systems, or CLIOS for short. Complex in that the problem involves multiple
stakeholders with divergent interests, multiple levels of decomposition, and first- and
second-order, nonlinear behavior that defies the limits of human prediction or
comprehension. Large-Scale in that the problem is characterized by multiple boundary
layers representing interfaces with human, ecological, or technical systems of varying size
and scope, from the macro to the micro. Integrated in that that the problem is characterized
by multiple points of connectivity, i.e. nothing acts in isolation but rather "everything is
connected to everything else" (Sterman, 2000). Most importantly, the problem is an open
system. It defies bounding and is subject to external manipulation and influence by forces
both within and beyond the control of man. What man often fails to appreciate is that
problem solving, by definition, involves intervention in open systems. The intervention is
equivalent to a force that, like dipping a toe into a pool of water, initiates waves, or a series
of processes that may, or may not be, visible, predictable, or quantifiable by human reason.
Worse still, these problems involve delays that often obscure the causal links and hide the
true sources of the adverse behavior witnessed. Thus, continued intervention often only
exacerbates the problem, targeting only the symptoms of a deeper illness.
The problems posed by the pollutant emissions of motor vehicles qualify under this
definition. Systems dynamics provides a tool for learning in such complex systems
(Sterman 2000). I invoke the method throughout this work to facilitate a better
understanding of the sources of, and behaviors witnessed by, the complex interplay of the
multiple and diverse forces and dependencies involved in the emissions problem. The
method enables the construction of a cohesive picture, or "shared vision" amongst
stakeholders with divergent interests. In this sense, the tool provides value by bridging the
disparate mental models, problem-solving methodologies, and channels of communication
that impede the cooperation necessary to achieve meaningful progress. By doing so, I hope
to facilitate high-leverage interventions (i.e. interventions that affect the desired "systemic"
behavior rather than isolated areas) that avoid the pitfalls of policy resistance to achieve
desired ends.
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1.2.2 THE FALLACY OF ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
Under a hypothetical business accounting regime, we might expect businesses to
debit deductions from the natural stock of capital and to factor in the "costs" of adverse
product emissions. Under such a regime, we would expect producers to include these
factors as part of the "cost of production" and to price passenger vehicles, and the energy
that fuels them, accordingly. Thus, goods and services would be priced according to their
"true" cost. That is, the cost that the individual consumer pays for the factors of production
required to produce, distribute, and sell the vehicle and it's fuel in addition to the cost
borne by society as measured by the adverse ecological and health impacts actualized by
the good's production, operation, and disposal.
But lo, this is not the case. Rather, it is an implicit rule in business that what you do
not measure does not matter. Our current business paradigm operates on tenets long-held
since the inception of the Industrial Revolution that natural capital exists as a right to all
entities that might endeavor to "improve" upon it for the purpose of man and that such
stock is essentially inexhaustible in supply. From the perspective of the late Eighteenth
Century, such an assertion might well have seemed perfectly plausible. But the
unavoidably exponential pattern of growth in the population and wealth of the world's
human inhabitants over the past two centuries has served to undermine this fallacious
assumption. Nevertheless, long-standing accounting practices continue to treat natural
resources as non-existent until extracted for productive purposes (Hawken, 1993).
Now, more than ever, the ascendance and prosperity of man on this planet has
initiated not gradual degradation of precious natural resources, but rather the disintegration
of every natural system on Earth. These systems sustain life and provide the factors
necessary for the growth and sustenance of whole economies. Most disturbingly, they do
so via mechanisms as complex and arcane to human understanding as the weather. Thus is
the moral imperative for acting now to stem what might already be irreversible forces at
play.
1.2.3 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
Assuming stakeholders wish to preserve the current consumer desire for
personal modes of transport, and presuming industry can "close the loop" on the emissions
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problem via a technological fix, the customer may prove unwilling to pay for the fix. I do
not attempt to argue that previous studies of innovation in industries such as personal
computing lacked these risk characteristics. Rather, I assert that this particular problem
provides a unique challenge to firms and society in that it invokes the tragedy ofthe
commons; that is, even in the presence of a technological fix, the individual consumer may
prove unwilling to pay for the initial high costs associated with providing benefits
appropriated more by society than by the individual. To better explain this phenomenon, I
provide the simplified situation outlined by Table 1.5 below. Suppose market research
provides the following data on two features under consideration for inclusion in their next
generation vehicle platform.
Producer Consumer
Innovation Account Value Account Value
Cup Holder Price $20 Individual $20
WTP $20 1-1 $18
Cost $5 Network $2
Profit $15 Communal $1
Internalized $0
Total Value $21
Tot Consumer WTP $20
Cleaner Engine Account Value Account Value
Price $4,000 Individual $2,000
WTP $2,000 1-1 $1,800
Cost $3,800 Network $200
Profit ($1,800)Communal $2,000
Internalized $0
Total Value $4,000
[ot Consumer WTP F$2,000
Table 1.5 - Simplified cost accounting for producer-to-consumer transactions
The transaction involves no intermediaries between the producer and the consumer.
The producer has a cup holder design that it believes it can sell to the consumer at the price
point of $20. Since the cup only cost the firm $5 to make, the company pockets $15 in
profit. The firm arrived at a price of $20 by a close examination of how the consumer
imputes a value to the added benefit delivered by the cup holder. In the "Consumer"
column of Table 1.5, I segment the consumer's decision between (1) the value internalized
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from benefits derived by the individual consumer, and (2) the value internalized from
benefits derived by the community. Note that two values comprise the individual's direct
benefit from the invention. One-to-One ("1-1") benefits represent the monetary worth of
the feature's benefit derived via the consumer's direct interaction with that feature. In the
cup holder example, the consumer directly benefits from the convenience of having a place
to set his cup down while driving. Network benefits consist of the set of benefits the
consumer gains from the interaction of others with the feature the consumer has paid for.
Again, in the cup holder example, the consumer ascribes a value of $2 from the
convenience that say, his passenger gains from having a convenient place to set his cup so
that it doesn't spill and damage the car's interior.
Also note that the cup holder has a "communal" value equal to $1. This is an
arbitrary value that represents the benefits realized by society. In this particular example,
the cup holder provides a convenient holding location for an empty soda can so that the
driver can locate a receptacle for disposal rather than ejecting the item from the car. This is
a benefit to society because it indirectly prevents litter that imposes a cost on society in that
its presence reduces quality of life, lowers real estate values, and requires costly public
intervention to clean up. Yet in Table 1.5, observe that the consumer does not impute this
value in their willingness to pay calculus. Perhaps the consumer only drives cross-country
and therefore does not internalize the costs his litter imparts on other communities.
Nevertheless, the sum of the value to all parties is $21, but the customer is only willing to
pay $20 because the consumer internalizes only 20 of the total $21 of value. This is of
little concern from the producer's point of view. Since the cost to society did not represent
a factor in the cup holder's production, the cost is not reflected in the price of the feature.
On individual value alone, the cup holder has a profitable business case.
Not so for the cleaner engine feature. The sum of the internalized values derived
from individual and communal considerations equals the consumer's total willingness to
pay (WTP) for that product. Observe that in the case of the cup holder, the firm turns a
substantial profit because the consumer's total WTP is much greater than the cost to
produce and deliver the attribute to the customer. In the cleaner engine example, however,
although individual and communal values sum to a total value that could substantiate a
profitable business case, the consumer only internalizes the benefits derived to the
-41 -
individual. Therefore, individual consumers will pay only $2000 for the benefit, an amount
that falls far short of a profitable business case for the producer. Despite the fact that the
act of making the product imparts a cost on society, this value is absent from the cost
calculus. Furthermore, the act of operating the product imparts additional costs on society,
but the cost is not represented in the consumer's value calculus.
But why should action rest on a moral imperative rather than a market imperative?
The answer lies with the consumer. Because price rarely imputes the real, or the collective,
cost of goods and services, the consumer behaves just as ignorantly as price. That is, why
should a single consumer be expected to bear the cost of cleaner products if his share of the
benefits is a fraction of the price paid. This is the classic "tragedy of the commons"
dilemma. Furthermore, there often exists significant disparity in the distribution of costs
and benefits across the pool of consumers. For example, why should consumers in the
Midwest pay a premium on a product for benefits disproportionately distributed to
consumers in Northeastern states, as is the case with the U.S. Acid Rain Program? To
contend with this cost/benefit asymmetry, the program employs an emissions trading
scheme that establishes an artificial market for the trading of emissions credits. The
success of emissions trading is attributed to the "enabling myth" that location doesn't exist
as far as emissions credits are concerned (Ellerman, 2002). I will discuss the potential for
such a regulatory scheme in later sections.
The problem is rich with irony after irony. First, because price has historically
ignored "true" costs, customers have come to develop certain expectations with regard to
vehicle and fuel prices. Thus, to transition to a regime that includes such costs risks a
negative reaction by both producers and consumers. Producers are quick to highlight
market studies that underscore the reluctance of consumers to pay for the costs such
improvements would entail. Consequently, any increase in price for these attributes risks
significant revenue streams on already thin margins. All else equal, an increase in price
results in reduced demand and reduced revenues.
But the premium is greatest only during the initial introduction of the technology,
where economies of scale haven't yet coalesced. As manufacturers reach higher levels of
production, scale economies reduce the price penalty, thereby making the technology
accessible to broader market segments. But these improvements require significant up-
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front investments in plant and equipment. To amortize these fixed costs, firms must sell in
considerable volume. The paradox is such: if mainstream customers are the key to turning
a profit, how can a business attain the scale necessary to reach a market-clearing price point
for the mass market if mainstream consumers cannot afford the pre-scale cost of the
technology?
1.2.4 LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS (LCA)
The data presented in the following chapters reflect metrics that consider the entire
product life cycle. That is, the factors required to extract, transport, process, manufacture,
distribute, operate, and dispose and/or recycle the product. The vast majority of data, from
which the conclusions of this study are drawn, are based on life cycle-based assessments
performed via Argonne National Lab's (ANL) GREET Model (Wang et al, 2001). These
results also draw from life cycle figures presented by Princeton's Center for Environmental
and Energy Studies (CEES) (Ogden, 2002) and MIT's Energy Lab (Weiss et al, 2000). In
all cases, the sources determine lifetime vehicle emissions based on upstream process such
as fuel extraction, storage, and distribution as well as downstream processes such as vehicle
refueling and combustion from operation. The figures also consider the factors of
production required to manufacture, deliver, and dispose and/or recycle the vehicle product.
Table 1.6 provides a summary of the fuel and propulsion technology packages considered
as well as the processes accounted for in the data provided. Tables 1.7 through 1.10 list
cost per mile data for each of the scenarios considered with respect to the five criteria
pollutants and greenhouse gases.
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Fuel/Vehicle Technology Process Analyzed
Conventional Gasoline (CG) Upstream
Federal RFG Phase 2 (FRFG2) Process fuel combustion
Direct Hydrogen, decentralized Natural Gas Fuel Production
Grid-independent HEV (HEV) Fuel transportation, storage, & distribution
PEM Fuel Cell-powered electric vehicle (FCEV) Downstream
Battery-powered electric vehicle (EV) Vehicle refueling
Vehicular fuel combustion
Vehicular fuel evaporation
Brake and tire wear
Source: Wang et al (2001)
Table 1.6 - Model Basis for Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) of fuel/vehicle technologies
Emissions of Baseline Gasoline ICE Vehicle
Emissions (glmile) Upstream Operation Total LCA Cost[cents]/mile
VOC 0.10 0.21 0.30 0.11
CO 0.14 5.52 5.66 1.59
NOx 0.20 0.28 0.47 0.36
PM10 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
SOx 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.06
Total Pollutant 0.57 6.08 6.65 2.15
C02-equivalent 113 401 514 5.14
Table 1.7 - Baseline Life-Cycle Gasoline ICE Vehicle Emissions
Emissions of Gasoline HE(ICE) Vehicle
Emissions (g/mile) Upstream Operation Total LCA Cost[cents]/mile
VOC 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.07
CO 0.09 3.53 3.62 1.02
NOx 0.11 0.28 0.39 0.30
PM10 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02
SOx 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.02
Total Pollutant 0.32 3.99 4.31 1.43
C02-equivalent 64 216 280 2.80
Table 1.8 - Life-Cycle Gasoline HEV (ICE) Emissions
Emissions of Direct Hydrogen FCEV Vehicle
Emissions (g/mile) Upstream Operation Total LCA Cost[cents]lmile
VOC 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
CO 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.03
NOx 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.11
PM10 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01
SOx 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Total Pollutant 0.29 0.02 0.31 0.16
C02-equivalent 171 J 0 J 171 1.71
Table 1.9 - Life-Cycle Direct-Hydrogen FCEV Emissions
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Emissions of Grid Dependent Battery Electric (EV) Vehicle
Emissions (g/mile) Upstream Operation Total LCA Cost[cents]/mile
VOC 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01
CO 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.03
NOx 0.78 0.00 0.78 0.60
PM10 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.03
SOx 0.93 0.00 0.93 0.34
Total Pollutant 1.91 0.02 1.93 1.01
C02-equivalent 384 0 384 3.84
Table 1.10- Life-Cycle BEV Emissions
1.2.5 INNOVATIVE CAPACITY
Innovative capacity at the firm, or industry level, refers to the propensity of
organizations to innovate. The literature also speaks of innovative capacity in terms of
innovative capability and adsorptive capacity. Regardless of the moniker, the science
recognizes that firms, industries, and entire nations exhibit disparate levels of invention as
measured by such criteria as patent filings.
There is little question that auto and energy interests have the capacity to innovate.
There is, however, the considerable question of whether or not they possess the capacity to
innovate down alternative propulsion pathways. The willingness of firms to do so depends
not entirely on the presentation or emergence of a profitable business case, but also on the
cultural and business systems required to stimulate, reward, and realize such innovations.
Chapter 2 delves into an examination of this complex and qualitative part of the adoption
dynamic.
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PART I: ASSESSING THE OPPORTUNITY
2 SYSTEM DYNAMICS DEVELOPMENT OF THE REFERENCE MODEL
Central to my research is the extension of a market adoption model based on
System Dynamics tools to examine potential pathways for the introduction of advanced
automotive powertrain technologies to the mass market. To do so, I have borrowed an
adoption model, heretofore referred to as the reference model, constructed by an LFM
student based on technologies estimated to be available to consumers in the year 2020.
Many of the conclusions drawn in this thesis are derived or verified from the application of
this model, specifically tailored for the purpose of addressing the problem of achieving the
goals of a sustainable automotive sector as highlighted in Chapter 1. In order to do so, the
author adopted an existing model as a reference framework. From this reference model,
the author set out to revise its structure in a number of aspects to appropriately address the
subject of the study.
Prior to any discussion of these modifications, it is first necessary to outline the
structural approach of the reference model. For a more explicit description or for detailed
documentation of this model, I refer the reader to Metcalf 2001. A brief overview should
suffice here.
2.1 STRUCTURE
Infrastructure MarketShare Learning Curve
Effects
Awareness Demand Y +
+Technology
Availability + Demand Capital Cost
+ 4+
Consumer Purchase
Value Price
Environmental Operating Cost Performance
Value Savings Value
Range Other Sources
Value of Value
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Figure 2.1- Overview of the System Dynamics structure of the reference model
Ii
The reference model consisted of 95 sketch variables, 68 of these representing
variables containing distinct values for each of the propulsion regimes considered. The
model comprised 298 elements in total, with 195 endogenous relationships and 103
exogenous parameters. The left-hand side of the diagram illustrates the key feedback
mechanisms: infrastructure [coverage], [technology] availability, and [consumer]
awareness.
Infrastructure Coverage represents the complementary service infrastructure
required to support a given propulsion system. Support includes not only the provision of
fuel service stations in adequate numbers to satisfy the convenience demands of customers,
but also the establishment of a trained community of service technicians, specifically
educated to service, repair, and maintain the fleet of vehicles on the road. Thus,
Infrastructure Coverage encompasses a broad spectrum of activities beyond the mere
construction or retrofit of the nation's gas stations. Rather, it could include the creation of
new, or adaptation of existing, value networks required to explore, extract, store, and
distribute the appropriate fuel or energy carrier to the vehicle.
For the relatively less radical propulsion architectures such as the gasoline-powered
HEV, the fueling infrastructure side of the equation is negligible when compared to the
need to establish the necessary certification regimen to license and train a cadre of service
technicians to support the newer technologies of the advanced powertrain. On the other
hand, the more radical propulsion architectures such as the FCEV, using direct hydrogen as
its energy cater, could entail significant capital investment in a fueling infrastructure in
addition to the licensing and certification of a service community. Table 2.1 offers a
comparison of the level of investment required for a representative set of potential
propulsion architectures.
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Fueling/Energy Carrier Service & Repair
Propulsion Architecture Infrastructure Infrastructure
Gasoline ICE Negligible Negligible
Gasoline HEV Negligible Moderate
Diesel HEV Moderate Moderate
Gasoline OBR FCEV Negligible Very High
Methanol OBR FCEV High Very High
Direct Hydrogen FCEV Very High Very High
BEV Moderate-High High
Table 2.1 - Relative investment hurdles for representative propulsion architectures
Technology Availability refers to the extent to which automakers make advanced
propulsion technologies available to the consumer market. In order to manage risk,
manufacturers will often introduce technologies on a limited basis to tease out the market
and attempt to gain valuable insights regarding product performance in the operating
environment. As a result, automakers may opt to deliberately undersupply the market.
Executing such a strategy also serves to stimulate demand for the product, prop up price,
and limit exposure to excess capacity or oversupply. Thus, consumers may have a
legitimate demand for the technology, but their access to the product is restricted by the
supply of product available for consumption.
Finally, Consumer Awareness plays a crucial role in technology adoption for
reasons that are self-explanatory. Consumers may be unaware of the existence of
alternative technologies or the attendant benefits they potentially offer over established
products. Without adequate marketing and advertising campaigns, consumers may remain
uneducated and unaware of these benefits despite the level of infrastructure coverage or
product availability on the market. Media coverage can also serve to seed public
awareness, knowledge, and interest in the costs and benefits of alternative technologies so
that consumers can factor these considerations in the purchase decision.
Infrastructure Coverage, Technology Availability, and Consumer Awareness
represent the characteristics of a given technology exogenous to the consumer's purchase
decision. These are combined with a Probability ofPurchase derived from product
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attributes endogenous to the consumer's purchase decision. Together, they yield aggregate
demand for a particular technology. They are multiplicative. Thus, demand is predicated
on some level of existence for each of these considerations. This makes sense implicitly.
If no one is aware of the technology, if no infrastructure exists to support the technology,
and if the automakers fail to make any technologies available to consumers, then it is
reasonable to assume that Demand would be non-existent in such cases. There is, however,
a potential fault in this logic, which the author intends to broche when discussing the
revised model.
Each of these four dynamics contributes both reinforcing (as represented by the
snowball in Figure 2.1) and balancing (as represented by the scale) behaviors in the system
due to the interrelated effects of Technology Demand on Technology Market Share. The
relationship of these effects to technology Demand resembles the "chicken-and-egg"
dilemma. In other words, a precondition for the existence of one is the existence of the
other; which comes first is uncertain. In the absence of the three exogenous conditions,
market demand fails to materialize. Yet, in the absence of demand the key players have
little incentive to invest scarce resources in supporting infrastructure, product availability,
or consumer awareness.
It is useful for the author to point out a key observation for discussion in later
chapters. The mass-market model is predicated on the assumption that automaker and
energy concerns will be willing to supply new technologies to the market and that
consumers in the mainstream market will be willing to adopt them. Thus, automakers
perceive that they must ensure new products either approach or exceed the performance
characteristics of existing products. Secondly, suppliers must also be sufficiently
motivated by the potential for growing revenue streams where large, risk-laden capital
commitments are required.
In the reference model, Technology Demand for each propulsion type increases the
Total Demand for all propulsion options, which is then used to normalize Technology
Market Share. Competition between propulsion technologies for Technology Market Share
creates a balancing feedback. Conversely, as technologies penetrate the market to capture
increasing share, costs decline with scale, thereby enabling a more attractive Purchase Price
that stimulates increased demand. This reinforcing behavior results from the "learning
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curve" effect typically exhibited by new technologies as the innovation evolves. The
reference model provides the means to adjust the relative strength of these feedback
mechanisms.
Again referring to Figure 2.1, we see that the demand for a given propulsion
architecture is derived from the calculation of cumulative Consumer Value from the sum
value of a set of criteria product attributes. These attributes include Operating Cost,
Performance, Range, Environmental Cost, and Other Sources of Value. In order to grasp
the structural differences between the reference and revision models, a general discussion
of each attribute follows. Again, for a more detailed treatment, I refer the reader to Metcalf
2001.
2.1.1 TREATMENT OF ATTRIBUTE VALUE IN STIMULATING CONSUMER DEMAND
Environmental Value
The reference model determines cost per mile of air pollution and greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and then translates these into annual costs based on the assumption of
12,000 vehicle miles traveled per year and a vehicle lifetime equal to 14 years. The author
chose not to apply a discount rate to these figures, arguing instead that the absence of a
discount rate is justified in order to appropriately account for costs that reflect
environmental and societal externalities. I concur with the author's assessment here. The
reference model thus calculates the total cost of environmental damage created by a
particular propulsion technology and then converts the cost to a relative value by
comparison to incumbent technology, i.e. the ICE.
Notably, Metcalf translates the full cost of environmental damage to a cost realized
at the point of sale by the customer via an Internalization Fraction. This fraction represents
the degree to which the consumer at the point of sale internalizes costs stemming from
environmental damage. Metcalf includes this parameter as a scenario variable.
To summarize, the reference model computes a monetary value in terms of
$/vehicle for environmental benefit associated with the environmental damage cost
differential of cleaner propulsion technologies and incumbent, ICE-based systems. This
value is returned, along with the set of additional attributes discussed, to calculate product
demand for a given technology. This is expressed as
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Equation 2.1 - Environmental Value
EnvValue =finernai * (ED CICE - EDC1 )
where
EnvValuei = Environmental Value internalized (Figure 3-1), $/vehicle
EDCi = Environmental Damage Cost, $/vehicle
finternai = Internalization Fraction, dmnl
Operating Cost Savings Value
The reference model seeks to capture the value ascribed to the consumer from the
cost differential of owning and operating a vehicle relative to the incumbent ICE product.
This is accomplished by calculating the annual operating cost as a function of both variable
and fixed costs. Variable costs are those dependent on fuel cost and fuel economy. Fixed
costs are those associated with insuring, maintaining, and servicing the vehicle.
Metcalf then adjusts the annual cash flows by a discount rate of 30% to reflect the
opportunity cost (annual rate of return) considered by consumers at the time of purchase.
Metcalf rightfully notes that consumers typically associate much higher discount rates than
what might be considered reasonable when making purchase decisions. The discount rate,
however, is a scenario variable and can be adjusted to reflect greater consumer
internalization, i.e. sensitivity, to operating costs. Metcalf uses a table function to convert
the user specified discount rate into an appropriate multiplier that is applied to annual cash
flows over the 14-year vehicle life. Again, refer to Metcalf 2001 for the specifics of this
multiplier.
Again, Metcalf translates the internalized cost of operating the vehicle into a
relative monetized value via the cost differential between a given propulsion technology
and the ICE operating cost as expressed by Equation 2.2.
Equation 2.2 - Operating Cost Savings
OpSavingsi = OpCostICE - OpCosti
where
OpSavings1 = Operating Cost Savings (Figure 2.1), $/vehicle
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Range Value
In translating vehicle range to consumer value, Metcalf rightly cites survey data and
analysis by Train (2000), suggesting that consumers place a strong negative value on range
below a certain expected threshold. Furthermore, the negative impact of ranges short of
this threshold is far greater than the positive value associated with a corresponding increase
in range. Metcalf dubs this phenomenon a "convenience threshold," representing the
consumer's expectation regarding the frequency with which he/she must fill the tank. An
s-shaped table function translates this behavior to a monetized value. The model employs a
number of such s-curves rather than "if ... then" constructs to capture similar consumer
behavior or technical system patterns.
Performance Value
The reference model estimates performance value on a relative scale, where ICE
performance is unity. Performance captures a number of both quantitatively measurable
vehicle characteristics such as acceleration, horsepower, top speed and more qualitative
ones such as handling, towing capacity, or hill-climbing ability. Metcalf again employs an
s-curve function table to translate relative performance to a monetized value. The s-curve
function simulates the diminishing marginal returns of increased performance and the
substantial penalty incurred for falling short of the benchmark ICE. In this model, relative
performance for the set of advanced powertrains is a static scenario variable, determined by
the user at the outset. It remains fixed for the life of the run and despite the subjective
nature of the curve, it maintains consistency of relative performance differentials across the
set of technologies. The user can, however, adjust this function to reflect a new set of
scenarios.
Other Sources of Value
Metcalf uses this attribute for two purposes. First, in her words "Other Sources of
Value represents an additional parameter to capture value that is not propulsion-specific
and/or value that is not represented in other attributes." Secondly, it is used as "filler" to
ensure that the consumer's Willingness to Pay (equal to the sum total of all attributes)
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exceeds the purchase price of the vehicle to yield positive value. The difference between
Willingness to Pay and Purchase Price thus equates a positive value to the consumer that
can be compared in relative terms amongst the set of technologies. The default value to
achieve this is $17000/vehicle for all technologies. This is an arbitrary and subjective
figure. It attempts to incorporate the value of all other product features that operating
savings, performance, range, or environmental impact attributes fail to capture.
2.1.2 DEMAND
The reference model sums the five individual values derived from the five
endogenous product attributes discussed in 2.1.1 to establish the consumer's Willingness
to Pay. Subtracting the actual Purchase Cost of the vehicle from this quantity yields the
relative value to the consumer as illustrated in Equations 2.3 and 2.4 below.
Equation 2.3 - Willingness to Pay
WTPi = Env Valuei + OpSavingsi + Range Value1 + PerValuei + OtherValue,
where
WTPi = Willingness to Pay for technology i, $/vehicle
EnvValue1  = Environmental Value of technology i, $/vehicle
OpSavingsi = Operating Cost Savings of technology i, $/vehicle
RangeValue1 = Range Value of technology i, $/vehicle
PerfValuei = Performance Value of technology i, $/vehicle
OtherValuei = Other Sources of Value of technology i, $/vehicle
Equation 2.4 - Consumer Value
Value1 = WTPi - Pi
where
Valuei = Consumer Value of technology i, $/vehicle
WTP1  = Willingness to Pay for technology i, $/vehicle
Pi (t) = Purchase Price of technology i, $/vehicle
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Metcalf then translates consumer value into a probability of purchase via the use
of a normalizing constant. The author uses this constant to convert Consumer Value to a
dimensionless form of Consumer Utility appropriate for exponentiation to yield
Probability of Purchase. To do this, the model uses a form of the multinomial logit
model common in marketing research. The logit formulation serves to integrate out error
terms across the technologies (Lilien et al 1992).
The author selected a normalizing constant by manipulation of the price elasticity
equation for a technology at a certain price. The price elasticity represents the reduction
in market share observed from a one percent price increase. The market share, however,
is that share that might exist in the absence of the feedback effects represented by
infrastructure, availability, and consumer awareness. These feedback effects are
considered external to the logit formulation for probability of purchase, and are thus
excluded from computation of the normalizing constant.
Equation 2.5 - Formulation of the Normalizing Constant from the Price Elasticity Equation
P
eprice = (1 - share)
b
where
eprice= Price elasticity, dimensionless
share = Share of technology independent of feedback effects, dimensionless
The model uses the Probability of Purchase to estimate starting market share and the
initial price level to solve for the normalizing constant, b, for each of the representative
technologies assuming an elasticity of -2. But because price elasticity changes at
different levels of market share, the author applies a single constant across all
technologies to eliminate bias of one technology over another under changing external
conditions. This ensures that the probability of purchase is based on the endogenous
technology attributes. The use of a normalizing constant is circumspect, however, raising
a number of concerns with regard to the validity of its application. These concerns will
be addressed in detail upon description of the revised model.
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2.2 FEEDBACK EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEMAND
The probability of purchase, derived from the multinomial logit function
described previously, combines with the three exogenous factors (Infrastructure
Coverage, Technology Availability, and Consumer Awareness) to determine aggregate
demand for a given technology as illustrated in Equation 2.6.
Equation 2.6 - Technology Demand and Technology Market Share
Demandi = Pr, * Infrai * Awarei * Availi
Tmi-4Demand.TMS, = Dead
Z Demand1j=1
where
Demand = Technology Demand for i, dmnl
TMSi = Technology Market Share for technology i, dmnl
Pr1  = Probability of Purchase for technology i, dmnl
Infrai = Infrastructure Coverage for technology i, dmnl
A warei = Consumer Fraction Aware of technology i, dmnl
Availi = Total Availability of technology i, dmnl
The multiplicative nature of the demand equation indicates that demand will be zero in the
absence of any one of these elements.
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Figure 2.2 - Structure of Infrastructure Coverage Feedback in the Reference Model
The above diagram outlines the feedback mechanisms of infrastructure coverage,
tracing the relationship between coverage and demand for a given technology. The
provision of infrastructure is a prerequisite for demand. Increasing demand increases
market share of new vehicle sales, displacing other technologies, thereby increasing the
fraction of a particular propulsion technology in the fleet at any given time. Note that the
provision of infrastructure is dependent on this fraction, rather than the market share of new
sales. This implies, for example, that fuel service providers base their supply decisions on
the pool of vehicles on the road rather than on shorter-term sales trends.
Infrastructure Coverage is presented as a stock in the reference model and is
assumed 100%, or unity, for gasoline-fueled architectures, i.e. ICE and HEV. Conversely,
the more radical technologies have near zero supporting infrastructures initially. All else
equal, as demand for a technology increases, desired infrastructure coverage increases as
well. This increase is represented by an s-shaped function that translates the Technology
Fraction in Fleet to Desired Infrastructure Coverage. The function implicitly simulates a
"decision rule," on which fuel suppliers base their supply decision. A delay in bringing
infrastructure on line, however, reflects the time to implement such change. The increase
in coverage translates to increased demand, increased Technology Market Share, which
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increases the total fraction of the technology fleet on the road at any given time. The
infrastructure feedback mechanism simulates the "chicken-and-egg" dilemma. This
mechanism is one of the principle barriers to market for the alternatively fueled propulsion
architectures.
Awareness Feedback
The second of the three key exogenous feedback mechanisms relates to consumer
awareness for reasons that are self-explanatory. Producers cannot expect purchase activity
in the absence of consumer awareness of the technology's existence or attendant benefits
relative to the mainstream product that currently suffices their needs. Thus, the lack of
consumer awareness constrains the actualization of consumer demand via technology
market share. Figure 2.3 illustrates the logic of the reference model.
Forgetting
Consumer + Consumer
Fraction ------ -Fraction
Unaware Enirightenment Aware
Technology
Awareness Demand
from Awareness from
Marketing Word of Mouth + Total
Demand
Technology -
Market Share
Figure 2.3 - Consumer Awareness Feedback Structure of the Reference Model
The diagram above presents two stock (or state) variables that disaggregate the total
consumer population into a pool of consumers aware of the existence of a given technology
and a pool of consumers that are unaware of the technology. Two activities serve to
"enlighten" consumers, converting them from the unaware pool to the aware pool. The
first is via marketing campaigns that use media resources to educate consumers. The
second stems from word of mouth effects as technologies make inroads to the market. With
more owners of new technologies comes increased spreading of the word. The word of
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mouth effect translates the number of people made aware per new vehicle owner. The user
can specify the strength of this effect as a fraction between zero and unity where a fraction
of 0.5 translates to one person enlightened for every two new owners) as expressed in
Equation 2.7.
Equation 2.7 - Awareness through Word of Mouth and Marketing
WOMi = Strength woM * TMSi
Mktgi = Basemscg * (Strengthmg,,)e"
where
WOMi = Awareness from Word of Mouth for technology i, 1/year
StrengthwoM = Strength of Word of Mouth Effect, 1/year
Mktg,1 = Awareness from Marketing for technology i, 1/year
BaseMkrg = Baseline Awareness from Marketing, 1/year
Strengthpmg, i = Relative Strength of Marketing Efforts for i, dmnl
eMktg = Marketing Elasticity, dmnl
Conversely, lack of consumer demand for a technology relative to other alternatives
would translate into decreased market share and hence decreased word of mouth. A
negative word of mouth effect initiates a balancing feedback mechanism that would serve
as a drag on demand for that product, all else being equal. The elasticity in the above
equation refers to the increase in consumer awareness for a percentage increase in
marketing spending or an equivalent media effort.
Even aware consumers will "forget" over time in the absence of stimulation,
thereby returning consumers to the unaware pool. This reinforcing feedback structure, by
which awareness diffuses through a population, is congruent with the Bass diffusion model
presented by Sterman (2000).
Availability Feedback
Availability refers to the fraction of vehicles made available to the public by
automakers and serves as a surrogate to the notion of access to a given propulsion
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technology. It implicitly represents the range of activities necessary to bring a given
technology to market such as research and development. Purchase activity cannot take
place in the absence of product availability. Thus, anything less than 100% availability
implies that despite all other factors in demand, not all consumers will have access to the
technology in order to execute a sale.
Competitor Target
+ Availability
Competitor
Stimulus
+ + Target
ChInge +nAvailfability+(rTarget
Market Actual
Stimulus Availability
k+ +/'
Technology + Technology
Market Share -4Demand
Total Demand
Figure 2.4 - Technology Availability Feedback Structure of the Reference Model
Figure 2.4 illustrates the two major reinforcing feedback mechanisms derived from
this dynamic. The automaker's target for availability translates to an Actual Availability
over a delay equal to the average time required to bring the technology through
development phases to the required production levels (the delay is indicated by a hatchet
mark between Target Availability and Actual Availability in Figure 2.4). The sum of
Actual Availability and Competitor Availability generates total availability. It is total
availability that enables the increase of Technology Market Share, as consumers must
choose between the set of alternatives actually available to them.
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Competitor Stimulus and Market Stimulus effects converge to affect the Change in
Target Availability. In the reference model, a single firm responds to both, and the other
firm responds only to competitor activity. This would be representative of a "fast-
follower" strategy.
The reference model uses Consumer Acceptance, expressed as a ratio of the
technology's market share relative to its availability as indicated in Equation 3.8, as a
surrogate for the Market Stimulus effect. The formula serves as a kind of metric for
"market pull," dubbed Market Stimulus, and defines an Adjustment Fraction via an s-curve
that peaks at 20% adjustment of the target availability per year at peak Consumer
Acceptance.
Equation 2.8 - Consumer Acceptance of Technology
Accept1 = TMS
Avail,
where
Accepti = Consumer Acceptance of technology i, dmnl
The Adjustment Fraction combines with Target Availability to create Market
Stimulus as in Equation 2.9 below.
Equation 2.9 - Impact of Market Stimulus on the rate of Chang in Target Availability
MktStimi= (l-Tgti) * fadj
where
MktStimi = Market Stimuls for technology i, 1/year
Tg4t = Target Availability for technology i, dmnl
fadj = Adjustment Fraction, 1/year
The Market Stimulus thus responds to Technology Market Share by multiplying the
maximum increase in Target Availability by the Adjustment Fraction. But Change in
Target Availability also responds to Competitor Stimulus as indicated in Equation 2.10.
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Equation 2.10 - Impact of Competitor Stimulus on the rate of Change in Target Availability
CompStim. (CompTgt -Tgti)
C1
where
CompStimi = Competitor Stimulus for technology i, 1/year
CompTgti = Competitor Target Availability for i, dmnl
treact = Reaction Time required to adjust Target Availability, years
Competitor Stimulus emulates competitive intelligence activities of the firm. The
firm can then adjust its target as it learns of its competitor's intentions. Similarly, the
competitor stimulus from the perspective of the competing firm is equal in magnitude and
opposite in sign to Equation 2.10 above. The model then considers these stimuli and
selects the greater of the two, as the Change in Target Availability as in Equation 2.11.
Equation 2.11 - Change in Target and Actual Availability Based on Market and Competitor Stimuli
ATgt, MAX(MktStimi, CompStimi)
toTgti (t = JTgt1 (s)ds + Tgt, ('s)
Actuali = DELAY3(Tgti, treact)
where
ATgt, = Change in Target Availability of technology i, 1/year
Actuali = Actual Availability of technology i, dmnl
DELA Y3 = Third-order Delay Function
t
actnal = Time to Change Actual availability, years
The decision rule implicit in the above set of equations is that, all else equal, via
competitive intelligence, competition will increase their own target availability in response
to the initiating firm.
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2.3 GOVERNING INTERACTIONS & STRUCTURAL LOGIC
I conclude this section by retracing Figures 2.1 - 2.4 to convey the full sense of the
reference model. Figure 2.5 captures the logic flow in a single graphic.
Technology
Market Share
Consumer Fraction* Aware
Infrastructure Demand-Awr
Coverage -.. _---r
* 7
Co e*eTotal Availability
Probability of
Purchase
Normalizing/-- r0Consumer Utility
Constant I
Consumer Valu#--Purchase Price
=Willingness to Pay
Environmental Other Sources of
Impact + + Value
Range Value
Operating Cost Performance
Savings Value
Figure 2.5 - Structural Logic of the Reference Model
The reference model monetizes five criteria values and sums them to equal willingness to
pay. Subtracting price yields value that is then divided by a normalizing constant to yield
utility. A logit function translates utility to a probability of purchase that is then multiplied
against infrastructure coverage, availability, and consumer awareness to yield demand from
which market share can then be determined.
Referring back to Figure 2.1, we begin the process with a set of five endogenous
and static vehicle performance attributes. These values yield a Probability of Purchase that
distributes market share amongst the set of technology alternatives based on their relative
- 62 -
III
benefit. Considered alone, demand would remain static based on this distribution.
However, consideration of exogenous market conditions to include infrastructure coverage,
technology availability, and consumer awareness initiates a number of dynamic processes
that shift demand over time. First, a Learning Curve effect enables generic technology
buy-down dynamics that serve to narrow the cost differential between alternative
technologies and the ICE with increasing scale.
The Awareness Feedback serves to "open up" the potential market for alternatives
by stimulating demand via awareness campaigns such as marketing spending and media
coverage. The initial state of the incumbent ICE architecture is 100% consumer awareness.
Infrastructure Feedback adds to the Awareness and Learning Curve effects. Infrastructure
Coverage, again equal to 100% for the ICE, serves as an entry barrier to the set of
alternative technologies. Table 2.1 attempts to convey the degree of the barrier that each
technology must overcome to penetrate the market. Finally, Availability feedback
completes the model. Again, the ICE begins with 100% availability; automakers must
dedicate the resources to bring alternative technologies to market, bringing with it delays
that alternatives must overcome to penetrate the ICE-dominated market.
2.4 REFERENCE MODEL SIMULATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
Metcalf executes a number of simulations to determine the conditions and
stakeholder activities necessary to achieve three alternative futures. These include ICE
Domination, Hybrid Competition, and FCEV Transition scenarios. The model employs
eight "scenario variables" to enable the user to generate distinct scenarios. They are
defined as the following:
(1) Relative Performance - A user defined, static variable between zero and one,
where the performance of the ICE is unity and the set of alternatives to the ICE
are less than, or equal to, unity. The variable is a surrogate for vehicle
characteristics such as acceleration, torque, and horsepower. The model uses a
default assumption that all vehicle architectures have equal performance based
on Power-to-Weight Ratio (PWR) as indicated by the study performed by the
MIT Energy Lab (Weiss et al, 2000). The study explicitly normalized
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performance when it projected technology development out twenty years so as
to compare other vehicle characteristics.
(2) Relative Strength of the Marketing Effort - A user defined, static variable
representing a ratio of the targeted spending for a given technology divided by
the baseline marketing spending for the vehicle platform (a mid-size sedan).
Thus, a ratio of 1 indicates that automakers make equivalent commitment of
marketing and media efforts to the technology in consideration when compared
to the baseline. Automakers must increase this ratio to promote an alternative
technology.
(3) Initial Target Availability - A user defined, static variable with a default value
near zero (1%) for all but the ICE (100%). This scenario variable serves to
execute a firm's internal strategy with regard to the set of potential vehicle
architectures. It can also capture "technology-forcing," external regulatory
policy such as ZEV mandates that require automakers to bring solutions to
market as a surrogate for demand.
(4) Initial Infrastructure Coverage - Fixed at 100% for the incumbent ICE
technology, the user can specify the initial level of fuel and service support that
precedes an alternative technology's introduction to market. This variable
serves as a lever for the user to execute a co-operative partnership arrangement
whereby joint investment by key stakeholders (auto, energy, and public
concerns) pre-empt the chicken-and-egg hurdle by supplying infrastructure to
market prior to demand.
Interestingly, DoE and the California Fuel Cell Partnership are working
to deploy an alternative-fueling infrastructure that will be initially supported by
complementary energy-based revenue streams such as distributed power prior
to the arrival of demand in passenger vehicles sufficient to support the station
alone. DoE's Hydrogen Technology Advisory Panel has proposed deployment
of an energy station at a location with significant natural gas availability. Prior
to the arrival of sufficient vehicle demand, the station would benefit from
stationary production of electrical power via fuel cell technologies for
distributed power generation. This proposal entails establishment of a natural
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gas reformer facility for the production of hydrogen that feeds a fuel cell of
varying size and power to produce electricity. The station also could derive
additional sources of revenue from serving natural gas, compressed natural gas
(CNG), and compressed hydrogen customers.
At such time that alternatively fueled vehicles become available and
penetrate the market, the station might require at best a retrofit to enable transfer
of fuel onboard the vehicle. Such a strategy is predicated on the adoption of
adaptive/flexible infrastructure deployment based on modular architectural
principles that seek to control for the risk associated with uncertainty in market
conditions and technological evolution by "designing in" characteristics and
interfaces for accommodating these changes downstream. Doing so offers the
potential of avoiding significant cost penalties should the market and/or
technologies depart down a divergent path. In the context of DoE's proposed
energy station, the strategy aims to create an alternative fuel infrastructure "in
wait" with the ability to service an emerging market should one materialize.
However, failing this, the facility is capable of profitability should this market
fail to materialize.
(5) Profit Margin - A static, user-defined scenario variable with a default value of
5% over the capital cost. The user can adjust this value lower to seed demand.
(6) Internalization Fraction - A static, user-defined scenario variable with a
default value of zero. It represents the fraction of environmental damage costs
considered by the consumer at the time of purchase.
(7) Discount Rate - A static scenario variable that determines the extent to which
consumers internalize future operating costs at the time of purchase. The author
uses a relatively high baseline rate of 30% to more accurately reflect typical
consumer purchase behavior rather than discount rates reflective of opportunity
costs used in financial analysis.
(8) Gasoline Price Increase - Also a static, user-defined scenario variable that
allows the user to simulate a change in gasoline prices due to market
supply/demand dynamics or due to the imposition of a gasoline tax. The
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increase is a discreet step function at the model outset rather than a gradual
price shift.
Upon defining the set of scenario variables to reflect varying initial conditions and
strategies, Metcalf (2000) then determines the conditions necessary to achieve a
representative set of alternative "future propulsion regimes." She finds that in the baseline
scenario, using the default assumptions that best reflect current market conditions, the ICE
easily dominates in the short-term. In the long-term, however, HEVs make gradual, but
limited, inroads to the market due to the inherent delays of commercializing the
technology. This emergence occurs in the absence of a concerted stakeholder push due to
the assumption that the gasoline HEV, like it's ICE counterpart, benefit from full
infrastructure coverage at the outset and through the reinforcing feedback mechanisms
discussed previously. Conversely, FCEV and EV technologies remain stymied of any
significant market penetration due to the considerable infrastructure barriers facing them.
Scenario Variable Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
ICE Domination Hybrid Competition Fuel Cell Transition
Propulsion Architecture > >> Li >
W -> =o> W > W W >
Relative Performance 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Relative Strength of the
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 6 1Marketing Effort
Initial Infrastructure
1 1 0.01 0.01 1 1 0.01 0.01 1 1 0.2 0.01Coverage
Initial Target Availability 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.2 0.01 0.01 1 0.2 0.2 0.01
Profit Margin 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 0 0
Internalization Fraction 0 0 1
Discount Rate 0.30 0.30 0.10
Gas Price Increase 0 0 4
Table 2.2 - Reference Model Scenario Variable Adjustments
The second scenario, "Hybrid Competition," seeks to determine the conditions
necessary for the HEV to make significant penetration to the passenger vehicle market.
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Metcalf (2000) concludes that the HEV requires three prerequisites for adoption in
significant numbers: equivalent performance to the ICE, marketing spending equal to a
factor of two over the baseline, and 20% initial target availability. Doing so reduces the
delays required to seed consumer awareness while committing to development and
commercialization of the hybrid product (Initial Target Availability). The infrastructure
barriers again prevent the more radical FCEV and EV designs from achieving any
significant level of market penetration.
The third and final scenario attempts to establish the conditions necessary for an
"FCEV Transition" to occur in the marketplace. These conditions are summarized in Table
2.2 above and enable the FCEV architecture to achieve penetration of around 10% in just
over 10 years. The technology then "takes off' via an inflection in its market share
between the 20 and 25-year points. Initial infrastructure seeds demand for the FCEV and
could'represent the coordinated commitments of energy, auto, and government concerns.
Note that gas prices are exceedingly high. This is accounted for by adjusting the discount
rate downward to reflect greater consideration of vehicle operating costs by the consumer
at the point of purchase. Metcalf (2000) notes that this could correspond with tighter
macroeconomic conditions.
Summary of Reference Model Assumptions
Before continuing, the following represents a synopsis of some of the core
assumptions of the reference model:
(1) Costs are in constant dollars.
(2) Analysis beginning in the year 2000 and ending in the year 2030.
(3) All technology parameters begin in the year 2000 with values derived from
projections to the year 2020 (see Weiss et al).
(4) One aggregate consumer market segment.
(5) All technologies are normalized to equivalent performance as projected by Weiss et
al (2000).
(6) One benchmark product segment representing the aggregate market for all
passenger vehicles. In this case, a mid-size sedan comparable to a Toyota Camry
or Ford Taurus.
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(7) Two competing firms - "Ours" and "Theirs"
(8) Parameterized to the North American market.
(9) Average Vehicle Miles Traveled of 12,000 miles per year per car
(10) Average Vehicle Life of 14 years
(11) Vehicle Purchase Price equals the sum of the component (or technology-specific)
costs,
(12) Other Vehicle Cost is assumed constant across technologies, and a profit margin as
specified by the user.
From these core model assumptions, we now turn to the development of the revised
model.
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3 SYSTEM DYNAMICS DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVISED MODEL
7 New Sales
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Figure 3.1 - Overview of the System Dynamics structure of the revised model
The diagram illustrates the major elements and feedback effects. Note the boxed elements
considered exogenous to the consumer purchase decision; elements considered endogenous to the
purchase decision are noted in red.
3.1 TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
A primary basis for revising the reference model rests on the fact that it relies on data
derived primarily from the projections provided by Weiss et al (2000). This report normalizes
all technology parameters to equivalent performance based on a single path of evolution to the
year 2020. For a more detailed description of this methodology, I refer the reader to this MIT
Energy Lab publication. The document evolves the energy infrastructure in parallel with
evolving vehicle technologies based on an EIA assessment of the future distribution of energy
sources feeding the nation's electricity grid and service stations. In doing so, the authors of
the report establish a single scenario-based "most likely" path of development for an aggregate
mass market existing twenty years hence.
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Metcalf (2001) uses the Energy Lab data for two critical reasons. First, the
assumptions underlying the results are explicitly stated and therefore transparent to third-
party scrutiny and reproduction. Second, the report considers a comprehensive set of
potential technologies and normalizes them to provide a fair basis for comparison of the
relative attributes and feedback dynamics we wish to examine.
This distinction warrants further explanation. To better understand the logic of the
reference model, one might equate it to "stepping into the future" roughly two decades
from today and observing the fleet of vehicles on the road and the differences amongst
them at that point of development. We then "reset" the clock as "current day" and run the
model based on scenario variables under the control of the modeler. In sum, the reference
model normalizes the set of potential technologies relative to an "evolved baseline" vehicle
- in this case a mid-size advanced body sedan - supported by the aggregate market and
energy infrastructure projected for the year 2020. The purpose, however, is not to "fast-
forward" to a future that might better support alternative technologies, but rather to provide
a reference point from which to base relative differences amongst technologies as
objectively as possible (Metcalf 2000).
Another key distinction deserves attention here. Upon leveling the playing field
and winding the clock back twenty years, the user fixes the scenario variables. These
include the initial endogenous vehicle attributes from which the model derives a probability
of purchase and ultimately demand for a given propulsion architecture. These attributes are
noted in red in Figure 3.1. Upon initiation of a simulation, the model starts the clock,
allowing the set of propulsion technologies to compete for market share subject to the
exogenous feedback effects of [population-based] new market growth, technology
availability, and consumer awareness. These are the boxed variables in Figure 3.1.
Although infrastructure coverage is the result of activities exogenous to the purchase
decision, we do not include it as an exogenous restraint because the consumer still has the
option to purchase the technology, even if little infrastructure exists. Conversely, the
consumer will not have the option to purchase if he is unaware the technology exists in the
first place, or if the technology is simply not for sale (i.e. available).
Note, however, that both infrastructure coverage and technology availability are
included as attributes endogenous to the purchase decision. This is because the consumer
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internalizes these considerations at the point of purchase. Alternatively, a consumer cannot
internalize whether or not he is aware of the technology's existence. Thus, awareness
remains purely an exogenous restraint on the potential sale of new propulsion architectures.
In sum, we can say that the consumer will consider the relative level of infrastructure
coverage and the availability of a desired propulsion architecture when choosing amongst a
set of options. A consumer cannot, however, consider a purchase if the he is unaware the
technology exists.
Returning to the reference model's frame of reference, the reader essentially
witnesses a scenario play out from current day with data derived from a hypothetical visit
to an alternative future twenty years ahead. The modeler's motive is to establish relative,
rather than absolute, differences in attributes amongst competing technologies. Thus, the
model never claims to provide absolute results in the form of specific figures for sales,
emissions, or fuel economy. Rather, the model conveys directionally useful information to
the decision-maker.
3.2 "LEARNING ENGINES"
Alternatively, the model as this author has revised it establishes relative differences
amongst the set of technologies as they exist currently. The model draws from data on both
criteria air pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions provided by the most recent GREET model
simulations supplied by alternative propulsion research efforts at Argonne National Labs
(Wang 2001). Unlike Weiss et al (2000), the data supplied by ANL represents the set of
technologies, as they exist in their current state of development. Furthermore, the revised
model replaces the attribute-based endogenous scenario variables that remain static throughout
the simulation with a set of dynamic variables that employ "learning engines" to more
accurately simulate their potential evolution over time.
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3.2.1 THE LEARNING ENGINE CONSTRUCT
<Fucl Economy of
New Vehicles>
Target + Range
Range
+Fuel Capacity
Required Capacity Change in Fuel
Capacity
Fuel Capacity +
Reference R&D Improvement Rate
Potential Fuel Capacity
Improvement Rate
Relative R&D
Figure 3.2 - Capacity as a representative "learning engine" for simulating the evolutionary
path of technology development
The learning engine is a fairly simple System Dynamics construct that employs a state
variable to represent the level of development of the attribute we wish to model at any given
time. Figure 3.2 provides a representative learning engine from the actual revised model to
better illustrate the concept.
The learning dynamic sketched above relies upon a decision rule that establishes a
desired target level for a given attribute. In the fuel capacity example above, the
customer's expectation of a particular vehicle range establishes the target capacity required
to deliver this range to the mass market, based on the fuel economy of the propulsion
technology in question. Note, however, that fuel economy is also a dynamic, evolving
vehicle property with a similar learning engine, which will be discussed shortly. Thus, the
technologies involved in increasing range, i.e. on-board fuel storage capacity and system
fuel economy, combine to close the differential between actual and desired state properties.
Changes in external conditions, deliberate investment, or commitment of
stakeholder resources all serve to close the gap between the actual vehicle performance
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level and the target vehicle performance metric at a rate determined by the severity of
external catalysts or the degree of resource commitment. This rate is arbitrarily capped at a
maximum to limit the pace of evolution to levels characteristic of industry-wide trends.
Table 3.1 explicitly lists the rates applied for each of the learning dynamics employed in
the model. These rates represent the maximum potential rate of change. The actual rate of
change is determined by the actual commitment of resources toward the full development
potential, relative to the baseline levels. Baseline levels are those that would apply in the
absence of R&D investment guided by strategic directives. For example, to enable a
strategy predicated on bringing fuel cell technologies to market, an automaker might
choose an R&D investment target 50% above current, baseline spending to hasten the
availability of the technology to the market place as well as to boost the performance of the
attributes crucial for market adoption.
For convenience, the "Learning Curve" dynamic for production experience is
included in the last row of the table. The Learning Curve simulates technology-specific
economies of scale by specifying a fractional reduction in cost, per doubling of cumulative
production. Unlike the product-specific performance attributes that trend toward a target
based on the resource commitments of stakeholders, the Learning Curve implicitly trends
toward a market-clearing cost at a pace dependent on market demand. The author applied
relatively lower rates for scale economies for the less radical propulsion architectures;
arguably a reasonable approximation, given the maturity of ICE technological development
and the greater level of system and component level commonality shared between the ICE
and HEV platforms.
Technology Rate of Change > >
X U
Fuel Capacity 0 0 0.2 0.1
Fuel Economy 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.15
Performance 0.10 0.25 0.25 0.25
Infrastructure Coverage 0 0.30 0.25 0.25
Fractional Reduction in Cost
0 0.10 0.15 0.15
per Production Doubling
Table 3.1 - Maximum Potential Rates of Improvement for the Learning Curve Mechanisms
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In sum, the learning engine construct attempts to capture the evolving dynamics of
stakeholder efforts to close the gap between a vehicle attribute's current performance and
the ideal performance desired by mainstream market consumers. This is analogous to
dynamically tracing the technological trajectory of vehicle attributes considered essential to
delivering the levels of performance desired by the mass market (Christensen 2000,
Sterman 2000).
One can imagine a fairly limitless set of learning engines at finer levels of system
decomposition. For example, we could construct similar "engines" to replicate riding down
the learning curve for key vehicle components or sub-systems such as vehicular fuel cells,
battery trains, or hybrid drive systems. This is outside the scope of this thesis, however.
Rather, the author surmises that the more generic learning engines applied in Table 3.1
captures improvements along these lines. For example, fuel capacity evolution could account
for the emergence of more radical technologies such as nanostructures or the diffusion of off-
the-shelf technologies such as advanced materials for lighter, stronger storage tanks for
alternative propulsion applications.
3.2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE LEARNING CONSTRUCT
As implied by the above statement, the modeler must be aware of three key
limitations of the learning construct. First, the curve does not model the potential
emergence of breakthrough technologies (one can imagine that doing so would involve the
incorporation of a step function at some arbitrary point in time). Despite the plausibility of
such a scenario, the author chose to refrain from attempts to model discreet events of such
random and unpredictable nature so as to devolve the model of potential bias toward a
given technology. Second, the model does not capture efforts to close the performance gap
relative to the demands of niche market consumers. Thus, the revision model implicitly
assumes that auto and energy stakeholders are attempting to reach mainstream consumer
segments from the outset.
Conversely, Christensen (2000) provides evidence that the history of industry
innovation suggests that firms have traditionally enjoyed greater success in bringing new
technologies to the mass market by initially introducing the technology to niche markets.
Doing so allows firms to downplay the technology's relative weaknesses while leveraging
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it's relative strengths to a market willing to pay a premium for those features. This
dynamic will be discussed in greater depth later in the chapter.
The second observation concerns the distinction between commitments of resources
toward product, versus process-based innovation. The first four entries in Table 3.1
approximate the learning dynamic of product-focused technological evolution. A firm
typically gleans these improvements during the early development phases of the product
life cycle. Conversely, the last entry in Table 3.1 represents cost reductions gained from
the commitment of resources toward process-oriented activities such as standardization,
repeatability, and scale. A considerable array of industry research supports the assertion
that innovations evolve in this manner. Utterback (1998), for example, notes the tendency
of firms to commit resources in the earlier phases of development toward product-based
activities in order to achieve the desired level of performance required of the target market.
Over time, however, as the product approaches levels appropriate for
commercialization, the firm chooses to "freeze" the design. Doing so allows the firm to
focus resources away from further improvements to product and toward the plant,
equipment, and training required to mass-produce it. These process-based initiatives
enable the standardization, repeatability, and scale required to coalesce a value chain
capable of supplying the needed materials at reduced cost. Thus, the strength of the
learning dynamic shifts over time from product-based improvements that drives attribute
performance toward commercialization, to cost reductions enabled by process-based
improvements and value chain emergence (Utterback, 1998). This can be characterized as
a shift from performance to cost-based learning dominance as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Product
" Innovation
0 Process0
C: lnnovqtiona
4-
0
0
Time
Figure 3.3 - The Evolution of Learning Dominance in the Product Life Cycle
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I distinguish radical innovation between product and process evolution via these
curves. As discussed in previous chapters, the earlier stages of innovation are
characterized by product-oriented improvements that seek to commercialize an
innovation by achieving the performance thresholds deemed necessary for the market.
These early stages of development are marked by significant achievements along the
performance trajectory. Once the technology reaches the threshold performance level
required of the market, however, prohibitive cost often becomes the greater barrier to
commercialization. Although R&D activities typically manage to achieve cost reductions
by seeking out cheaper materials during development, realizing a market clearing cost
target often requires the kind of process-based cost reductions attainable only by
economies of scale. Economies of scale happen only when a market for the product
emerges. Thus, the classic chicken-and-egg dilemma rears its ugly head yet again.
Producers are loath to commit the considerable resources required when the market is
uncertain. Regulatory intervention can facilitate cost reductions from scale by creating
an initial market for high-risk alternative technologies. One method for doing so is fleet
purchase mandates.
To summarize the learning curve dynamic, automakers or other stakeholders
attempt to close the gap between current and ideal range, fuel capacity, fuel economy, and
infrastructure coverage by targeted R&D investments over time. In the reference model,
the scenario variables governing the vehicle attributes endogenous to the vehicle remain
static throughout the run. Only the exogenous scenario variables, i.e. infrastructure
coverage, product availability, and consumer awareness, adjust dynamically as the model
steps through time. The user initiates these variables prior to the run, thereby establishing
the "starting point" from which the vehicles will compete. The user also exercises control
over other scenario variables such as changes in the price of gasoline and the level of
marketing investment for stimulating the reinforcing effects of the awareness feedback
dynamic.
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3.3 MODEL STRUCTURE AND LOGIC FLOW
Another of the fundamental departures from the reference model resides in the
treatment of exogenous market and transportation infrastructure system considerations and
endogenous vehicle system considerations. This distinction provides the guiding framework
for the construction of the revised model and the equations and decision rules that govern
consumer, vehicle, market, and infrastructure system behaviors.
3.3.1 LOGIC FLOW
The reader should carefully note the distinctions between the logic flow of the
reference model as illustrated in Figure 3.4 and the logic flow of the Revision Model
represented in Figure 3.5 on the following page.
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Technology
Market Share
Consumer Fraction
Aware
Infrastructure = Demand
Coverage ge r 4 *
* Total Availability
Probability of
Purchase
Normalizinw. . -- -P Consumer Utility
Constant
Consumer Value-4 Purchase Price
It'
= Willingness to Pay
Environmental Other Sources of
Impact + + Value
Range Value
Operating Cost Performance
Savings Value
Figure 3.4 - Structural Logic of the Reference Model
The reference model monetizes five criteria values and sums them to equal
willingness to pay. Subtracting price yields value that is then divided by a
normalizing constant to yield utility. A logit function translates utility to a
probability of purchase that is then multiplied against infrastructure
coverage, availability, and consumer awareness to yield demand from
which market share can then be determined.
= New Vehicle Sales
Total New Vehic
Market Product Market
Share
= Demand
Total Availability Consumer Fraction
Probability of Aware
Purchase
Attractiveness from = I Attractiveness from
Product Availability Attractiveness of Infrastructure AdequacyTechnology
Attractiveness from*
Environmental Impact * * Attractiveness from
Performance
Attractiveness Attractiveness
from Cost from Range
Figure 3.5 - Structural Logic of the Revised Model
The revised model obviates the need for a normalizing constant by
comparing a set of product attributes to a reference value equal to unity
(represented by the baseline ICE product). The attributes are multiplicative
rather than additive to reflect zero demand in the absence of an attribute.
The logit function returns a probability of purchase for a given technology.
Demand for a given technology is then a function of the product of the
probability of purchase, consumer awareness, and product availability.
Technology Demand is then normalized by the sum of the demand for all
technologies to yield Product Market Share. Multiplying this by the market
size yields New Sales for a given technology.
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Key differences to note from Figures 3.4 and 3.5 include:
(1) The variables Willingness to Pay, Consumer Value, Consumer Utility, and the
Normalizing Constant have been removed.
(2) The variable "Attractiveness of Technology" has been created and is equal to
the product, vice the sum, of the attractiveness of each of the technology
attributes.
(3) The attractiveness of a given technology is equal to the product, rather than the
summation, of the attractiveness of each independent attribute to the customer.
(4) Infrastructure Coverage has been decoupled from the computation of
Technology Market Share; instead, this condition is now considered an attribute
that impacts the overall attractiveness of a given technology. The author
contends that this variable is a condition external to the vehicle itself; the
consumer factors this condition into his purchase decision, but the condition
does not restrict the sale of vehicles to anyone willing to purchase. Conversely,
awareness and availability do restrict the sale of vehicles even if the consumer
is willing to buy; the consumer cannot purchase if he's unaware of the
product's existence and he cannot buy if the product is unavailable.
(5) In accordance with (4), the variable Infrastructure Coverage has been removed
from the computation of Demand for a given technology. The reference model
computes Demand as the product of Probability of Purchase, Infrastructure
Coverage, Consumer Fraction Aware, and Total Availability.
(6) New Vehicle Sales is calculated as the product of Product Market Share and the
annual Total New Vehicle Market.
(7) Product Market Share is determined by normalizing Demand for a given
technology product against the sum of the individual demands for each
technology product.
Three concerns with the reference model motivated these changes. First, the
treatment of Demand in the reference appears to separate Infrastructure Coverage and
Product Availability from the consumer's purchase decision. The reader can note from
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Figure 3.4 that these attributes are considered exogenous to the Probability of Purchase.
The revised model, on the other hand, treats these attributes as both exogenous, and
endogenous, considerations that the consumer factors into the purchase decision (see
Figure 3.5); they are therefore key attributes affecting the Probability ofPurchase.
The model ultimately returns the Product Market Share as the fraction of Demand
for a given technology product relative to the total demand of all technology products
considered. Moving up the logic flow diagram in Figure 3.5, the product of Total New
Vehicle Market and Product Market Share yields New Vehicle Sales for a given
technology. The reader should note the difference between Product Market Share and the
variable Technology Fraction in the Fleet. The former represents a given product's share
of new sales in the current period, while the latter represents a given product's share of the
aggregate fleet of vehicles on the road. Consequently, Technology Fraction in the Fleet is
equivalent to the snapshot of the mix of vehicles on the road at any given time and reflects
the lag between current sales and historical purchasing trends. Section 3.4.1 discusses this
variable in further detail.
Secondly, note from Figure 3.4 that the reference model derives purchase
probability from the summation of consumer Willingness to Pay for a representative set
of product attributes. The additive nature of this computation could present a logic fault
when considered under extreme conditions. For example, suppose that a given
propulsion architecture has no range at all. Implicitly, we know that a passenger vehicle
with no range would have absolutely zero value to a customer. But because the
computation is additive, the model would still return a positive value for the Probability
ofPurchase, assuming that any one of the other four attributes have a non-zero value. In
light of these concerns, the revised model considers the product of all technology
attributes endogenous to the consumer's purchase decision - that is, the model computes
purchase probability of a given propulsion architecture as the total product of the values
returned for each attribute affecting the purchase decision.
Finally, the revised model departs from the use of a "Normalizing Constant" by
considering the attractiveness of each attribute against a reference, or baseline, value. The
reference value reflects the consumer's current expectation for attribute performance based
on the level of performance delivered currently by products employing dominant
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propulsion technologies (i.e. the gasoline ICE). The ratio of current performance to
reference performance provids the input to a "function for attractiveness" for each product
attribute. This function translates the input determinant to a dimensionless output value
representing the attractiveness of the product to the consumer at the point of purchase. In
sum, the revised model treats the computation of purchase probability as multiplicative,
rather than additive. Thus, if an attribute returns a zero attractiveness value, the Probability
ofPurchase will be zero as well.
3.4 SCENARIO VARIABLES
The revised model leverages much of the reference model structure and therefore
uses many of the original scenario variables. The model modifies a number of these
variables to account for subtle differences in logic and structure. The model also goes
further to include a set of additional scenario variables, or "switches," whereby the user can
"turn on" particular policy/strategy levers to witness the influence of such interventions on
the simulation. Table 3.2 compares the set of scenario variables provided by the reference
and revised models.
Scenario Variable o > 0
Relative Performance x x
Relative Strength of the Marketing Effort X X
Initial Infrastructure Coverage X X
Initial Target Availability x x
Gasoline Price Increase x X
Profit Margin x x
Discount Rate X *
Internalization Fraction x *
Initial Sensitivity to Environmental Impact * x
Relative Strength of Public Ad Campaign x
Initial Target Product Investment x
Feebate Program X
Table 3.2 - Scenario Variables in the reference and revised models
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3.4.1 ASSESSING ATTRIBUTE VALUES
In contrast to the reference model, which derives a probability of purchase for a
particular platform by considering vehicle attributes endogenous to the vehicle system, the
revised model considers vehicle attributes from the perspective of the consumer's purchase
decision. That is, the calculation of the Probability ofPurchase for a given technology is
based on whether these attributes are endogenous to the consumer's purchase decision.
The contribution of each attribute to the total purchase probability is calculated by
considering the attractiveness of each technology's attributes relative to the ICE
benchmark. This is accomplished by comparing the actual value to the reference value.
For the endogenous attributes, the reference is equal to unity and is equivalent to customer
expectations for the mass market as predetermined by the incumbent ICE architecture. The
ratio of actual to reference is then translated to a dimensionless attractiveness measure by a
look-up function. The look-up function attempts to convert the magnitude of the ratio to a
dimensionless value representative of consumer behavior. Equation 3.1 calculates the total
Attractiveness for a given technology as the product of the set of values returned by the
respective attribute functions. Equation 3.2 converts the attractiveness metric to a
technology-specific probability of purchase using the logit function.
Equation 3.1 - Total Attractiveness for a given propulsion architecture
TotAttracti = APer*ARange*Acost*AEnv*AAvb*Alnfra
where
TotAttracti = Total Attractiveness of technology i, dmnl
APerf = Attractiveness from performance of technology i, dmnl
ARange = Attractiveness from range of technology i, dmnl
A cost = Attractiveness from environmental impact of technology i, dmnl
AAv, = Attractiveness from product availability of technology i, dmnl
AInfra = Attractiveness from infrastructure adequacy of technology i, dmnl
Equation 3.2 - Probability of Purchase Logit Formulation
4
utility =IZexp(TorAttract)
j=1
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TotAltract.
r - Utility
where
Utility Total Utility to the customer of all platforms, dmnl
Pri = Probability of Purchase for technology i, dmnl
Performance
The level of performance of each vehicle attribute is considered relative to a
benchmark. Because the ICE has long been the dominant propulsion mode, customers
have developed expectations for performance based on their experience with this
technology. For this reason, the model designates performance of ICE-based vehicle
technologies as reference and assigns it the value of unity. In this context, Performance
refers to the set of vehicle attributes relating to such considerations as power, torque,
acceleration, top speed, and handling. Performance is a scenario variable, although default
values are set to reflect the standing of each technology relative to the benchmark if they
were to hypothetically go to market today. Equation 3.3 calculates the attractiveness of a
given technology relative to the ICE.
Equation 3.3 - Performance
APe 
= (fp' PerflCE
where
Pef = Performance of New Vehicles of technology i, dmnl
Perf/iCE = Reference performance of ICE technology, dmnl
fPerf = Function for attractiveness from performance, dmnl
Equation 3.3 returns the attractiveness from performance metric for a given technology to
Equation 3.2. Performance is a dynamic scenario variable. The user establishes the initial
performance parameter relative to the ICE as well as the level of R&D investment targeted
toward closing the performance gap between a new alternative technology and the
-84-
III
incumbent ICE. Thus, all performance values less than one will approach unity over time
at a rate determined by relative technology investment.
Range
The revised model departs significantly from the reference model with regard to the
treatment of the range attribute. In establishing relative differences in vehicle range, the
reference model relied on data provided by Weiss et al (2000). This MIT Energy Lab
report chose to normalize vehicle attributes according to their power-to-weight ratio. To do
so, the report essentially shores up the performance shortfall of alternative propulsion
platforms such as the HEV and FCEV by partially "borrowing" from the positive range
differential associated with them. With the exception of the EV, the result is an almost
uniform range of approximately 400 miles across the breadth of propulsion systems.
Because the EV suffers from inherent range limitations, the Weiss data penalize EV
platforms by borrowing from other vehicle attributes.
Alternatively, the revised model treats range as a dynamic vehicle attribute. The
initial range is a scenario variable, as are the investment levers associated with R&D
investment targeted toward closing the gap between the range demanded by the mass
market and the actual range at any point in time. These investments are, however, limited
by inherent delays in the system. Equation 3.4 describes the calculation that delivers the
value for attractiveness derived from vehicle range to Equation 3.1.
Equation 3.4 - Vehicle Range
Range = Range,
Range RangeICE
where
Range, = Range of New Vehicles of technology i, dmnl
RangelcE = Reference range of ICE technology, dmnl
fRange = Function for attractiveness from range, dmnl
The function for attractiveness from range follows an arbitrary S-shaped curve that
attempts to simulate the inherent disparity in valuation associated with vehicles limited by
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range to less than 250 miles on a single fill-up or charge. Market data indicates that
consumers discount the technology to a much greater extent than the equivalent premium
that might be paid for ranges above 400 miles. The S-curve attempts to capture this
purchase behavior.
1.4 
_
1.2 - ------------ --- - ----
E0
40.8-
0(U
0 1 - -T -I
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Ratio of Range to Reference Range
Figure 3.6 - Attractiveness from Range as a function of the ratio of range for a given
technology to the range of the benchmark ICE platform.
Cost
The reference model compares the operating cost of different technologies, with
variability dependent upon fuel cost and fuel economy. The revised model departs little
from this basic construct. We continue to assume a fixed VMT of 12,000 miles per vehicle
annually. The model returns total operating cost per year by combining both fixed and
variable costs. The model departs from the original only in the application of a discount
rate that adjusts dynamically with shifts in fuel cost. For further explanation of the
methodology for computing and applying this discount rate to the stream of variable costs,
please see Section 3.5.3. Figure 3.7 illustrates the methodology behind the calculation of
the total lifecycle vehicle cost considered in the consumer purchase decision.
The construct first attempts to determine the total variable costs involved as derived
from two sources: fuel cost and other variable costs such as service and maintenance.
Other Variable Cost per Mile represents the maintenance and tire service costs incurred at
periodic intervals along the vehicle age in mileage. These costs are assumed to be 5.17
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cents per mile, based on Davis (2000). Predictably, these depend upon VMT and a fuel
cost assumed static over the period of ownership by the consumer and are summed to yield
total Variable Operating Cost. The model then applies the Discount Rate detailed in
Section 3.5.3 to the total Variable Operating Cost and adds this to the total Fixed Operating
Cost to yield the total Lifecycle Operating Cost of the vehicle. It should be noted that the
Discount Rate is first transformed into an Operating Cost Multiplier via a table function
that is then applied to a yearly cash flow over a period equal to the average vehicle life of
14 years. I refer the reader to Metcalf 2001 for the equations governing calculation and
application of this multiplier. Suffice it to say here that the multiplier is simply a factor that
when multiplied against a stream of annual payments, converts those payments to the
operating cost internalized by the consumer at the time of purchase. It is equivalent to a
Net Present Value calculation in financial analysis.
Fuel Cost Discount Rate Purchase Price
per Mile
Variable Lifecycle IN-Lifecycle Vehicle
Operating Cost Operating Cost Cost
Other Variable Fixed Operating
Cost per Mile Cost
Figure 3.7 - Fishbone diagram of Lifecycle Vehicle Cost to the consumer
This construct then adds Purchase Price to the Lifecycle Vehicle Cost to yield a total cost to
the consumer. This value returns to Equation 3.5 where it is compared against the
benchmark ICE platform. The function depicted in Figure 3.8 than converts this ratio to a
value representing the level of attractiveness imputed by the consumer for this vehicle
attribute.
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Equation 3.5 - Attractiveness from Cost
ACost = ICost ryCost ICE)
where
= Lifecycle Vehicle Cost of technology i, dmnl
= Reference Lifecycle Vehicle Cost of ICE technology, dmnl
= Function for Attractiveness from Cost, dmnl
-- - -- - - -- --- ---- --- -- - - -- -- --- ---- - - - - -
- ----- ---------------------
------ -- -- - - -- - - -- --- -  ---- -- - - - -
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Ratio of Cost to Reference Cost
Figure 3.8 - Attractiveness from Cost
(As a function of the ratio of the cost for a given technology relative to the benchmark ICE platform)
Environmental Factors
Currently, this vehicle attribute plays a minor role in the consumer's purchase
decision. I argue that this a consequence of two forces. First, that only a small segment of
the consumer population demonstrates any sensitivity to environmental factors. Therefore,
the majority of potential buyers fail to internalize such considerations when deciding on a
vehicle purchase. Second, producers must respect consumer expectations, but behaviors
are malleable; that is to say that behaviors are evolvable and governable. Behaviors evolve
over time, but external forces in the form of laws, norms, media, and design of the world
around us shape them (Lessig, 2001). Thus, although only a small fraction of the
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consumer population might factor environmental consequences into their purchase decision
currently, much can be done to modify this behavior in the years ahead. Such an argument
is analogous to the emergence of a value system antithetical to smoking. It is directly the
result of media efforts to educate consumers to the hazards they face.
The model computes an Environmental Damage Cost based on the methodology
described in Chapter 1. It determines a value for the Attractiveness of Environmental
Factors as illustrated in Equation 3.6 by comparing the Environmental Damage Cost of a
given technology with that of the dirtiest benchmark, once again the ICE. The ratio is then
converted to an attractiveness measure via the function displayed in Figure 3.9.
Equation 3.6 - Attractiveness from Environmental Factors
(EDC 1
A~fV f~~ EDCJCE)
where
U)20
C.
2
1.8
1.6 -
1.4-
1.2 -
1 -
0.8 -
0.6 -
0.4 -
0.2 -
0
C
= Environmental Damage Cost of technology i, dmnl
= Reference Environmental Damage Cost of ICE technology, dmnl
= Function for Attractiveness from Environmental Factors, dmnl
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Environmental Impact Ratio
Figure 3.9 - Attractiveness from Environmental Factors
(Derived as a function of the ratio of Environmental damage created by a given technology relative to the
damage created by the benchmark ICE technology)
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Product Availability
The revised model treats the availability of alternative technologies to the public as
endogenous to the consumer purchase decision and is included here for that reason. The
author contends that demand may exist for such alternative technology, but that the
inaccessibility, inconvenience, or sheer absence of the available product on new car lots
penalizes the new technology in the form of a decreased probability of purchase. In other
words, consumers may be more likely to take their business elsewhere. The construct is
analogous to all other vehicle-specific attributes in that it compares the availability of a
given alternative with the incumbent benchmark, returning a ratio that is then converted to
an attractiveness measure determined by an arbitrary function as in Equation 3.7 and Figure
3.10.
Equation 3.7 - Attractiveness from Technology Availability
rAvb.
AAvb 
= fv AvbCE
where
Avbi = Availability of technology i, dmnl
AvbjcE = Reference Availability of ICE technology, dmnl
fAvb = Function for Attractiveness from Availability, dmnl
0 0.9
0.8
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Technology Availability Ratio
Figure 3.10 - Function for Attractiveness from Availability of a given propulsion system
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Infrastructure Coverage
By analogy to technology availability above, the author contends that the consumer
considers the infrastructure coverage supporting a given propulsion system a key criterion
of purchase. Initial infrastructure coverage for a given propulsion technology represents
the extent to which fuel and maintenance are available at the start of simulation to seed
vehicle demand. For HEV, FCEV and EV technologies, this initial coverage is a scenario
variable, in that it can be increased to reflect heavy investment in infrastructure prior to the
technology's introduction to the market and prior to demand, which could be induced by
regulatory intervention. The default values for the FCEV and EV are non-zero at a fraction
of the potential (1% coverage). The model defaults ICE to unity and HEV to 0.9, reflecting
the pre-existence of a necessary fuel service infrastructure for this technology. Equation
3.8 and Figure 3.11 illustrate the formulation of an attractiveness figure of merit.
Equation 3.8 - Attractiveness from Infrastructure Coverage
Alnfra= fInfrajInCov.A,,, f'*"In CovICE
where
InCovi = Infrastructure Coverage of technology i, dmnl
InCovlCE = Reference Infrastructure Coverage of ICE technology, dmnl
finfra = Function for Attractiveness from Infrastructure Coverage, dmnl
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Figure 3.11 - Effect of Relative Infrastructure Coverage on Vehicle Attractiveness
3.5 TRACKING KEY METRICS
The revised model includes useful mechanisms for capturing the state of various
attributes of the market adoption "system" at any point in time. This tool enables decision-
makers to pre-run policy scenarios to determine, in advance, the relative success of
alternative strategy options. We accomplish this by establishing the key metrics by which
stakeholders wish to gauge the systemic impact of a given strategy. System Dynamics uses
stock and flow structures to track quantities flowing through various stages of a system
(Sterman, 2000). Structures referred to as "Co-flows" and "Aging Chains" allow us to
track a set of key attributes and metrics of consequence. These mechanisms relay the state
of attributes at any given time and are described in detail in the following section.
3.5.1 Co-FLOWS AND AGING CHAINS
Seven new views were created, each using aging chains and co-flows to facilitate
the tracking of the following key metrics of interest over time:
(1) Average Fleet Fuel Economy
(2) Average Fleet Performance
(3) Average Fleet Range
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(4) Average Fleet Air Pollution
(5) Average Fleet Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
(6) Average Fleet Vehicle Price
(7) Fleet Annual Oil Consumption
(8) Technology Fraction in the Fleet
(9) Total Vehicle Pollutant Emissions
(10) Total Vehicle Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
(11) Total Environmental Damage Cost
Each of these metrics provides critical data to stakeholders regarding the outcomes
of particular strategies. To track these variables, we first construct an aging chain. An
aging chain consists of any number of stocks called cohorts. Each cohort can have any
number of inflows and outflows as illustrated in the generic aging chain and co-flow
structure of Figure 3.12.
Average Residence
Time for Outflow
C3 -/\ - Stock ; =0'3
Inflow Outflow
Average
Attribute
Totalt
Increase in Atrbe Decrease in
+ Attribute Attribute +
Marginal
Attribut
per Unit
Figure 3.12 - A Generic Co-flow structure for tracking attributes of a stock
To yield the attribute Average Fleet Fuel Economy, the aging chain constructed in
the revised model disaggregates the vehicle fleet stock into two separate cohorts called
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"Late Model Vehicles" and "Older Vehicles." Each cohort has an inflow and an outflow
as illustrated in Figure 3.13.
7LateMel e Older Vehicles
New Vehicle Sales eCice Aging Vehicle Scrap Rate
by Product
Average Late Model Fuel Average Older Vehicle Fuel
Economy Economy
Per Technology Per Technology Older
Late Model FuelIlo Vehicle Fueln
Increase inTotal Economy Reduction in Total Late Economy Reduction in Older
Late Model Fuel Model Fuel Economy from Vehicle Fuel EconomyEconomy Aging from Scrapping
-Fuei Econoy of New
Vehicles>
Figure 3.13 - Representative Aging Chain/Co-flow for tracking fuel economy in the revised model
The inflow to "Late Model Vehicles" is New Vehicle Sales and the outflow is
Vehicle Aging. The inflow to the stock of Older Vehicles is Vehicle Aging and the
outflow is the Vehicle Scrap Rate. Equation 3.9 describes the behavior of the aging chain
formulation.
Equation 3.9 - Aging Chain Formulation
LMVehicles, (t) = J(Sales1 (s) - Aging, (s))ds + LMVehicles,(to)
to
Sales, = TMS, * MktSize
Aging.= LMVehicles,
NVLife
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LMVehiclesi
Sales,
TMSi
MktSize
Agingi
NVLife
= Late Model Vehicles of technology i, vehicles
= New Vehicle Sales of technology i, vehicles/year
= Technology Market Share of technology i, dmnl
= Size of the New Vehicle Market, vehicles/year
= Aging rate of technology i, vehicles/year
New Vehicle Life, years
The co-flow structure mirrors the structure of the main aging chain while providing
the key information necessary to yield the metric of interest (Sterman, 2000). In the Fuel
Economy example illustrated in Figure 3.13, I construct the stocks Total Late Model Fuel
Economy and Total Older Vehicle Fuel Economy. These stocks form an aging chain
similar, and parallel to, the first. Both flows contribute the necessary data for the metric we
wish to capture - in this case Average Late Model Fuel Economy and Average Older
Vehicle Fuel Economy per Equations 3.10 through 3.13. Equation 3.14 yields the metric of
interest, Average Fuel Economy for the fleet at any given time, by summing the two fuel
economy stocks over the entire vehicle fleet. Metrics 2 through 6 were constructed by
analogy. Equations 3.10 through 3.12 yield the remaining figures of merit.
Equation 3.10 - Average Late Model Fuel Economy
LMFE.
AvgLMFE =
LMVehicles,
where
AvgLMFE1
LMFE,
LMVehiclesi
= Average Late Model Fuel Economy of technology i, mpg*cars
= Late Model Fuel Economy of technology i, mpg
= Late Model Vehicles of technology i, cars
Equation 3.11 - Average Older Vehicle Fuel Economy
AvgOVFE' - 0 VFE
OVehicles,
where
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where
= Average Older Vehicle Fuel Economy of technology i, mpg*cars
= Older Vehicle Fuel Economy of technology i, mpg
Older Vehicles of technology i, cars
Equation 3.12 - Total Average Fleet Fuel Economy
Fle e tA vgFE AvgLMFE + AvgO VFE
LMVF +OVF
where
FleelAvgFE
LMVF
OVF
= Fleet Average Fuel Economy of technology i, mpg
= Late Model Vehicle Fleet, vehicles
= Older Vehicle Fleet, vehicles
Equation 3.13 - Average Vehicle Performance
FleetAvgPerf = AvgLMVPerf, + AvgOVPerf
LMVF + OVF
where
FleetAvgPerfi = Fleet Average Vehicle Performance of technology i, dmnl
AvgLMVPerfj = Average Late Model Vehicle Performance of technology i, dmnl
AvgOVPerfi = Average Older Vehicle Performance of technology i, dmnl
Equation 3.14 - Average Vehicle Range
AvgLMVR, + AvgOVR,
FleetAvgR, = MF VL VF + O F
where
= Fleet Average Vehicle Range of technology i, miles
= Average Late Model Vehicle Range of technology i, miles
= Average Older Vehicle Range of technology i, miles
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AvgOVFEi
o VFE,
OVehiclesi
FleetAvgRi
AvgLMVR 1
AvgOVR
III
+ Fleet Average Fuel +
Economy of Gas
Vehicles
Fleet Annual Oil
Consumption
<Vchicle Miles+
Traveled>
Gasoline Fleet
Total Late Model Total Gasoline + VMT Total Older Vehicle
Fuel Economy of Vehicle Fleet- ---- r Fuel Economy of
Gas Vehicles Gas Vehicles
+ + Total Vehicle Fleet +
Late Model Tech
Fraction in Fleet Per Technology Technology Fraction
+ Vehicle Fleet + in the Fleet
Total Late + +
Model Fleet
<Late Model
Vehicles> <Older Vehicles>
<Per Technology Late - - <Per Technology Older
Model Fuel Economy> Vehicle Fuel Economy>
Average Fuel
Economy
Figure 3.14 - Using the AgingChain/Co-flow Structure
(To capture the average fuel economy for a given technology and the fleet average fuel economy of all
vehicles on the road at any given time)
These data allow us to capture and track metrics that may be of importance to
decision-makers. Since the model allows the user to simulate a variety of strategies and
market conditions, explicit delineation of these critical outputs enables the decision-
maker to witness downstream impacts of any particular policy. Most importantly, the
aging chain/co-flow structure facilitates the application of trade studies to assist decision-
makers in choosing policies that maximize desired outcomes while minimizing
undesirable ones. Since this study examines fundamentally complex policy issues in
such arenas as air pollution and environmental security, the application of aging chain/co-
flow tools allows the policy analyst to track available options, how the world might
behave in response to possible choices, and what preferences might arise among possible
outcomes. Thus, I anticipate that these sub-models will contribute the foundation data
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underpinning any forthcoming policy recommendations in the larger thesis research
effort. The author hopes that the inclusion of these structures in the Revision Model will
improve our ability to predict the consequences of alternative policies and provide a
framework for valuing those consequences to make better decisions.
3.6 MODEL EXTENSIONS AND ADDITIONAL STRUCTURES
The following sections detail the construct of several key extensions to the
reference model. This includes the logic and structures used, the equations governing
system parameters and behaviors, and any decision rules used to simulate decision-making
activities.
3.6.1 CONSUMER SENSITIVITY To ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
The reference model employs a simple switch construct to account for consumer
sensitivity to environmental considerations in the purchase decision. That is, the consumer
is fully sensitive to environmental impacts, i.e. the switch is "on," or the consumer is
entirely negligent of such consequences, i.e. the switch is "off." In contrast, the revised
model treats environmental sensitivity as a dynamic, rather than discreet, parameter of the
consuming public that can be influenced over time. In the construct illustrated in Figure
3.15 below, consumers migrate from the stock of "environmentally insensitive" to the stock
of "environmentally conscious" as a function of the impact of the Public Awareness
Campaign lever. This lever is discussed in greater detail in the following section. For now,
it suffices to say that the model begins with the assumption that only 5% of the market
factors environmental impacts into their purchase decision. The Public Advertising
Campaign lever serves to educate consumers of the health and environmental consequences
of vehicle emissions. Thus, it enables the outflow of consumers from the "insensitive"
pool to the environmentally conscious pool.
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Environmental Impac
Consumer Fraction
Sensitive to
Environmental
Impact
Increase in
D'] Environmental
Awareness
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Public Ad Campaigns>
Consumer Fraction
Insensitive to
Environmental Impa t
Figure 3.15 - Consumer Sensitivity to Environmental Considerations in the purchase decision
The dynamic is distinguished from private marketing efforts, which raises
consumer awareness of the existence of product alternatives. Private marketing campaigns
may serve to simultaneously educate consumers regarding the health and environmental
benefits of their products, but I have chosen not to include this here to avoid potential
double counting. For simplicity, I have also chosen to exclude a "forgetting fraction" in
this basic construct. The author feels justified in doing so in that the attribute reflects the
evolutionary emergence of an environmentally responsible value system. Equation 3.15
outlines the formulation of these parameters.
Equation 3.15 - Formulation for Consumer Fraction Sensitive to Environmental Impact
CFlnsensitive = j(-Increase(s))ds + (1- Initial(t0 ))
Increase = CFlnsensitive * PA Campaign
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CFSensitive = j(+Increase(s))ds + Initial(t, )
to
where
Increase
PA Campaign
CFlnsensitive
CFSensitive
Initial
= Rate of increase in consumer environmental consciousness, 1/year
Awareness generation from public advertising, 1/year
= Consumer Fraction Insensitive to Environmental Impact, dmnl
= Consumer Fraction Sensitive to Environmental Impact, dmnl
Initial fraction of consumers sensitive to environmental impact, dmnl
The Sensitivity construct forwards the fraction of consumers sensitive to
environmental impact to the Attractiveness from Environmental Impact formulation for a
given technology. Equation 4.16 illustrates.
Equation 3.16 - Attractiveness of Environmental Impact
C EDC,
fEnv=adj EDCICE
AttractEnv, = (1+ CFSensitive) * fEnv
where
fEnv
fA d
EDC
EDCICE
AttractEnv
CFSensitive
= Function for Attractiveness from Environmental Impact, dmnl
= Environmental Adjustment Function, dmnl
= Environmental Damage Cost of technology i, $/vehicle
= Environmental Damage Cost of technology i, $/vehicle
= Attractiveness from Environmental Impact of technology i, dmnl
= Consumer Fraction Sensitive to Environmental Impact, dmnl
The above equations enable us to simulate the emergence of a stronger environmental value
system in the representative market, should we choose to do so.
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3.6.2 MARKET GROWTH
A key difference from the reference model is the inclusion of a simple market
growth "engine" that attempts to simulate the effect of population and vehicle market
growth on the feedback mechanisms discussed earlier. Figure 3.16 portrays the growth
engine construct for the North American vehicle market.
<Vehicle Scra i j
Rate> Total Vehicle
Scrap Rate
Total New
Fleet Vehicle Market
Change in Flee
Fractional Growth
in Fleet
Figure 3.16 - Market Growth Construct of the revised model
The construct begins with the state variable Fleet initialized at 200 million vehicles,
an approximation representative of the number of light duty vehicles on the road in the U.S.
market in 2002 (Ward's, 2000). The Fractional Growth in Fleet determines the rate of
vehicle fleet growth. The default value is 1.6% per year and is representative of the
historical rate of sales growth in the U.S. over the past thirty years (U.S. Census, 2000).
Equation 3.17 tallies the Total New Vehicle Market as the sum of both new vehicle market
growth resulting from historical increases in sales, and increasing vehicle turnover, derived
from the increasing segment of vehicles reaching the end of their 14-year service life.
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Equation 3.17 - Total New Vehicle Market
IoFleet = J(iAFleet(s)ds) + Fleet (tj
OldFleet,
Scrap =0 
'
-OVL
4
TotScrap = Scrap,
j=1
AFleet = Growth * Fleet
MarketGro = TotScrap + AFleet
where
Fleet = Size of the Total Vehicle Fleet, vehicles
Scrapi = Scrap Rate of technology i, vehicles/year
TotScrap = Total scrap rate of all vehicles, vehicles/year
AFleet = Change in Fleet size, vehicles/year
MarketGro = Total New Vehicle Market, vehicles/year
to, t = Initial time and current time, respectively, years
s = Point in time between initial and current time, years
ds = Time period for integration, years
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the inclusion of a market growth dynamic serves
both balancing and reinforcing roles in the actual marketplace.
3.6.3 DiSCOUNT RATE
In contrast to the reference model, the revised model brings the discount rate
applied to variable costs endogenous to the model. The discount rate equates the annual
rate of return applied by the consumer to future cash flows at the time of purchase. Typical
discount rates used in financial analysis range from 5-10% per year, representing the
opportunity cost of foregone interest payments from short-term debt instruments (Brealey
and Myers 2000). But consumers often exhibit quite different behavior when weighing
variable costs in their purchase decision. Studies of the home appliance market indicate
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that consumers often implicitly apply a much higher discount rate to savings derived from
energy efficiency, sometimes as high as 50% per year. This means the customer fails to
internalize much of this cost and therefore significantly discounts the importance of this
cost savings when considering their purchase. This may result from consumer expectations
of continued low variable cost, ambivalence over payments that are not current, or the
simple lack of consideration to this particular cost element.
For the purpose of this thesis, the author has dynamically linked fuel prices with the
discount rate to more accurately reflect consumer behavior patterns at the point of
purchase. Essentially, this involves a function that creates an inverse relationship between
gas prices and the discount rate. In other words, the discount rate dynamically decreases as
gas prices increase relative to historical expectations. Simply translated, as fuel costs
increase, the consumer implicitly applies more weight to future fuel costs when considering
the purchase of a vehicle. This function returns a discount rate ranging from 12.5% to
36%, based on increasing fuel cost as indicated by relative gas prices. Figure 3.17 below
illustrates the function for the discount rate with increasing relative gas prices translating to
decreasing discount rates.
35% -- ----- ---- -- --- --- -- -- -
30% --- - --- - - ----------- - --- - --- --- - -
25% --- --- --- - - - ------ - - -- - - -- - - -
0 20% -
15% -
10% --
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Fuel Cost Ratio
Figure 3.17 - Effect of Relative Gas Prices on Discount Rate
3.6.4 FEE-BATE PROGRAM
The Fee-bate Program represents a form of regulatory intervention that attempts to
redistribute externality costs to those consumers responsible for generating those costs.
Retail vehicle prices, nor fuel prices, accurately reflect the "true" cost of the vehicle to
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consumers because they ignore costs borne by society in the form of reduced quality of life.
The "Fee-bate" construct in the revised model uses a redistribution scheme based on the
differential between the environmental damage cost of a given technology and the
benchmark cost created by the incumbent propulsion mode - the ICE. Purchasers of a
cleaner propulsion mode relative to the ICE will receive an incentive rebate equal to some
function of the environmental damage cost differential. Conversely, purchasers of dirtier
modes will be subject to a fee equal to some function of the cost differential.
The fee-bate attempts to achieve two goals. First, it lowers the cost barrier of new
and cleaner technologies to consumers by subsidizing them with funds drawn from fees
assigned to dirtier technologies. By closing the cost gap, consumers can focus on other
performance-based purchase criteria. Second, by lowering the cost hurdle at the
introductory phase, technologies capable of competing with dominant modes can rapidly
achieve market penetration, enabling producers to quickly achieve scale economies to drive
down manufacturing costs. Third, because fees are initially drawn from a significant pool
of vehicles and transferred to a much smaller pool of new vehicles, the per-vehicle charge
is a fraction of the actual damage cost differential. Thus, fees phase in incrementally, grow
with successful adoption of alternatives, and then phase out as scale economies drive down
the real cost of alternatives and obviate the need for subsidies.
The revised model applies a formula based on the fraction of late model
technologies in the vehicle fleet. Equation 3.18 describes the calculation of the Feebate
Fraction. This fraction is then applied to the differential in environmental damage cost to
yield the fee that will be levied against the ICE or the rebate provided the cleaner
alternative. These amounts are added or subtracted against the vehicle purchase price.
Equation 3.18 - Feebate formulation
FeebateFrxnlCE = 1.2 - (LMTFFeet)cE
FeebateFrxni = I - (LMTFFleeti
FeebatePgmi = (EDCICE - EDC,)*FeebateFrxnni
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where
FeebateFrxnlcE = Fee fraction charged to the ICE retail price, dmnl
FeebateFrxnj = Rebate fraction deducted from the retail price of
alternative technologies, dmnl
FeebatePgm1  = Total fee/rebate applied, $/vehicle
The fee-bate construct is a scenario variable that includes a basic switch, allowing the user
to turn this particular policy intervention on or off, based upon the desired scenario.
3.6.5 PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN
The Public Awareness Campaign construct serves to stimulate awareness of the
adverse quality of life and health impacts of mobile source air pollution as well as to seed
awareness of the availability of alternative products on the market. In the role of the
former, media campaigns analogous to anti-tobacco advertisements serve to educate the
public of the potential hazards to individuals and society posed by emissions of criteria air
pollutants. In this sense, the effort parallels a grass roots effort to instill more
environmentally responsible behavior by the consuming public.
Concurrently, the investment would complement privately funded industry
marketing campaigns, thereby serving to accelerate the awareness and word-of-mouth
dynamics in the model. In this role, publicly funded advertisements essentially expand the
pool of potential consumers in the awareness stimuli exogenous to the purchase decision.
At the same time, the campaign works to strengthen environmentally responsible consumer
behavior that would result in consumers ascribing greater value to environmental
considerations during the vehicle purchase decision process. In this sense, the campaign
works to influence decision variables endogenous to the consumer purchase decision.
Equation 3.19 lists the formulas applied.
Equation 3.19 - Public Advertising Campaign
PACAware = MktgNorm*(PACRel)e
PACRel = PA CExpend
Baseline
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PA CA ware
MktgNorm
PA CRel
e
PACExpend
Baseline
= Awareness generation from Public Ad Campaign, 1/year
= Normal awareness generation from marketing, 0.05/year
= Relative strength of Public Ad Campaign, dmnl
= Marketing elasticity, dmnl
= Expenditure on Public Ad Campaign, dmnl/year
= Baseline private spending on marketing, equal to unity, dmnl/year
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4 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION SCENARIOS
I open this chapter with a discussion of how the formulations in the previous
chapter interact under the baseline assumptions of the revised model. I outline four
scenarios, the criteria for their selection, and the assumptions underlying each. I then
present the results of each simulation and close with a brief interpretation of their basic
meaning. Each scenario illustrates a potential adoption pathway for the representative
propulsion architecture. For simplicity, I have chosen to "fix" each major technology with
a specific energy carrier, even though one could experiment with a variety of energy
carriers for each of the technologies represented.
Second, the reader should bear in mind that the model does not attempt to "evolve"
the energy infrastructure as with the vehicle-specific attributes deemed crucial to the
customer purchase decision. Thus, some key metrics such as fleet annual fuel consumption
and Environmental Damage Cost may appear worse than might actually occur, should a
greater fraction of the U.S. power grid derive energy from renewable resources. The model
as presented should be considered a work in progress, subject to continued refinement and
extension. The purpose of providing these metrics is to lend the reader a sense of the scale
of the problem and the patterns that might emerge under a variety of possible conditions.
Thus, the reader is cautioned to consider the results presented in relative, vice absolute
terms.
4.1 BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS
For the purpose of this thesis, the baseline scenario is equivalent to the scenario that
yields continued ICE domination of the vehicle market. It is presented as Scenario 1, and
represents simulation under the default values assigned to the set of Scenario Variables to
be discussed shortly. These values represent the state of technologies, markets, and value
systems, as they exist today. I use actual and verifiable data where possible. However, due
to the proprietary nature of some figures, I have chosen to infer generic or arbitrary values
where appropriate. The author derived these approximations via his best educated guess,
based on discussions with industry representatives or gleaned from available literature.
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Static Assumptions
The set of scenarios that follow were selected to represent their respective class of
propulsion architectures. That is to say that the fundamental propulsion technologies stem
from four primary and discernible architectures, each designed to leverage the potential
benefits derived from their respective power generation and delivery methods. The
architectures chosen consist of the grid-independent variants of the internal combustion
engine (ICE), the hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), the fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV), and
the grid-dependent battery electric vehicle (BEV).
Table 4.1 on the following page lists the crucial design assumptions of each of the
propulsion architectures selected. ICE-based platforms, to include the HEV, employ a
spark-ignition direct-injection (SIDI) engine. For the purpose of this thesis, compression-
ignition engines (i.e. diesel) have been omitted primarily due to Tier 2 regulatory
requirements that effectively outlaw the levels of NOx and particulate emissions associated
with diesel engines. The author should note, however, that industry continues to develop
technologies such as plasma-based lean burn and plasma NOx trap after-treatment that may
enable automakers to achieve order-of-magnitude reductions in these emissions. The
allure of diesel is its superior energy density, roughly 10% higher than the gasoline
equivalent. This characteristic gives diesel its 25-30% edge in fuel economy over gasoline-
powered vehicles. Assuming automakers are able to reduce emissions (or dilute mandates)
to comply with forthcoming law, diesels will still face the relative lack of sufficient fueling
infrastructure to support significant adoption in the marketplace.
For the reasons above, all ICE-based technologies are assumed to run on gasoline.
The FCEV, on the other hand, draws from direct, on-board storage of compressed
hydrogen and therefore requires no on-board reformer to convert conventional fuels to a
hydrogen carrier. Alternatively, the BEV draws power directly from the U.S. electricity
grid; it is therefore the only platform represented that does not operate independent of the
power grid. The default base gas price is $1.43/gallon and is consistent within the range of
retail gas prices observed historically (EIA, 2001). Although CEES projects hydrogen
costs of $1.70 per gasoline-equivalent gallon (Ogden, 2002), to maintain maximum
plausibility the model assumes a per gallon gasoline-equivalent cost of hydrogen of $2.20,
consistent with the more conservative estimates provided by Weiss et al (2000). This
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Static Assumptions ICE HEV FCEV BEV Source
Powerplant -SIDI ICE -101 ICE -Fuel Cell Stack -Electric Motor Wang 2001
-Electric Motor -Electric Motor
Fuel Gasoline Gasoline Direct Hydrogen Power Grid Wang 2001
Energy Carrier Gasoline Gasoline Hydrogen Electric Potential Wang 2001
Fuel/Energy Cost $1.43 $1.43 $2.20 $1.62 Weiss 2000[Per GEG]
Initial Gasoline-
Equivalent Fuel 22.4 42.6 72.0 67.2 Wang 2001
Economy, [miles/gal]
Initial Powertrain Weiss 2000
System Cost $4,770 $9,000 $100,OOT $18,000 + Industry Est.*
Initial Production 300,000,000 40,000 100 10,000 Estimate**Experience [units]
On-Board Fuel No No No No Wang 2001Processing
Grid
Dependence Grid Independent Grid Independent Independent Grid Dependent Wang 2001
*Cost indicated includes total powertrain system costs for the propulsion architecture and are derived from industry estimates.
**Initial cumulative production experience figures are "order-of-magnitude" approximations intended to calibrate learning curve dynamics.
Table 4.1 - Basic Design Assumptions for the Scenario Set
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report also provides the initial cost of the ICE propulsion system. The author has approximated
the generic current cost of the set of alternative systems based on industry interviews that
provide order-of-magnitude accuracy only. Initial fuel economies for the set of technologies
are consistent with calculations provided by the GREET model (Wang, 2001). The author
estimated cumulative production experience figures as order-of-magnitude approximations
derived from historical industry production volumes for the purpose of calibrating learning
curve effects with observed industry patterns.
4.2 SCENARIO VARIABLES
In keeping with the intent to establish maximum plausibility of the scenarios and to
ensure that model variables are fairly straightforward, the author has attempted to keep user-
based changes to a minimum. Doing so enables the user to generate distinct scenarios based on
a minimum of parameter adjustments. The following set of variables comprises the scenario
variables explicitly delineated for user adjustment to generate the scenarios discussed in the
remaining sections of the thesis.
1. Initial Relative Performance
The model establishes the performance of the set of alternative technologies relative to
the propulsion architecture dominant in the existing market. Thus, the model fixes the ICE at
unity for the entirety of the simulation period and initializes all other architectures as some
fraction of unity. This fraction represents the current state of development of the performance
attribute for a given technology relative to the benchmark ICE. Here, performance is measured
in terms of the power-to-weight ratio (PWR) based on the study provided by Weiss et al
(2000). In contrast to this report, however, the default assumption of the revised model does
not explicitly normalize this attribute to compare other vehicle characteristics. Thus,
performance varies initially, and throughout the simulation period. Furthermore, the user can
adjust the initializing parameters only. Unlike the static performance assumption of the
reference model, upon simulation, the relative state of performance for a given technology may
evolve from the initial, user-defined, reference point.
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2. Relative Strength of the Marketing Effort
This variable represents one of the private-sector levers from which management may
use to execute a particular product strategy. The model simulates this lever as a ratio of the
spending on marketing for the given technology relative to the baseline marketing spending for
the vehicle platform. The default assumption is set to unity. Thus, a user-defined strength of
"2" equates to a doubling of marketing and media-based efforts to promote the alternative
technology relative to the baseline.
3. Initial Infrastructure Coverage
As per the reference model, this user-defined variable provides an additional lever for
product strategy and represents the availability of a supporting fuel, maintenance, and service
infrastructure necessary to seed vehicle demand at the start of the simulation. Again, the model
benchmarks the set of alternative technologies relative to the dominant technology, setting the
ICE at unity for the duration of the simulation. Alternatives are initialized as some fraction of
unity. The default value of the HEV is set to 0.9, reflecting the pre-existence of a necessary
fueling infrastructure, but the initial lack of skilled technicians required for service and
maintenance. The default values of the FCEV and EV technologies are set at 0.01 (1%
coverage) reflecting the lack of both the necessary fueling infrastructure and adequate service
and maintenance support. The user may adjust the FCEV and EV values to reflect intensive
investment by private and/or public entities prior to introduction in order to circumvent the
chicken-and-egg dilemma and seed initial demand.
4. Initial Target Availability
The default initial target availability for the set of alternative propulsion technologies at
near zero (1%). This lever could represent a deliberate, internally driven industry effort to
advance an alternative technology as part of a cohesive strategy to market alternative vehicles.
Alternatively, it could reflect external intervention in the form of zero tailpipe emissions
vehicle (ZEV) mandates or near-zero emissions mandates. Such mandates require that
automakers meet certain threshold sales targets for cleaner vehicles as a minimum percentage
of total vehicles sold annually.
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5. Initial Target Product Investment
The initial target product investment for a given propulsion architecture represents the
deliberate infusion of funds to accelerate product-based performance improvements by
management. Product-based improvements refer to the set of vehicle attributes, such as range,
fuel economy, and performance, considered most relevant by consumers in making their
purchase decision. This scenario variable provides the key lever by which management can
attempt to close the performance gap between actual and desired vehicle attributes. The reader
should note that this scenario variable is static in that it does not adjust dynamically as market
adoption patterns emerge over time. The default value for all technologies except the ICE
(benchmarked at unity) is 0.01 (1%).
The model also factors in "spillover" effects from technology investment. That is,
investments targeted toward advancing one propulsion technology concurrently benefits
development of other technologies that share common systems and components. For example,
investments targeted at HEV system development might spawn technologies applicable for use
in FCEV platforms if, for example, the two systems rely on similar electric motors, generators,
or other common componentry.
6. Profit Margin
The default value for the profit margin applied to a given technology is 5%. Profit
margin is an exogenous scenario variable; once the user defines this variable, it remains fixed
for the duration of the simulation regardless of demand and adoption patterns. The user may
adjust the profit margin for a particular technology downward in order to lower the purchase
price and seed demand as part of a targeted strategy to gain market penetration and scale
economies, to learn from the early market, or to promote a public image of environmental
responsibility. Both Toyota and Honda have chosen to price their Prius and Insight HEV
models well below cost in the North American market. The user could simulate this strategy
by indicating a negative profit margin for the HEV technology.
7. Initial Sensitivity to Environmental Factors
The initial sensitivity to environmental factors represents the initial assumption
regarding the portion of the population considered environmentally aware enough to factor
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environmental considerations into their purchase decision. The default value is 5%, meaning
that roughly one-in-twenty consumers will weigh this factor when buying their next car.
Again, the user can choose to seed environmental awareness of the consumer market prior to
the launch of product by indicating a higher initial sensitivity. Alternatively, the user could
grow sensitivity by choosing to fund a public advertising campaign targeted at making the
public aware of the adverse health and environmental impacts of pollutant emissions.
8. Relative Strength of the Public Ad Campaign
This variable represents one of the public-sector levers from which non-profit or
government entities may attempt to modify the purchasing behavior of consumers. The model
simulates this lever via a construct analogous to the relative strength of the marketing effort. It
is a ratio of the spending on a public advertising campaign relative to the baseline marketing
spending for the vehicle platform. The default assumption is zero, indicating that no such
campaign is active. Thus, a user-defined strength of "1" is equivalent to the level of effort
expended by industry marketing activities to promote a particular model. The model assumes
it achieves the equivalent impact of private-sector marketing and media-based efforts to
promote the alternative technology relative to the baseline. The Public Ad Campaign affects
two consumer dynamics: awareness of cleaner alternatives and sensitivity to environmental
factors.
9. Gasoline Price Increase & Time of Gasoline Price Increase
The user can specify an increase in the price of gasoline and the time at which the
increase takes effect. Doing so enables the user to simulate either exogenous market supply
and demand forces at work or a government-imposed gasoline tax. Thus, the user can witness
the potential downstream impacts of these external forces on market adoption patterns. The
baseline assumption is zero, indicating that gasoline prices remain fixed at the base price of
$1.43/gallon for the duration of the simulation.
10. Fee-bate Program
The fee-bate program, described in detail in Chapter 4, represents a public sector
intervention to account for externality costs in vehicle price. This scenario variable employs a
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switch construct with a default value of zero, allowing the user to turn this particular
intervention "on" by assigning the switch a value of 1. The user can thus simulate the impact
of this public intervention congruent with other scenario adjustments.
4.3 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
With the static assumptions and scenario variables defined, we now turn to the specific
characteristics of the scenario set. Table 4.2 on the following page summarizes all assumptions
and notes adjustments to the default values in bold. These adjustments define the scenarios
discussed in this section.
Note that Scenario 1 involves no adjustment to the default parameters, and thus
represents the ICE domination future, the baseline for all other scenarios. To create an
alternative to the status quo, it is necessary to adjust key scenario variables. For the HEV
competition scenario, we adjust five parameters from the default assumptions. These consist of
a combination of both private sector strategy and public sector policy intervention. The FCEV
and BEV scenarios, on the other hand, entail nine adjustments each, corresponding with the
higher level of stakeholder activities, contributions, and cooperation required to realize these
futures.
Given these conditions, Table 4.3 lists figures for the market share of a given
propulsion architecture and the fraction of that technology comprising the fleet of all vehicles
on the road after thirty years. Table 4.4 lists values for the key progress metrics we wish to
track for each scenario in ten-year increments. Table 4.5 presents this same data as a percent
change over the baseline year (2002). I now turn to a discussion of the findings provided by
each scenario simulation.
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Scenario Variable Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3: Scenario 4:
ICE Domination Hybrid Competition Fuel Cell Transition EV Take-Off
Propulsion>> >>
Architecture U wIU Li
- -
P60 1 4--&LI
Initial Performance 1 0.7 0.6 0.6 1 0.7 0.6 0.6 1 0.7 0.6 0.6 1 0.7 0.6 0.6
Relative Strength of I 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 4
the Marketing Effort
Initial Infrastructure
Coverage 1.0 0.9 0.01 0.01 1.0 0.9 0.01 0.01 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.01 1.0 0.9 0.01 0.2
Initial Target 1.0 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.0 0.2 0.01 0.01 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.01 1.0 0.2 0.01 0.2
Availability I_ __ ____
Initial Target Product 1.0 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.0 0.4 0.01 0.01 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.01 1.0 0.2 0.01 0.4Investment
Profit Margin 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Initial Sensitivity to 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Environment
Relative Strength of 0Public Ad Campaign
Gasoline Price 0 0++$3
Increase
Feebate Program OFF ON ON ON
(Changes to default values are noted in bold)
Table 4.2 - Scenario Variable assumptions for the Scenario Set
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Product Market
Share
Technology
Fraction in the
Fleet
1: ICE Dominationi Scenario 2: HEV Competition Scenario 3: FCEV Transition 
Scenario 4: EV Take-off
[%]
1%]
> > w
U-
17.3 0.8 0.9 45.4
6.2 0.5 0.6 58.3
w. x
0.4 0.4 18.2 32
0.3 0.3 43.8 36.6
w
0.5 28.1 52.0 0.9 19
0.7 45.6 43.6 0.9 9.9
Table 4.3 - Year 2032 Product Market Share & Technology Fraction in the Fleet Projections
Base
Year
Scenario 1: Scenario 2:
ICE Domination HEV Competition
N N N N N
Progress Metric Units o Q - C
N N N CN N
Total Vehicle Pollutant Billions of
Emissions Kg/yr 16 18.7 21.8 25 18.5
Total Vehicle GHG Billions of 1,234 1,397 1,534 1,668 1,380
Emissions Kg/yr
Average Fuel Economy
of Gas Vehicles Miles/gallon 22.4 23.2 24.9 27.1 23.8
Aggregate Average Miles/gallon 22.4 23.3 25.1 27.6 23.8
Fuel Economy
Fleet Annual Oil Billions of
Consumption gallons/year 107.1 121.1 132.1 1412 118.4
Total On-Road Cost of Billions of 1,223 1,382 1,574 1778 1,367
Environmental Damage $US/year
20.3
1,421
28.3
28.5
116.2
1,465
Scenario 3:
FCEV Transition
C4
18.2
1,292
25.1
25.3
109.4
1,269
N
18.9
1,205
32.4
32.6
94.7
1,278
Table 4.4 - Key Progress Indicators by Scenario at 10-year Increments
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Scenario 4:
EV Take-off
N
N
18.2
1,278
25.8
N
N
0
N
19.1
1,182
32.9
37.1
88.2
1,278
26.9
106.3
1,254
  inati i Scenario 2: HEV Competition Scenario 3: FCEV Transition
U,
I Base I Domin
N
0
0
N
N
io 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3: Scenario 4:
HEV FCEV EV Take-off
ation Competition Transition
N
N
0
N
Total Vehicle Pollutant Emissions
Billions of Kg/yr 16 16.9 36.,
Total Vehicle GHG Emissions
Billions of Kg/yr 1,234 13.2 24.
Average On-Road Fuel Economy
of Gas Vehicles Miles/gallon 22.4 3.6 11.2
Aggregate Average Fuel Economy
Miles/gallon 22.4 4.0 12.1
Fleet Annual Oil Consumption Billions of
gallons/year 107.1 13.1 23.C
Total On-Road Cost of
Environmental Damage Billions of $US/year 1,223 13.0 28.
N
N
15.6
11.8
6.3
6.3
10.6
11.8
N
N
0
N
26.
15. 9
26.%
27.'e
8.5
19.E
N
N
13.8
4.7
12.1
12.9
2.1
3.8
N
N
18.1
-2.4
44.6
45.5
-11.6
4.5
N
N
13.8
3.6
15.2
20.1
-0.7
2.5
N
N
0
N
19.4
-4.2
46.9
65.6
-17.6
4.5
23.8
-6.8
92.9
104.5
-25 2
9.6
Table 4.5 - Percent change in Key Progress Indicators by Scenario at 10-year Increments
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4.3.1 SCENARIO 1 (BASELINE): ICE DOMINATION
Scenario Basis
In the ICE Domination scenario, gasoline prices remain unchanged at levels
considered relatively affordable to consumers. Because gas prices are low, consumers fail
to internalize fuel costs, implicitly discounting the costs of refueling by 36%, a figure
congruent with energy studies in the appliance sector. Only 5% of consumers internalize
environmental considerations in their purchase decision and this figure remains static
through the course of the simulation period. This scenario is equivalent to a "laissez faire"
approach to vehicle development, in which stakeholders accept the status quo and make
little effort to actively intervene in the marketplace.
Findings
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the market adoption pattern for the baseline scenario.
In the absence of targeted industry investment in product development or marketing, public
policy intervention, or external market shocks such as a gasoline increase, ICE
architectures easily dominate the market over the thirty-year scenario period. HEV
platforms do eventually establish a minimally respectable level of market penetration,
comprising over 17% of sales by 2032, and over 6% penetration of the total fleet of
vehicles on the road.
Technology Market Share
0.75
ICE
0 Status Quo
0.5 0 No Pokcy Intervention
HEV
0.25 FCEV
0 1 -BEV
2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030
Year
Figure 4.1 - Technology Market Share in the ICE Domination Scenario
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In contrast, FCEV and BEV propulsion architectures achieve negligible (<1%)
market penetration over the same period. This can be attributed to the more severe
infrastructure support hurdles facing these technologies. HEVs on the other hand, benefit
from a pre-existing gasoline fueling infrastructure.
The reader should note that the adoption of HEV platforms is highly dependent on
model assumptions and inputs. Although the default level of investment in marketing is
equal to one, automakers could constrain HEV demand significantly through the awareness
feedback mechanism by refusing to invest in HEV product marketing. More importantly,
the model does not attempt to distinguish between foreign and domestic auto interests.
Thus, if domestic automakers deliberately suppressed efforts to stimulate HEV awareness
through marketing channels, foreign automakers may choose to do so anyway.
One of the most fascinating aspects of this "race" amongst a set of potential
technologies, is the jockeying of firms over time, each with their own strategy for
technology leadership, in order to position themselves to capture value should a particular
technology "take-off." The disparity amongst firms in their relative core competencies and
competitive position with regard to leadership across the spectrum of potential propulsion
technologies spawns a number of conflicts of interests. These conflicts represent
misalignments in incentive structures that can result in significant impediments to
innovation and progress.
For example, consider Firm A: a domestic firm that holds a key leadership position
in electric vehicle technologies, but suffers relative to its competitors in hybrid-based
platforms. We could expect this firm to exert its market power to lobby government
representatives and influence value networks in order to create a market environment
nurturing of its own technology and hostile to Firm B, a foreign firm with a technological
lead in HEV architectures. In order for Firm A to protect its potential EV market from
possible losses that might be incurred should HEVs enter at more affordable prices, Firm A
might choose to lobby against a proposed revision of state mandates that would allow a
more liberal interpretation of "Zero-Emission Vehicles" to include "Near Zero-Emission"
technologies such as the HEV.
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4.3.2 SCENARIO 2: HYBRID COMPETITION
Scenario Basis
Referring back to Table 4.2, the HEV Competition scenario again assumes zero
increase in gasoline price over the thirty-year simulation period. As a result, the scenario
basis remains equivalent to the conditions specified in the baseline ICE Domination
scenario. In contrast to Scenario 1, I adjusted five scenario variables to create the behavior
observed. Fundamentally, this involved a coordinated stakeholder effort to prepare the
market for the successful entry of HEV technologies. Industry strategy includes a 40%
targeted investment in product development above the baseline combined with a marketing
effort double the baseline. Public sector interventions include the public advertising
campaign to seed awareness and environmental sensitivity and the fee-bate program to fold
externality costs into the purchase decision, thereby stimulating demand for cleaner
technologies. The scenario initializes target availability of the HEV platform at 20%. The
reader may interpret this as a function of internal industry strategy to reduce risk exposure,
test demand, and provide or react to a competitive stimulus. Alternatively, the target might
also represent near-zero emissions mandates required by law.
Findings
Figure 4.2 below illustrates the market share of annual fleet sales by propulsion
type. In contrast to Scenario 1, we witness a much earlier and significant penetration of
HEV technologies, with an inflection point signifying take-off and denoted by the dotted
line around year ten (2012), vice year 26 (2028) in the baseline scenario.
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Figure 4.2 - Technology Market Share as a fraction of total sales for the HEV Competition scenario
There are several implications suggested by the adoption pattern that emerges in
this scenario. I caution the reader that each should be interpreted in terms of the directional
relationship suggested rather than any absolute points of data. First, stakeholders may
interpret the activities required by both private and public sector entities as a plausible
potential future. One might argue, however, that auto and energy interests might contest
the imposition of fee-bate structures that create undo advantage to competition. For
example, a firm with a leadership position in HEV-based development might lobby against
a fee-bate regime that provides incentive to fuel cell or battery electric technologies.
Avoiding this particular perverse incentive - the exercise of market power to influence
standard-setting bodies, regulatory entities, value chain members, or other stakeholders -
requires a context-based fee-bate regime that dictates the desired health and environmental
outcomes only while avoiding dictates that directly specify or favor a particular technology
solution. Second, note that the coordination of both private and public sector activities
accelerates the "take-off" 'inflection in the market by roughly 16 years, with attendant
benefits to environmental, public health, and energy security impacts that will be discussed
in the following chapter.
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4.3.3 SCENARIO 3: FUEL CELL TRANSITION
Scenario Basis
The third scenario poses the question: what conditions are necessary to achieve
market penetration and take-off of fuel cell-based propulsion systems in the mass market?
Table 4.2 indicates that for this particular scenario, the author adjusted nine scenario
variables vice the five under Scenario 2. Clearly, for fuel cell-based technologies to
emerge as a respectable competitor in the mass market, it will have to reach a state of
maturity capable of competing on vehicle attribute terms with HEV platforms. The FCEV
propulsion scenario envisions entry to the market in its current state of development,
assumed by default to be 60% that of the ICE.
It will also take concerted coordination amongst auto, energy, government, and
institutional stakeholders to overcome the chicken-and-egg dilemma and lower the barriers
that impede fuel cell entry into the mainstream transportation market. Industry actions
include a more concerted marketing effort than was the case in Scenario 2. More
importantly, in contrast to the HEV Competition future envisaged in Scenario 2, FCEV
technologies require the parallel development of a supporting infrastructure. Thus, I have
adjusted this scenario variable to reflect emplacement of such infrastructure, equivalent to
20% relative to the ICE. The model assumes that this coverage is achieved prior to the
introduction of fuel cell-based platforms to the mass market. Furthermore, the model does
not distinguish the sources of this coverage; it could reflect the investment of a single
stakeholder, or it could result from the combined investment of auto, energy, government,
and other institutional entities.
In addition to the variable adjustments made to the HEV Competition scenario, the
FCEV propulsion platform requires four additional interventions. External market
conditions and public sector interventions must combine to a $1 real increase in gasoline
price (equivalent to a 70% increase). This 70% increase in could reflect supply or demand-
based market condition futures and/or the imposition of a gasoline tax by government.
Consequently, the discount rate associated with fuel cost decreases from the 36% level of
the previous two scenarios, to 28%, reflecting greater consideration of fuel cost to the
consumer at the point of purchase. The fee-bate program is active. Finally, this scenario
operates from the supposition that HEV development continues in parallel with fuel cell
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development efforts during the same period. The model, however, does not factor in the
maturing of the technology via complementary market segments, such as distributed
power. Many of the leading firms in fuel cell power have targeted the commercial and
residential distributed power markets as prerequisites to achieve the early revenue streams
necessary to support continued development for future transportation applications. Figure
4.3 illustrates the results of this scenario.
Findings
Technology Market Share
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Figure 4.3 - Technology Market Share as a fraction of total sales for the FCEV Transition scenario
The adoption pattern of Scenario 3 suggests some notable characteristics. First,
note that HEV and FCEV-based platforms compete for market share early on. This is
attributable to the impact of the fee-bate on reducing the purchase cost of FCEV platforms
to a level competitive with alternatives. Within the decade, hybrids take-off (inflection
point at year 2011, approximately), moving quickly into the marketplace. Fuel cells,
however, reach a plateau at about 7% market share and languish for a decade before
achieving an inflection point signifying take-off. We can attribute this pattern to the non-
linear nature of infrastructure coverage desired by industry interests. Industry stakeholders
require that FCEV platforms achieve a certain threshold of penetration into the fleet before
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they will more fully commit to infrastructure development. This pattern corresponds with
the findings of Metcalf (2000) and indicates that a number of years pass before FCEV-
based platforms breach the threshold required for energy companies to gain the incentive to
invest in greater infrastructure coverage.
Another intriguing pattern analogous to the findings of Metcalf (2000) is the
"hybrid hump" phenomenon. That is, FCEV propulsion architectures achieve take-off at
the cost of ICE and hybrid technologies. We can surmise that the strength of the market
growth dynamic is insufficient to satiate increasing demand for FCEV-based product.
Therefore, adoption behavior is more characteristics of a saturated market in that the
balancing dynamic of competition amongst technology platforms reflects a "zero-sum"
game: one technology's gain comes at a competing technology's loss.
Examining Figure 5.5 yields another interesting pattern of behavior in that we
witness two technological disruptions that change the basis for competition amongst
propulsion architectures. ICE platforms dominate the market at the outset, but HEV
technologies displace them within two decades' time. The simulation period concludes at
the thirty-year point, just as FCEV-based platforms achieve take-off. If were to extend the
simulation period out an additional twenty years to 2052, we would witness the decline of
HEV platforms and the emergence of FCEV technologies in less than twenty years' time.
In sum, we witness an acceleration of the propulsion technology life cycle through all
phases of development. This stands in stark contrast to industry history, considering that
ICE-based designs have dominated the automotive market for over 70 years. I leave a
more detailed discussion of this observation for the following chapter.
4.3.4 SCENARIO 4: BATTERY ELECTRIC TAKE-OFF
The final scenario considers the conditions necessary for grid-dependent battery
electric-based propulsion systems to take off in the mainstream market.
Scenario Basis
Table 4.2 indicates that for this particular scenario, the author adjusted nine
scenario variables in a manner analogous to Scenario 3. Exceptions include the necessity
to quadruple marketing strength over the baseline and to increase gas prices by $3 per
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gallon, representing an over 300% increase in this parameter. The increase in real cost
translates to a consumer perceived discount rate applied to fuel cost of just under 21%, a
conservative figure under the circumstances. Although less plausible than Scenario 3, this
increase could consist of external market supply and demand forces and/or it could stem
from the imposition of a gasoline tax. In either case, the reader should note that the
increase approximates the real cost of petrol to consumers in foreign markets such as
Europe.
The BEV faces many of the same infrastructure-based barriers that face the FCEV.
However, despite its affordability relative to its FCEV counterpart, the BEV platform
suffers additionally from diminished range in its current state of technological
development. As in Scenario 3, FCEV technologies require the parallel development of a
supporting infrastructure. Thus, I have adjusted this scenario variable to reflect
emplacement of such infrastructure equivalent to 20% relative to the ICE. The model
assumes that this coverage is achieved prior to the introduction of BEV-based platforms to
the mass market. As previously indicated, the model does not distinguish the sources of
this coverage; it could reflect the investment of a single stakeholder, or it could result from
the combined investment of auto, energy, and government entities.
Findings
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Figure 4.4 - Technology Market Share as a fraction of total sales for the EV Take-Off scenario
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Analogous to Scenario 3, the BEV achieves a market "beachhead" early on due to
the equalizing effect of the fee-bate regime on vehicle purchase price. We can surmise
from Figure 4.4 that HEV platforms, once again, achieve take-off within a decade whereas
comparable BEV platforms hit a plateau by 2014 and actually shed a fractional amount of
share before achieving the critical fleet fraction necessary for the provision of infrastructure
by energy stakeholders. Once infrastructure comes on line to support the technology,
combined with evolutionary advances in battery technology that extend range, BEV
propulsion architectures achieve take-off in the mainstream market as indicated by the
inflection point in the final decade of the simulation period. In order to avoid bias, the
model does not factor in breakthroughs in battery or energy provision technologies.
Note, however, that at the tail end of the simulation, BEV-platforms appear to reach
another inflection point. This signifies that the technology might have reached the limit of
its penetration, given the performance constraint of the range attribute and the relative
improvement of the environmental factors attribute of its HEV cousin. Thus, it appears
that the two technologies coexist in that they divide and maintain their respective share of
the market.
The next section will attempt to recommend a preferred strategy to stakeholders by
re-examining each of these scenarios in the context of the key sustainability metrics
discussed in Chapter 4.
4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL, PUBLIC HEALTH, & ENERGY SECURITY
The four scenarios discussed in the previous sections of this chapter represent
potential futures based on the dynamics and parameters considered by a single model. The
purpose of employing such a model is to gain insight to certain market dynamics in order to
ascertain risk, manage that risk, and ensure that potential outcomes achieve desired
objectives. Upon setting out, the goal of employing a system dynamics-based model were
three-fold: (1) to examine the conditions necessary for the adoption of cleaner propulsion
technologies by the mass market, (2) to observe the system-wide impacts of adoption
patterns in the North American market, and (3) to determine how well the combination of
industry strategy, regulatory policy, and market conditions achieved desired social
- 127 -
objectives. What the model could not lend us, however, is insight into the methods for
successfully delivering advanced propulsion platforms to mainstream consumer markets. I
leave this discussion for the remaining chapters.
4.4.1 SOLUTION PATHWAYS
To date, federal and state governments have attempted to promote research and
development of technologies that hold the promise of achieving environmental, health, and
national security objectives.
USABC
In the early 1990's, the federal government helped forge the U.S. Advanced Battery
Consortium (USABC), a partnership amongst key auto industry OEMs and battery
suppliers to allow cooperation that could speed the development of an advanced battery
capable of achieving the performance requirements demanded of transportation
applications. During this time, GM came to market with its EV1, the first production
electric vehicle in 70 years. Unfortunately, although the USABC achieved significant
progress, it ultimately failed to attain the order-of-magnitude gains in range, life, and cost
reduction necessary to reach mainstream market requirements and appease the players
involved.
PNGV
Alternatively, the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV),
inaugurated by the Clinton Administration in September of 1993, set as its goal the
building of a five-passenger sedan capable of accelerating to 55 mph in less than 12
seconds while achieving three times the then-current average of 27.5 mpg (Shnayerson,
1996). The proclamation favored no single technological solution such as EVs, but
required results within a decade's time. Like USABC, the federal government would share
costs with industry while allowing collaboration amongst the major OEMs and suppliers to
define standards and speed solutions to market. But also like USABC, while
demonstration vehicles such as GM's Precept, Ford's P2000, and DaimlerChrysler's
NECAR series proved out the potential for advanced fuel/vehicle systems in passenger
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vehicles, the effort failed to spawn a production vehicle from the domestic automakers.
U.S. firms still consider cost-effective platforms generations away from mass-market
commercialization.
Freedom Car
Most recently, the Bush Administration cut substantial funding to PNGV in favor
of the "Freedom Car" proposal. "Freedom Car" would yet again represent an
industry/government partnership to speed the development of cleaner technologies, this
time based on fuel cells, to market. While a promising technology for weaning the
American public away from fossil fuels and toward hydrogen, a much more ubiquitous
energy carrier available through vast reservoirs of natural gas, fuel cells remain in a
relatively immature state of development for the rigors of transportation-based applications.
But, this does not preclude realizing the potential the technology offers for achieving long-
term industry and social imperatives at some point in a very uncertain future. Currently,
fuel cell suppliers such as Ballard, Plug Power, and UTCFC are cautiously venturing into
niche market applications such as outdoor portable power, and auxiliary and distributed
power, where the strengths of fuel cells outweigh their weakness in the current state of the
art. For automakers, fuel cells offer the promise of transitioning away from open-system
engine designs to closed-loop processes that would obviate the vast resources spent by
industry each year to thwart efforts to impose ever-stricter emissions laws.
The ICE Again???
Most interestingly, however, are claims from industry that ICE-based solutions
exist to the nation's environmental, health, and national security objectives. Arguably,
automakers may have a point. From a business perspective, automakers have targeted
engine development resources toward improvements promising the highest margin and thus
the highest return on invested capital. Irrespective of competitive pressure, automakers will
provide improvements along pathways the consumer is willing to pay the greatest for. This
is no more than simple business sense. Consequently, we have observed significant
advances in horsepower, torque, acceleration, and towing capacity. Along each of these
pathways, the consumer has demonstrated its willingness to pay. Largely due to low gas
- 129-
prices, the market has witnessed little analogous demand for fuel economy or fuel
efficiency. Consequently, automakers have dedicated a minimum of resources toward
improving product along these lines, committing only to keep up with evolving emissions
mandates. In fact, wherever possible, automakers have taken advantage of market trends
and legal loopholes that allow them to skirt mandates and chase the high margin segments
of the market. For example, domestic automakers have classified sport utility and cross-
over vehicles as trucks whenever possible, in some cases even adding weight via beefed-up
suspension systems to push these platforms over the threshold of regulatory jurisdiction
(Doyle, 2000).
Horsepower,
torque, acceleration
4.. ,, Fuel Economy &
Emissions
Effort
Figure 4.5 - Relative state of ICE development as a function of individual performance characteristics
But can automakers really achieve factor-ten improvements in fuel economy and
emissions via ICE technology as some suggest? To answer this question, I apply the
Christensen framework of analysis. First, if we were to segment ICE development along
its performance characteristics, we might observe the S-shaped curve of technological
development indicated in Figures 4.5. It is possible to argue that market demand has
stimulated development of engine attributes such as horsepower and towing capacity up the
technology s-curve to a higher state of maturity. Conversely, lack of demand has produced
little development along fuel economy modes of improvement. We can therefore argue
that this particular engine attribute resides at a more immature point on the technology s-
curve.
The importance of this observation lies in the level of effort required to yield gains
along the attribute pathway. It implies that automakers could achieve significant
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improvement if management chose to commit the resources to develop the necessary
technologies and processes. Traditional modes of problem solving recognized the inherent
trades involved between fuel economy and emissions performance, and other more desired
powertrain attributes such as horsepower, torque, and acceleration. Less traditional modes,
however, involving emerging electronic and plasma technologies, hold the promise of
improving yields in fuel economy and emissions with little degradation of other key engine
performance characteristics.
Current cooperation between auto and energy interests to reduce sulfur content in
diesel fuel, for example, could open the door to 25-30% gains in fuel efficiency from this
switch alone. Further developments in ultra-capacitors, selective on/off (allowing
automatic shut down and start up of the engine during start/stop), advanced NO, traps, lean
bum, and exhaust after-treatment made possible by plasma science offer the potential of
providing cost-effective solutions to the problem of high NO, and particulate content in
diesel exhaust. Combining an electric motor to create a "mild hybrid" can add to these
economy gains should their cost achieve market clearing levels in time.
The model attempts to account for potential ICE development along these lines. It
achieves this by establishing a desired fuel cost per mile (3 cents/mile), congruent with
consumer expectations for range and fill-up costs based on incumbent ICE platforms.
Figure 4.6 provides a graphic of the relative change in fuel economy for each of the
propulsion technologies over the simulation period. Note that I include only three
scenarios representing the different fuel price levels. In the absence of a fuel price increase,
ICE-based platforms attain a 22% increase in fuel economy over the thirty-year simulation
period. Conversely, as we increase fuel price, automakers are induced to commit greater
resources to the goal of achieving greater fuel economy. At $2.43/gal and $4.43/gal,
automakers increase ICE fuel economy by over 47% and 85%, respectively. These
improvements may be derived from improvements in engine efficiency, exhaust after-
treatment, fuel pre-treatment, or vehicle light-weighting technologies.
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Figure 4.6 - Fleet Average Fuel Economy of ICE-based platforms for Scenarios 1-4
4.4.2 SUSTAINABILITY GOALS
Based on the previous discussion, stakeholders argue the case for a number of
potential pathways for keeping pace with stricter emissions and fuel economy
requirements. From an industry perspective, doing so should require a minimum of cost.
The difficulty resides in determining which is the desired future. And here is where a
system dynamics-based model can serve as an aid to decision-makers in the face of large
uncertainties and complex, 2"d-order, non-linear system behaviors.
Each of the four adoption scenarios discussed previously spawns system-wide
consequences. I have revised the model to account for some of the key metrics of import to
decision-makers and stakeholders. Therefore, I return to these metrics for the express
purpose of rendering a preferred course based on desired outcomes.
Energy Security
Figure 4.7 below provides an illustration of the magnitude of the differential in
energy dependence amongst potential futures in light of national security objectives.
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Figure 4.7 - Annual Fleet Average Oil Consumption with "No Market Growth"
The bottom line represents Scenario 3 under a "no market growth" assumption. I
provide this graphic to convey a sense of the influence of the market growth dynamic on
this particular metric. The differential between Scenario 3 and Scenario 3 with "No
Growth" is on the order of 50 billion gallons of fuel per year. In other words, by 2032, our
very conservative figure for market growth is responsible for 50% of the total annual
dependence on oil. Failing to consider this dynamic might certainly lead decision-makers
astray.
Under Scenario 1, the combination of incremental improvements to fuel economy
and limited market penetration of HEV-based platforms fails to keep pace with the
deleterious effects of market growth. Consequently, oil dependency increases by 32% over
the thirty-year period from approximately 107 billion gallons per year to 141 billion gallons
per year. The trend shows little sign of abating in the out years. Under the HEV future
envisioned in Scenario 2, the market growth dynamic dominates in the early years, but
within a decade the penetration of cleaner HEV-based technologies reverses the trend in oil
dependency. Note, however, that the market growth dynamic eventually regains
dominance toward the latter half of the final decade. Thus, even the HEV dominated future
fails to check market growth. Only Scenarios 3 and 4 achieve the goal of reduced energy
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dependence within the simulation period. Both scenarios experience increasing
dependence in the early years, but soon overcome the market growth dynamic as the
respective technologies achieve initial adoption levels and displace dirtier, less efficient
propulsion platforms. By the end of the run, FCEV- and BEV-based strategies achieve
overall reductions in oil dependence of 7% and 25%, respectively. The disparity in these
figures reflects the different adoption patterns that emerge in these two scenarios, given the
gap in fuel price. If we were to adjust the FCEV-based adoption scenario to reflect an
equivalent increase in fuel cost, we could expect wider adoption of alternative platforms
and thus less dependence on oil.
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Figure 4.8 - Cumulative Environmental Damage Cost for all scenarios relative to a
"No Market Growth" trajectory
Figure 4.8 lends insight to the relative costs of environmental and health-related
damages over the simulation period. The grayed bottom line represents the "no market
growth" version of Scenario 3 described earlier to highlight the degree to which demand
growth works counter to public health and environmental goals.
In light of sustainability goals, the adoption patterns witnessed under Scenarios 1
and 2 clearly fail to keep pace with the market growth dynamic. In contrast, Scenarios 3
and 4 appear to curtail growth until about the latter third of the simulation period, where we
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once again witness increasing EDC as the adoption of cleaner propulsion alternatives fails
to keep pace with market growth. Unlike Figure 4.7, the graphic appears to indicate that
regardless of public or industry strategy, the costs of environmental damage continue to
mount. But it serves our purpose here to remind the reader that these figures provide
directional significance only. Again, the model does not attempt to evolve the energy
infrastructure to account for shifts in the relative level of dependence on fossil fuel,
renewable, and non-renewable resources. Should we consider these forces, we may
ultimately observe an overall decrease in EDC within the thirty-year study period.
With respect to energy dependence and the costs to public health and the
environment, the data presented here clearly support the case for a combination of industry
strategies and public policy analogous to Scenarios 3 and 4. All else equal and barring
reliance on external economic shocks, Scenario 3 proves the more plausible future, given
the political distaste for measures that call for increases in the gasoline tax. It serves to
note, however, that I advance this recommendation under the assumption that the goal is to
directly deliver propulsion-based innovations to mainstream consumers in the mass market.
The next chapter contends with some of the potential pitfalls facing such a strategy.
History proves that disruptive innovations - those that threaten the existing business
paradigm - often face significant industry resistance. Consequently, new entrants are most
consistently credited with ushering in new waves of innovation, often by displacing
established firms. Thus, government leaders should resist strategies that rely on a single
solution pathway. Rather, the realization of desired outcomes rests on a solid
comprehension of the dynamics of innovation and the countervailing forces that threaten to
derail even the most ingenious policy frameworks.
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PART II- GETTING TO MARKET
5 INDUSTRY HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS
There exists a wide spectrum of potential solution pathways for the problem of
vehicle efficiency. Industry leaders have known and even pursued, pathways that included
alternative propulsion designs such as electric and steam motors for decades. Yet while
industry dedicated assets to their development, few have ever pursued their subsequent
production. This research suggests a number of reasons for this apparent lack of
motivation. Such industry characteristics as reliance on rigid, largely static manufacturing
processes and tooling with high fixed capital costs, the highly integrated nature of
automotive engineering, a value proposition/business case dependent upon scale,
persistence of low gas prices, lack of demand, and a 70-year culture wedded to the ICE and
the regime that preserves it prove the greatest impediment to progress on the efficiency
front. But technological barriers aside, the problem persists currently due to the
misalignment of business interests with social imperatives. The most important assertion of
this research, however, is that even in the presence of real market demand, the business
system is simply not attuned to justify and stimulate investment along these pathways.
5.1 IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATIVE CAPACITY
In no uncertain terms, unless significant process and product change occurs with
haste, these trends will pose the greatest threat to human health and quality of life within
the next few decades on a scale far worse than smoking. Worse still, it threatens the health
and maintenance of the omnipresent life support system called Earth that sustains our
livelihood and the commerce that enriches it. This research presupposes that the
advancement of technological solutions rests squarely on public policies and industry
strategies that align business interests with this vital social imperative. This means
constructing a business system and regulatory regime that creates a profitable business case
for the accelerated adoption of clean vehicle technologies.
Detroit's Big Three automakers have in their history, when called upon, delivered
magnanimous feats of technological prowess. During World War II, Ford, GM, and
Chrysler converted in record time over 85% of their total capacity to wartime production of
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munitions, jeeps, tanks, and aircraft to equip America's vaunted "Arsenal of Democracy."
Following the war, the Big Three returned full swing into commercial production, eager to
provide a new car to every GI returning home from the war. After all, the GI would need a
car to commute to work from his new home secured with a VA Loan in one of the many
housing tracts in the new suburban America.
Fast forward now to the year 2002, where over 600 million motor vehicles, each
powered by an internal combustion engine, operate on the planet. Every single one of these
vehicles spews thousands of tons of known greenhouse gasses and carcinogenic toxins into
the air we breathe every day. Every piece of evidence suggests that this number will
double to over a billion vehicles by the year 2020 (Doyle, 2000). Government regulation
and industry efforts have made great strides in reducing a handful of emissions such as lead
on a per car basis by nearly 95%. But rising automotive usage, urban sprawl, and the
displacement of fuel efficient cars with SUV, minivan, and other truck-based platforms
have combined to double the number of vehicle miles traveled, reduce weighted average
fleet fuel economy, and virtually eliminate per vehicle gains on a net fleet emissions basis.
Even worse, only in the past decade has the world's scientific, government, and industrial
communities accepted the phenomenon of global warming as fact, and that rising wealth
and growing motor vehicle usage, and the carbon dioxide emissions associated with it, are
the single greatest contributor.
Unfortunately, despite evidence of industry evolution in directions that hold the
potential of stemming these adverse impacts, the current business paradigm - the value
proposition by which auto interests make money - will continue to delay and impede
necessary progress on this front. Although this research substantiates the potential for
achieving great strides within three decades' time, it calls into question the capacity of
established interests to deliver. Chapter 5 presents conclusive data supporting the argument
that meaningful market adoption can happen. The objective of this research is to consider
not only whether (1) Can meaningful market adoption of cleaner technologies happen and
under what conditions, but equally as important (2) Who is more likely to deliver them,
domestic incumbents, foreign competitors, or new entrants? The following sections
consider the architectural and cultural forces that offer insight into these important
questions.
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5.1.1 ARCHITECTURAL PERSISTENCE
The Role ofArchitecture in Shaping Norms, Laws, and Values
Two key developments of the 20h century left our generation saddled with the
costly and necessary endeavor of attempting to mitigate the ecological and health damage
passed on to us by the generation that came before. The first development was the
emergence of the internal combustion engine as the dominant industry design, rather than
the steam or electric alternatives that were common during the technology's formative
years. The ICE is an open system based on the thermodynamic properties of the Carnot
Cycle. At best, the gasoline-powered version achieves a peak efficiency of only 25%. In
reality, because the ICE is based on static compression volumes, it operates outside the
engine's peak efficiency band during the majority of its operation, realizing on average a
mere 17% efficiency rating. The rest is exhausted in the form of poisonous waste gases into
the ambient environment where it is presumed to diffuse to non-toxic levels. The important
take-away from this development is the general industry, and consumer-wide acceptance,
of an open-system propulsion design for motorized travel. Thus, not only would the
technology define all future architectures, in so doing it would also acculturate entire
industry value chains and generations of consumers to a set of behaviors, expectations,
norms, and values that any alternative paradigm suggested by 21 s century society would
have to contend with (Lessig, 2000).
The second key development of the 20h century that exacerbates current emissions-
reduction efforts is the pattern of land use development that emerged in the post-WWII era.
In cities whose development followed the emergence of the automobile, the advent of
zoning laws, highway funding regimes, and transportation engineering practice codified
wide avenues, vast artery-and-collector road networks, and separation of uses that
embedded personal vehicle-dependence deep into the fabric of American society. These
infrastructures required vast capital to emplace, and contrary to espoused notions of
modular design, reflects the most rigid and persisting objects of mankind's construct.
Decades, even centuries might pass before obsolescence, war, natural disaster, or economic
imperative might clean the slate for an alternative infrastructure.
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Real estate development economies emerged from this architecture; creating
economies where consumers place value on proximity to places of home and work in terms
of commute time, rather than physical distance. Previous generations had measured
proximity in terms of transportation by foot or rail; now, they would measure by time of
travel via personal automobile. The difference is one of scale and the consequence to
human quality of life. The car enabled the dispersion of society to suburbia and "edge
cities" while simultaneously eroding any business case for more efficient forms of transit
such as light rail. Automotive travel requires a certain degree of wealth to afford, thereby
stranding the less wealthy in the metropolitan centers, further spurring the exodus of the
relatively wealthy to the suburbs. Since the 70's, such dispersion has led to the emergence
of "edge cities" along circumferential business routes outside the metropolitan center. Like
the auto-centric planned cities that sprung up in the American west, edge cities fell pray to
planning with many of the same auto-centric precepts, offering little if any transportation
mode choice to its inhabitants.
The key take-away from this development is the persistence of erected
infrastructure and the modes of social behavior and interaction that it enables or disables
(Lessig, 2000). I argue that this infrastructure is the physical manifestation of a more
coherent architecture that reflects the economic, political, social, and legal values that
enabled it. The architecture is a two-way channel of communication. Human values and
the tools and technologies of human hand help us envision an architectural construct from
which to plan our cities, locate our places of work, and organize our neighborhoods; at
some critical threshold, the persistence of that architecture's infrastructure affects behavior
that ultimately serves to sustain it (Lessig, 2000). It does so by lowering the cost of
evolution within the current paradigm while erecting cost barriers for substitutes. The
following industry example offers a case in point.
At the conclusion of WWII, the auto and energy interests of the time envisioned an
architecture that would lay down a path of development mutually beneficial to firms and
societies. To enable this future, they acted to remove the barriers to automotive prosperity
and to ensure infrastructures that would nurture a healthy and sustained period of demand
growth for their motorized innovation. From the automotive perspective, these barriers
included the existence of substitutes such as non-motor vehicle mass-transit and on-street
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railways that restricted motor vehicle movement. When it came to the ICE, the automakers
pulled out all the stops to ensure a supportive infrastructure to spur demand.
Despite the existence of extensive electric railways in major American cities such
as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Philadelphia, auto interests saw an
alternative mass transit future for America's cities: motorized bus lines. Through a
complex network of subsidiaries that included National, American, and Pacific City Lines,
General Motors and a host of industry partners that included stalwarts Standard Oil,
Phillips Petroleum, Hertz, Mack Truck, Greyhound, and Firestone Tire & Rubber executed
one of the most well-conceived and quietly executed acts of market power of the 2 0 h
century. In no uncertain terms, this collaboration systematically acquired, and then
dismantled, the streetcar, trolley, and "light rail" transit operations of virtually every major
metropolitan city in the United States. By slowly starving the transit systems of funds for
maintenance and new purchases to keep up with demand growth, GM's subsidiaries
successfully eliminated electric rail transit, replacing it with a much less efficient, less
profitable, and universally unpopular fleet of ICE-powered busses (Doyle, 2000).
In 1949, a federal court found General Motors guilty of criminal conspiracy, fining
the company a laughable $5,000 and its treasurer $1. National City Lines continued for 6
more years before it sold off its motorized operations. Through contract provisions, the
firm explicitly prohibited buyers from engaging in the purchase of any new equipment
using any fuel or means of propulsion other than gasoline (St. Clair, 1986). The result: a
complete stagnation of competition. By that time, GM's subsidiaries had removed 88% of
the nation's streetcar network; of the 40,000 streetcars that existed in 1936, only 5,000
remained (St. Clair, 1986).
Today, many cities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Chicago, Detroit, and
Atlanta struggle with the political unpopularity and cost of retrofitting their metropolitan
communities with subway or other light rail alternatives. Debates rage over asphalt versus
rail. Rail detractors argue that the cost per mile of track relative to ridership simply cannot
compete alongside the relatively more affordable option of additional traffic lanes.
Although this wasn't always so, their argument is well founded. The GM-led coalition
achieved it's objective: Emplace an infrastructure that sustains demand growth while
stimulating further infrastructure growth that erects barriers to substitutes by making them
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more costly. Auto-centric zoning laws, city plans, and land development patterns emerged
that dispersed populations, separated uses, and reduced densities. Consequently, this
deliberately installed architecture today disables a competitive business case for density-
dependent rail lines. These developments provide a critical case study of how persisting
architectures shape laws, norms, values, and consumer expectations. Those behaviors that
emerged from dependence on the automobile as the principle focus of organization, serve
today to preserve automobile dependence and suppress implementation of alternative
solutions. Ironically, however, this key episode in U.S. industrial history serves to
demonstrate that concerted stakeholder action can, when combined with hospitable market
conditions and the promise of large potential profits, realize the emplacement of the
necessary infrastructure to support demand for a chosen propulsion technology.
Architectural persistence defies near-term solution and works counter to social
values such as equity, public health, access to and preservation of natural resources, and
national security objectives. Wholesale dependence on motorized transit equates with
dependence on foreign oil, a gaping vulnerability that invites exploitation and manipulation
by foreign powers as witnessed by the oil shocks and recessions of the 1970's and early
80's. It compels our elected officials to fund regional baby-sitting efforts that cost the
American public dearly. The presence of a single U.S. aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf,
for example, comes with a price tag of over one million dollars per day, not to mention the
lives and livelihoods it endangers. Finally, from the perspective of the inhabitants of these
regions, our visible physical presence smacks of 19th century imperialism, providing fodder
for propaganda that enables backward and corrupt governments to continue to control and
oppress their populations by propping up the U.S. as a scapegoat for the starvation and
misery of their people. If there is one thing that we have learned, one-dimensional
solutions often yield multi-dimensional punishments...
The role of architecture is ubiquitous in our society. It exists at all levels - in our
cities, our homes, our roads, our places of work - and defines the physical world around us;
design determines our interaction with the physical world; it frees and constrains our
activities. Until leaders from all sides recognize the magnitude of the impact of
architectures on society, we will continue to find ourselves a prisoner of entrenched
systems and behaviors that work counter to our most valued ideals. This research advances
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the notion that leaders must craft policies and strategies that consider architecture as an
avenue of opportunity, and leverage it to enable behaviors that yield desired social
outcomes.
5.1.2 POLICY DEFECTION
"If the human race can send a man to the moon, surely it can clear up
smog. "- a California state senator, 1969
In October1997, William Clay Ford, Jr., now chairman and CEO of Ford Motor
Company and a graduate of the Sloan School of Management, spoke to the Detroit chapter
of the Society of Automotive Engineers.
"The love affair with the automobile might not be over yet, but the
honeymoon is. Environmental Stewardship is a heartfelt concern of our
customers and ofpolicy-makers around the world. It should be a top
priority for the auto industry in the twenty-first century. The challenge is
clear: we must lead the green revolution."
Since the 1970's, automakers doubled the fuel efficiency of their automobiles,
reduced emissions more than 96 percent nationally, and now recycle more than 75 percent
of automotive content. These represent significant achievements in there own right, but
came about more as a result of the force of law and by the determined efforts of legislators
like Senator Edwin Muskie, than by any voluntary program of industry's invention. In
fact, Ford's challenge to automakers stands in stark contrast to nearly half a century of
determined resistance to calls by governments, institutions and environmentalists to clean
up their act.
The following is a representative sample of the record:
* Automakers delayed installing Positive Crankcase Ventilation (PCV) on new cars
bound for California until 1966. The technology involved a simple, inexpensive
metal tube and had been around since the 1930's.
* In 1969, the US Dept of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against the Automobile
Manufacturer's Association (AMA), accusing the Big Three automakers of a 16-
year industrial conspiracy to willfully obstruct and delay the research,
development, manufacturing, and installation of pollution control devices. The
automakers settled by consent decree.
- 142 -
III
* Ford publicly announces an early catalytic converter in 1957 and a blowby device
in 1962, but is "silenced" by the Public Relations Committee of the AMA.
* In a blatant exercise of market power, Chrysler cancels Engelhard Industry's
contract to supply catalysts to the OEM for being "too aggressive in its testimony"
at EPA hearings regarding the effectiveness of pollution control devices.
" In a 1970 Ralph Nader study of foot-dragging by automakers on emissions
solutions, a GM engineer states that management "already had the conclusion [that
the steam engine was not a feasible alternative] and we were told to prove it."
Over the past five decades, the major US automakers have forged a predictable
modus operandi in their almost universal treatment of emissions and fuel economy efforts.
It might look something like this:
1. Do whatever it takes to kill any pollution control, fuel economy, or
emissions related requirement or mandate that legislation might impose.
2. If killing the measure proves infeasible, pursue actions to dilute the
requirements or delay its enactment as long as possible.
3. Dedicate a minimum of resources to emissions control efforts, but enough
to demonstrate the firm's commitment to a potential solution.
4. Insist, and continually demonstrate that while the firm is making progress,
the technology remains unfit for commercialization due to performance
problems and cost.
5. If engineers provide a range of estimates for cost and time to market,
publicize only the highest figures.
6. If a legislature is nearing a decision that may prove harmful to the
industry, release a public statement indicating the firm's intent to deliver
ahead of the would-be deadline of the proposed regulation.
7. Whenever possible, commit the firm to government-sponsored partnerships
to shore up appearances that the firm is doing everything it can to bring
cleaner technologies to market and to buy time for a change in external
conditions, such as a more industry-friendly administration, to materialize.
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5.1.3 INDUSTRY SCENARIOS AS A PLANNING TOOL
The record, and this established modus operandi, begs the question: Should we
really expect innovation on the fuel efficiency front to come from domestic industry
stalwarts? If history is any proof, the answer is unequivocally no. Rather, a more
predictable scenario involves the emergence of overwhelming external forces, market or
competitive, that forces the hand of industry for the sake of their own survival.
Michael Porter (1985) defines a scenario as "an internally consistent view of what
the future might turn out to be." Industry scenarios enable the firm to translate uncertainty
about the future into the strategic implications for competition within an industry. It is not
meant as a forecasting tool; rather, the method enables management to make implicit
assumptions about the future explicit, and to consider the range of possible and credible
industry structures that may result (Porter, 1985). Because the purpose of this research is to
identify high-leverage public interventions and to inform firm strategic planning, the author
believes that the exploration of some simple future industry structures may prove
instructive to decision-makers. The following represent the set of relevant scenario
development considerations:
" Gas price volatility
" Consumer sensitivity to environmental, public health, & national security
considerations
" Shifting regulatory regimes
" Competitive stimulus/Competitor behavior
- Market cultivation versus demand pull
- Market leadership versus fast-follower
In light of the above, consider a set of potential scenarios from the government's
perspective, regarding the conditions that might emerge resulting in the desired emissions
outcome:
1. Gas Increase Scenario - Gas prices move higher due to movements in supply and
demand and remain high for long enough time for an engineering-based industry
response. Industry exerts market power to push gas prices down without success.
Incumbent foreign competitors come to market with HEV- and EV-based options in
popular vehicle segments.
2. Laissez Faire Scenario - Nothing happens. Status quo prevails, but energy
industries slowly migrate to cleaner, but still traditional, gasoline and diesel fuels.
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Gas prices continue at relatively low levels and incumbents successfully stifle
competitive entry via market power. Firms manage to make evolutionary emissions
and fuel economy improvements to the ICE.
3. U.S. Market Leadership Scenario - Through a concerted marketing strategy,
incumbent automakers aggressively (<10 years) phase in cleaner, more fuel-
efficient platforms. Beginning first with demonstration vehicles and following with
launches into the most popular vehicle segments. Foreign producers follow suit.
4. Foreign Market Leadership Scenario - Incumbent foreign competitors, executing a
deliberate strategy, successfully phase in cleaner, more fuel-efficient platforms to
popular vehicle segments. Domestic firms follow within two years with similar,
variant, or alternative designs of their own.
5. Us versus Them Scenario - Incumbent foreign competitors act, but incumbent
domestics resist, hoping that foreign efforts will prove futile. U.S. firms accelerate
development of alternatives, but publicly fight for regulatory obstacles to imports.
6. New Entrant Scenario - Through a concerted strategy, a non-OEM moves up-
market from a niche. They are able to wrest share from incumbents via a different
value proposition. Technology begins at a performance disadvantage to
mainstream market requirements, but the steeper technological trajectory carries it
to mainstream markets. Entrant builds a value network base from which to
challenge incumbents, but needs brand recognition of incumbent auto firms. New
entrant firms forge strategic partnering arrangements whereby entrant provides
system solution and automaker provides brand, distribution channel, and systems
integration.
The purpose of examining this set of potential future industry scenarios is two-fold:
(1) to identify those futures most preferential for achieving desired performance-based
outcomes, (2) to identify those with preferential (or at least neutral) competitive outcomes,
and (3) to steer government policy regimes toward frameworks that achieve both desired
performance and competitive outcomes. While a scenario may achieve (1), it is an entirely
more difficult endeavor to achieve both (1) and (2). Yet history is replete with examples
where the pursuit of (1) at the expense of (2) proved politically untenable due to the
significant margin of economic, media, and political influence established firms could
marshal on behalf of preserving their interests. Thus, a crucial requirement of a successful
policy framework must effectively address competitive outcomes. Failure to do so will
only translate to fierce and counterproductive policy resistance efforts by key industry
stakeholders.
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The first scenario relies on a sustained increase in gas prices to stimulate the
necessary demand for alternatives. However, given the historically low level of prices in
the U.S. and industry estimates suggesting 40 years of remaining oil reserves to support our
fossil-fuel dependent world economy, I assign a fairly low probability to this outcome. The
second scenario implies little, if any public intervention or targeted industry strategy.
Rather, it asserts that continued progress in ICE technology is enough to achieve the
requisite levels of emissions for sustainability. Based on the results of the system dynamics
model in the following chapters, this scenario too bears little resemblance to reality. The
remaining scenarios suggest U.S., foreign, and new entrant market leadership in emissions
progress. The discussion that follows focuses on resolving the relative likelihood of this set
of potential futures.
In attempting to identify the more likely scenarios, history serves as a potential
barometer. Today's debate regarding the efficacy of bringing alternative propulsion
technologies to the market mirrors a similar debate that occurred four decades ago in late
'60's California. During that decade, Washington began proposing actions that would
bring the federal government into alternative engine research and purchase of alternative
vehicles for government fleets. In 1969, the Nixon Administration inaugurated a program
of R&D "to marshal both government and private research with the goal of producing an
unconventionally powered virtually pollution free automobile within five years" (Doyle,
2000). The program, a clear forerunner of a series of similar efforts such as USABC and
PNGV (see Section 5.4.1 for a more detailed description of these partnerships) , never
received the funding it was promised. Rather, it drifted back toward efforts aimed to
improve the ICE before dying a quiet death under follow-on administrations.
The decade also saw the appearance of ICE alternatives such as the electric car, the
steam-based Rankine Cycle engine, gas turbines, and even gasoline-electric hybrids. GM
showed off a cavalcade of 26 such vehicles in its "Progress of Power" show in 1969, the
same year America saw a man walk on the moon. Unfortunately, most of these cars had
"problem areas" - which the manufacturer ensured were highlighted. Others, such as
William Lear of Lear Enterprises charged into the controversy with plans to develop and
prove the efficacy of a production ready "clean" engine. His company successfully
developed an engineering prototype of a cleaner car based on the vapor turbine steam
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engine used in a production bus of the firm's make that could meet or exceed the 1976
Clean Air Act requirements. But the project died when financial assistance from
government and auto interests failed to materialize (Doyle, 2000).
Disgusted by the lack of industry response to California's severe smog problem,
state senator Nicholas Petris introduced bill SB 778 to the California Senate in early '69.
The bill would prohibit the sale of all diesel- and gasoline-powered internal combustion
engines in the state by 1975. Industry lobbyists scoffed, but the bill passed 26-5 before the
Automobile Manufacturer's Association (AMA), now taking the bill a bit more seriously,
brought their weight to bear to kill the fledgling bill in the Assembly. Up until that point,
state and federal regulators followed the approach of setting performance standards rather
than dictating technological solutions.
Other similarities with today's alternative engine debate abound. For example, one
of the crucial hurdles to the effectiveness of catalytic converters involved the lead content
in gasoline. With pressure coming from the auto industry and the Nixon Administration,
and with the threat of upcoming legislation, Big Oil conceded to voluntarily phase out
leaded gasoline (Doyle 2000). The episode mirrors today's bid to entice oil interests to
phase out sulfur content in diesel. For the automakers, the diesel-powered ICE holds the
key to achieving 25-30 percent greater efficiencies in fuel economy, and thus reduced
carbon dioxide emissions. Unfortunately, like lead, sulfur poisons the catalyst in diesel
engines, reducing catalyst life and degrading its performance. California, long averse to
diesel due to its high NOx and particulate content, will effectively ban diesel when Tier II
requirements go into effect in 2004, unless Big Oil can make significant reductions in
sulfur content.
Yet another analog to the Clean Air decade involved the effort of automakers to
develop devices such as a thermal reactor that could burn off excess gases at high
temperature. The effort mirrors today's effort by exhaust system manufacturers to bring
promising advances in plasma science to bear on the problem of gasoline and diesel
emissions. By subjecting poisonous exhaust gases to an intense hot flame, the plasma
device reduces the compounds to inert constituents while eliminating most particulates and
reducing NOx by orders of magnitude over today's catalytic technologies (Cohn et al,
2001).
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The striking lessons from the events of four decades' time are clear. In hindsight,
we know that a series of external forces came to bear on U.S. automakers. The passing of
watershed legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and
the Clean Air Act of 1970 established environmental due process, instantiated the EPA and
armed it with sweeping regulatory authority over industry. Shortly thereafter came the first
of two oil shocks that sent the U.S. economy into a tailspin with an Energy Crisis that
begged for the kind of technological leadership automakers had demonstrated in WWII.
Instead, while corporate lobbyists and industry leaders delayed, obfuscated, and
equivocated, foreign competitors rushed to fill the burgeoning demand for clean and fuel-
efficient cars with advanced technologies such as Honda's CVCC engine.
For nearly two decades, domestic automakers claimed that technologies for
achieving the 1975 requirements of the Clean Air Act did not exist. Yet Honda came to
market with a stratified-charge engine that could meet 1975 emissions requirements
without a catalytic converter. By 1980, market research indicated that the portion of the
purchase decision weighted toward fuel economy reached 40% (Plotkin, 1996). In that
crucial window of opportunity, U.S. firms had little to offer the American public. Imports,
however, gained a crucial beachhead on American soil. Consequently for the Big Three,
the 1970's would mark the beginning of an inexorable slide in market share that shows no
sign of abating to this very day. Furthermore, the quality movement spawned by Japanese
entry revamped production processes to achieve efficiencies, but failed to recognize or
capture value from similar efficiencies to be had in closing open-system product designs.
Then, as today, the domestic auto firms continue to struggle in their effort to
maintain share. We have witnessed the bold move of GM to come to market with a
production electric vehicle, the EV], in 1996. Yet even during this period, GM and its Big
Three cousins Ford and Chrysler continued to lobby against emissions-related regulatory
regimes such as California's ZEV mandate, requiring that vehicles with zero tailpipe
emissions comprise a minimum percentage of new car sales by 1998. These efforts proved
successful in delaying the requirement to the year 2003. To date, GM's EV] remains the
only production vehicle designed from the ground up around an electric motor that can
meet this mandate, albeit in an unpopular two-door commuter consumer segment. Ford
and Chrysler (now DaimlerChrysler) intend to offer conversions. Japanese producer
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Toyota will offer a conversion as well, but in one of its more popular vehicle segments, the
compact 4-door SUV known as the RA V4.
Both Honda and Toyota boast first to market rights on production hybrids, Toyota
with its 5-passenger Prius model, and Honda with its 2-passenger commuter Insight. Next
month, Honda will offer the Insight's gasoline hybrid-electric engine in its popular 5-
passenger Civic line of compact sedans. The move marks a first for the industry, and is
being complemented by parallel marketing efforts that attempt to appeal to the
environmental concerns of consumers. The marketing campaign relies as well on efforts to
create an association via eco-labels, between consumers and the company's cleaner product
offerings. Meanwhile, only in 1999 did the members of the Big Three, led by the prodding
of Ford chairman William Clay Ford, Jr., dissolve their membership with the Global
Climate Coalition (GCC), an industry-funded lobbying group that contested the existence,
and sources of, global climate change phenomena. Although Ford withdrew plans it
announced earlier to release a production version hybrid of its most popular Explorer SUV,
as of this date the firm still plans to come to market with a hybrid version of its compact
SUV, the Escape.
In sum, while the stage for alternative propulsion technologies in the first decade of
the 21st century smacks of de ja vu, the competitive pressures of modern day, combined
with technological advances, may yield accelerated progress on this front. Of the six
scenarios listed earlier, this author is inclined to let history, and the culture entrenched by it,
judge. Doing so clearly points to scenarios involving either foreign incumbent or new
entrant leadership in delivering emissions-based innovations to market.
5.2 INDUSTRY MATURATION - THE CAR COMES OF AGE
In the last section, we discussed the history, and resulting culture, of industry
resistance to emissions and fuel economy imperatives. This section examines another
industry trend with implications for market leadership in the emissions arena, the maturing
of the technology life cycle. Marketing experts contend that the auto industry is in the
midst of a transition typical of products in a mature phase of the product life cycle. Figure
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5.1 depicts these phases as a function of the product attribute most crucial to product
differentiation.
Functionality---w Convenience -- Reliability -+ Price
Figure 5.1 - Primary basis for differentiation during the product life cycle
There are a number of indications that the auto industry is currently migrating
toward a phase of maturity whereby price is the primary differentiator. Price pressures
spawned by global competition have spawned an industry-wide move toward
consolidation, with the largest players executing acquisition strategies predicated upon
staking out brand across product segments and securing distribution networks in key,
potentially high-growth market segments. Cost reduction efforts have also impacted the
make/buy decisions of the six major OEMs. Firms have emphasized core competencies
such as system integration and have chosen to outsource those elements of the value chain
deemed either outside their core expertise, or characterized by declining growth rates or
margins, to second- and third-tier suppliers.
Instead, firms are seeking out related businesses where the firm can leverage core
expertise to capture potentially higher margins in higher growth segments such as in-
vehicle communication services. Consolidation also conforms with the industry move
toward platform commonality as a means to reduce the number of base platforms while
simultaneously broadening product offerings across the full spectrum of traditional market
segments (i.e. fewer platforms, more models). Finally, the recent industry consolidation
around brand across the product line only confirms management's belief that price has
become the most critical differentiator. Commanding brand across the spectrum of product
offerings enables firms to leverage higher margins from segments with flatter price
elasticity of demand.
If the above indicators are correct, the move of the industry's bread and butter
product toward commoditization only portends an extremely tenuous business proposition
for domestic automakers. With declining overall margins, any externally imposed price
pressure outside of competitive or demand stimulus will threaten already thin revenue
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streams. We could therefore expect regulatory efforts such as CAFE to meet fierce
resistance from industry management. Even worse, emissions mandates, fees, or other
instruments of regulatory intervention would specifically target the highest margin profit
segments of the domestic automakers, namely trucks, crossover vehicles, and SUVs.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 highlight the significance of the growth in light-duty truck platforms as
compared to the relative decline in car sales in terms of units sold as well as the value of
sales in this segment.
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Figure 5.2 - Unit sales of cars and trucks, 1984-1998
Figure 5.3 - Value of U.S. car and truck sales, 1984-1998
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From the perspective of the domestic automakers, it is a simple equation.
Regulation forces automakers to take measures that will impose costs that the mainstream
consumer is not willing, or able, to pay for. If, however, the consumer desired greater fuel
efficiency or reduced emissions, he would seek out a producer offering such a vehicle at a
price that the market would bear. But because for the past two decades gasoline prices in
North America have remained some of the lowest in the world, fuel efficiency is of little
concern to consumers relative to other considerations such as utility and performance.
Indeed, statistics gathered by the author while contributing to an auto industry study at MIT
bear out this relationship as illustrated in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
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Figure 5.4- Average fuel economy of all passenger vehicles from 1981-1998
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Figure 5.5 - Average fuel economy of all passenger vehicles, 1971-1998
(Sources: Barry, Levisohn, and Pakes (1995); Wards, Automotive News)
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Figure 5.5 provides a longer-term view of fuel economy trends by expanding the
sample backwards to 1971 using data provided by Barry, Levisohn, and Pakes (1995). In
the expanded series, we can observe overall increases in the fuel efficiency of vehicles
from just 16 mpg at the beginning of the 1970's decade to a high of 25.6 mpg by the early
1980s. We can speculate that the provision of more fuel-efficient product stemmed from
three external forces that fundamentally shifted the character of market demand in favor of
attributes enabling higher fuel economy. These forces included the twin oil shocks in '71
and '79, competitive entry of Japanese makes, and the establishment of fuel economy
mandates under CAFE (for Corporate Average Fuel Economy) in the wake of the Clean
Air Act of 1970.
Despite inception of the CAFE regulatory regime, the combination of the energy
crisis with the timely arrival of small, fuel-efficient Japanese imports provided enough of
the economic and competitive stimulus for domestic automakers to act. Ironically, the
arrival of these foreign imports would also signal a shift toward the next evolutionary phase
in product differentiation away from convenience and toward reliability as previously
illustrated in Figure 5.1. This is evidenced by the quality movement of the 1980's,
initiated by the Big Three as a consequence of their struggle for survival against the
onslaught of cheaper, more reliable, high-quality Japanese imports.
After 1983, the industry adjusted, and fleet fuel efficiency decreased again to a low
of about 21.5 mpg in 1992, after which, it recovered for the remainder of the 1990s to
slightly over 23 mpg. But fuel efficiency remained below the 1983 peak, eventually
stabilizing around 23 miles to the gallon until the latter half of the 1990's, where it began
yet another downward trend, this time initiated by America's nascent love affair with utility
vehicles.
While fuel economy has slipped from a high of nearly 26 miles to the gallon in
1983, vehicle performance and utility have trended upward. Light duty, truck-based
platforms have enabled domestic automakers to meet this demand with new product that
has displaced car-based platforms over the same period. By 1998, truck-based models
surpassed cars, grabbing over 50% of the new vehicle market. It is interesting to note,
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however, that even before trucks, minivans, and SUV's gained popularity in significant
numbers, by 1992 fuel economy had slipped to just 21.6 miles to the gallon.
This statistic belies a deliberate shift in emphasis away from fuel economy toward
the other more valued attributes of utility and performance. Truck-based platforms could
not only meet this demand at less cost than comparable car-based models, they could do so
unencumbered by the higher CAFE mandates associated with their car-based cousin. In
1984, the Big Three boasted 84% and 78% market share of the domestic light-duty truck
and car markets, respectively. By 1998, the Big Three's share of the domestic car market
slid to 58%, while they maintained market share in domestic trucks. Asian auto firms,
however, threaten to penetrate this share with a glut of new truck-based product in the near
term. Thus, American firms face assaults on their highest margin vehicle segments on two
fronts. In addition to potential regulatory moves that threaten to erode these profit streams,
domestic automakers concomitantly face the more ominous prospect of declining market
share in their most profitable vehicle segments.
5.3 THE CAR: CONSUMER DURABLE OR HIGH TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT?
But does the problem rest squarely with the customer? If the customer does not
demand and is not willing to pay for cleaner, more fuel efficient vehicles, then requiring
automakers to sell them such products is doomed to be a losing business proposition. And
in an industry where profitably rests on mature products with thinning margins and a high
fixed cost of investment is de rigueur, the potential for loss is such that no self-respecting
manager could justify his job over it. Especially when the organization views the potential
revenue stream as an insignificant fraction of its bread and butter product.
But the problem of absent customer demand for potentially superior product is one
that is not unique to the auto industry. Rather, the high-tech industry is flush with
examples of superior products that struggle in the marketplace, only to stagnate or
withdraw unceremoniously (example: Apple's Newton). The problem depends on one's
perspective. Automakers continue to treat their customers as a traditional consumer market
rather than a high-tech market, when every indication is that today, and tomorrow's,
automobiles contain more high-tech gadgetry than ever before. Witness the emergence of
in-vehicle communications systems (i.e. telematics), more advanced E-PROM chips that
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provide real-time On-Board Diagnostics (OBD), or ever more sophisticated materials and
assembly techniques. The average automobile currently carries twenty computer
processors and over sixty on-board sensors. This number is expected to increase
dramatically in the coming decades as vehicles adopt telematics for communications,
geolocation, and intelligent transportation applications.
Automakers are also experimenting with the idea of platform commonality and sub-
system modularity. In concert with the evolution of vehicles from dependence on
mechanical interfaces to electronic or electromechanical ones (i.e. "drive by wire"),
automakers may to some extent enable "plug and play" capability. Aside from the
challenge of defining standards for interface protocols, doing so means contending with (1)
widening disparity in the technology life cycles of the sub-systems that comprise the
vehicle and (2) displacement of vehicle turnover by higher sub-system turnover. This
portends a potential shift of value in the supply chain to the second and third tier suppliers
of electronic and electromechanical systems. The risk to automakers is the "Intel Inside"
phenomenon where the higher margin value of the vehicle may shift from the OEM's brand
to the supplier of the vehicle's subsystems (Fine, 1998).
But car firms seem to have a difficult time accepting the idea that they are selling a
high-tech product, rather than a traditional consumer durable. The distinction between the
two is even greater when one considers the fact that a vehicle is typically the second most
expensive purchase an average consumer will make in his lifetime. Each requires a very
different marketing approach to gain successful entry of new product. Failing to
comprehend the difference in the type of market one is selling to, combined with the sheer
magnitude of the purchase decision, only worsens the predicament; it will hinder success
while further justifying the supposition that consumers cannot be made to pay for what they
don't want.
But today's car purchase resembles less a pure consumer durable and more a high
technology product. In previous decades, a consumer could buy a car and expect the
vehicle to deliver its value proposition equipped with relatively static technology over the
course of its life. Today, however, a car is taking on a host of new value propositions that
depend upon technologies with much shorter product life cycles than the vehicle itself But
because today's cars lack adaptability at the user interface, consumers will consider good
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design and technology obsolescence in their purchase decision. Thus, a vehicle purchase
today looks more like a high technology purchase than ever before. Consider a purchase of
a laptop computer or even a PDA. Because of the high price point of these purchases, the
average consumer will buy with the expectation that the product will deliver about three
years of useful life before the technology is surpassed by newer innovation. But imagine if
the laptop cost a mere $100, rather than $3,000. All else equal, we might expect that at
hypothetical, and unrealistic price point, the more tech-savvy consumer segments would
upgrade to a laptop of superior technology as that technology became available in the
market. In other words, no delay would exist between the consumer's desire to "upgrade"
and the act of upgrading. It is therefore the magnitude of the cost that dictates the
consumer's expectation regarding the useful life of the product.
Furthermore, at higher price points the purchase begins to take on the character of a
business investment in plant and equipment, the key difference being that a business can
write-off depreciation of capital equipment and a private car consumer cannot. Thus, the
consumer holds the property longer to amortize the high fixed cost of the vehicle purchase.
This spawns two additional behaviors. First, we can expect product turnover to decrease.
Automakers have long since been aware of the inverse relationship between vehicle price
and vehicle turnover. Second, we would expect good design to play a larger role in the
consumer's purchase decision. After all, the longer one must own the product, the more we
would expect the consumer to base the purchase decision on how well he can live with the
design over the expected period of ownership. Automakers have also long understood the
importance of the car as a fashion statement to the purchaser.
So how does this translate to the new car market and what does it mean for
automakers? I can answer this question with another question. What if cars hypothetically
cost $2,000 instead of $20,000? First, we would expect the game to fundamentally change.
The used car market might slip to a mere fraction of today's, for example. But two other
key behaviors might emerge. First, product turnover should increase markedly. Second,
good design might take on less importance than previously. After all, if a customer grows
tired of a design after six months, he would be more inclined to purchase another one rather
than hold out in order to recoup the original cost of purchase.
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What this observation portends for the auto industry is this: as vehicles trend toward
high technology, consumers will become more concerned with the potential for
obsolescence. In the absence of built-in modularity, many will choose to "wait and see" in
the short-term. Fundamentally, mainstream consumers do not want to bear the risk of
technology obsolescence. Removing this concern from the purchase equation is the first
step toward breaching the early majority segment of the technology adoption curve.
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6 OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION
The previous chapters explored a representative set of potential pathways for the
adoption of a statistically meaningful proportion of "cleaner" advanced fuel/vehicle
technologies. Excepting GM's foray into the California market with its EVJ, as of this
writing, only the two largest Japanese automakers have entered the U.S. market with
production advanced propulsion platforms. The 5-passenger Toyota Prius and the 2-
passenger Honda Insight commuter were designed from the ground up around hybrid
gasoline/electric powertrains. These vehicles represented "first of their kind" forays into
the alternative powertrain market. Both envisioned modest demand targets, but success at
this experimental level appears to have emboldened these automakers. Both manufacturers
have announced intentions to release subsequent HEV and BEV models. Toyota will offer
an EV version of its popular RAV-4 SUV and Honda will offer a hybrid gasoline/electric
version of its popular Civic line next month as a 2003 model. It marks the first time an
automaker will offer an already popular model as a hybrid for sale in the U.S. market.
Although Ford has indicated its intention to come to market with a hybrid version of its
Escape SUV in the 2003 model year, to date not a single domestic automaker has countered
the moves of their Japanese competitors.
These events suggest that the major Japanese players are executing according to a
larger strategic vision. Their short-term goal: test the market with a couple of introductory
production models, learn from failures, but build on success. Deliberately design interfaces
that evoke desired modes of behavior from consumers, educating them to value the
emergent benefits of the new technology. In the mid-term, release alternative power trains
as an option package in popular, existing production models. Continue to drive costs down
via scale and scope. In the long-term, the price differential erodes, and if the market is
cooperative, fuel prices increase relative to today's prices, and the larger adoption segments
"buy in." Sound simple? Far from it, and the path is riddled with risk that firms must
manage carefully along the way.
In this chapter, I turn to the more thorny issues confronting efforts by domestic
automakers to successfully bring advanced powertrain technologies to market.
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6.1 PITFALLS OF ARCHITECTURAL INNOVATION
In order to formulate and target high-leverage public interventions that achieve
desired outcomes, regulatory authorities must grasp the dynamics of the innovative forces
they wish to marshal in the public and private sectors. Innovations originate from many
potential sources, including government labs, the R&D wings of established firms, and
academic institutions. This body of research focuses solely on the technological solution
space and presupposes that established automakers will deliver the innovation demanded.
Therefore, comprehending the sources and nature of innovation will enable decision-
makers to construct policy regimes that harness the capacity of those entities most capable
of delivering innovations to market.
First, regulatory entities must understand that performance-based requirements, by
definition, place a burden on firms. The degree of difficulty that firms face in achieving the
requirement is largely determined by the nature and type of innovation the requirement
invokes. The requirement may necessitate simple diffusion of off-the-shelf technologies;
such solutions often lie within the technological know-how of the source firm, or may
involve the diffusion of existing technologies from adjacent industries. Conversely, the
outcome desired by regulators may require a much more complex solution that challenges
the firm outside its traditional core competencies.
Different types of innovation yield very different competitive consequences
because they require very different organizational capabilities to deliver them (Henderson
& Clark, 1990). In attempting to ascertain whether established firms are best positioned to
produce innovation in advanced fuel/vehicle systems, it is useful to examine the nature and
type of innovation required to deliver a successful solution to market. William Abernathy
(1978) and Clay Christensen (1997) differentiated between fundamental types of
innovation. Incremental innovations represent minor and continuous product
improvements that are evolutionary in nature, cater to existing markets, and reinforce the
organizational capabilities and market dominance of established firms. Discontinuous or
disruptive innovations, on the other hand, represent innovation that is radical in nature,
caters to a fundamentally different consumer value proposition or market, and threatens the
existing knowledge, competencies, and dominance of established firms. I contend that the
efforts to realize clean propulsion technologies will more closely approximate the latter.
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As a consequence, this will prove one of the more considerable obstacles threatening the
successful introduction of cleaner technologies to the mainstream consumer markets.
The potential solution scenarios discussed in this research rely on the adoption of a
set of alternative propulsion systems couched in established ICE-based automotive designs.
I suggest that as a result, stakeholders invoke another more insidious derivative of the
disruptive class of innovation referred to as "architectural" by management literature.
Henderson & Clark (1990) define architectural innovations as those that change the way in
which components of a product are linked together, while leaving the core design concepts
untouched. This category of innovation preserves the component knowledge of the
organization while destroying the architectural knowledge base. But because architectural
knowledge is deeply embedded in the structure and information processing procedures of
established firms, it is often difficult for firms to recognize and hard for them to correct.
Figure 6.1 attempts to map the distinction between radical, incremental, and architectural
innovations based on the degree of change demanded of the product's (1) architecture, and
(2) components and core design concepts.
Degree of Change Demanded in Components &
Core Competencies
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Figure 6.1 - Innovation Types as a function of change demanded
Successful product development demands two competency bases: (1) component
knowledge, or knowledge about each of the core design concepts and their implementation,
and (2) architectural knowledge, or knowledge surrounding the linking of components and
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sub-systems to create an integrated and coherent whole (Henderson & Clark, 1990).
Innovation is often characterized by periods of experimentation followed by the emergence
of a dominant design (Utterback, 1994). The dominant design "freezes" the product
architecture, defines the interaction of systems and components, and emerges in order to
take advantage of scale economies. The dominant design, in essence, stabilizes the product
architecture by incorporating a range of basic design choices that are not revisited in
subsequent designs (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Often, with the emergence of a dominant
architecture, firms cease investment in learning about alternative configurations and instead
focus their efforts on achieving process efficiencies.
A full seventy years have passed since the emergence of the ICE as the dominant
propulsion design in the auto industry. The focus of competition has long since shifted
away from the exploration of design space and toward the perfection of repeatable and
predictable processes for delivering the dominant design at scale. Today, the ICE remains
the central organizing principal of modern vehicle design, production, and firm
organization. By necessity, the successful engineering, production, and sale of complex
manufactured products such as automobiles entails highly defined structures and routines.
These structures and routines help the firm deal with complexity, but embed certain
implicit communication channels, information filters, and problem-solving strategies that
enable the firm to execute its mission (Henderson & Clark, 1990).
This research has discussed a representative set of advanced fuel/vehicle systems
that automakers have either produced, or are currently under development for potential
production. The majority of these technologies involve predominantly architectural design
changes for several reasons. First, with minor exceptions the proposed alternatives deliver
a virtually identical set of attributes exhibited by current ICE-based platforms. Customers
will observe many of the same components, and arrangement of components, they have
come to expect in customary ICE-based vehicles: four wheels, four seats, four doors, and a
steering wheel. Second, the core design concept behind each of these components, and the
science and engineering associated with them, remain undisturbed. Technologies such as
the electric motor, battery, and fuel cell are new only in their application to automobiles.
Finally, and most importantly, the alternatives involve the reconfiguration of an established
system to link together existing components in new ways. Many of these reconfigurations ,
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will occur "under the hood," outside the visual field of the customer. Nevertheless, the
incorporation of existing technologies such as electric motors, generators, and
ultracapacitors will create new linkages and spawn new interactions in the established
product.
The inherent complexities and unpredictability of these interactions create
significant obstacles for firms with long entrenched, deeply embedded architectural
knowledge. Much of what the firm knows will prove useful in climbing the steep learning
curve involved. But the firm's greatest assets can also become its greatest liability.
Henderson & Clark (1990) argue that the subtlety of this challenge - recognizing what is
useful and what is a liability, and acquiring and applying new knowledge - often proves
difficult for established firms because of the way architectural knowledge is organized and
managed. Organizations build knowledge and capability around the recurrent tasks they
perform.
Where firms often stumble is in their failure to appreciate the systemic change that
the new arrangement of sub-systems or components creates. Instead, they tend to rely on
their old frameworks - their old architectural knowledge - and consequently miss the real
nature of the threat. For example, in a potentially misplaced effort to save money and
reduce risk, many automakers are attempting to meet the call for better fuel efficiency and
emissions performance via "conversions" rather than by blank sheet, ground up design
efforts. To put it another way, these firms are attempting to shoehorn alternative systems
into architectures designed at the outset around the ICE. The danger implicit in such efforts
is two-fold. First, new interactions spawn new system behaviors that ultimately undermine
the firm's established architectural knowledge. Second, the effort fails to recognize or
capitalize on the potential to realize an entirely new or different value proposition that is
either unexplored or unrealized in the mainstream market. This requires firms to think
outside their traditional boundaries and therefore to consider information that the firm has
long since screened out as irrelevant to delivering its traditional value proposition.
The development of the jet aircraft industry provides a useful analog. With the
arrival of jet engine technology, established aircraft providers understood that they had to
develop jet engine expertise, but only those that recognized the significance of the subtle
changes that the new technology would impart on the aircraft "system" survived the
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subsequent shake-out as the industry transitioned from turboprops to jets. This
architectural innovation permanently tilted the competitive landscape and witnessed the
ascendance of Boeing and the decline of de Havilland and Douglas Corporation as the
industry leader. The episode proves ample warning to domestic automakers that choose to
defer market leadership in advanced powertrains to foreign competitors in favor of a "fast-
follower" strategy. Such a strategy is predicated on the fallacious notion that new
architectures can be easily acquired, absorbed, or adapted to the organization's old
frameworks.
In summary, this research contends that aside from a deeply embedded culture
averse to realizing innovations on the emissions front, the architectural implications of the
innovation demanded stands as one of the greatest obstacles to the realization of emissions
progress by established automakers. The problem is further compounded by the recent
industry shift toward sourcing a greater portion of sub-system and component design to 2nd
and 3rd tier suppliers, while focusing core OEM competencies on systems integration
activities. Thus, OEM efforts to reduce product development risk may ultimately tilt the
firm toward increasing dependence on its architectural competence base, thereby exposing
the firm to greater architectural risk. The deeply embedded nature of this knowledge, the
considerable delay in recognizing its presence, and the time and resources required for
management to develop and institute mechanisms to effectively counter its adverse effects
translates to a long-term handicap of the firm. Such developments may yield significant
competitive consequences when considering the formulation of policy regimes that aim to
yield desired performance- and competitive-based outcomes.
6.2 POLICY RESISTANCE
In order to understand the intransigence of domestic auto firms with regard to fuel
economy and emissions, one must return to the formative years of the federal Clean Air
Act of 1970. In the late 1960's and well into the 70's, U.S. automakers unequivocally
protested, lobbied, and successfully delayed and diluted federal and state efforts that
mandated drastic reductions in vehicle pollutant emissions. Their primary arguments
routinely centered on the localized nature of the problem (to urban centers such as Los
Angeles, Boston, and New York), the inherent trade off between emissions and fuel
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economy, and the reduced demand and subsequent loss ofjobs that would follow from the
inevitable increase in car prices. Despite two oil shocks that created overnight markets for
fuel-efficient vehicles, only the Japanese automakers stood ready with product to seize the
opportunity. Sadly, even today the major U.S. automakers still fail to see the irony of this
event in industrial history; for it was on the basis of fuel economy that the Japanese
automakers were first able to establish a beachhead on U.S. soil. Later, as gas prices
stabilized, the famed reliability of their products would wrest double-digit market share
from Detroit's Big Three.
Today, the situation has seen little change. The effort of domestic automakers to
systematically delay and dilute measures to improve emissions and fuel economy
performance reflect nearly four decades of a highly evolved political art form. The nation's
automakers continue to practice this art form today, throwing hundreds of millions of
dollars a year and vast company resources at lobbies that endeavor to quietly smother
efforts in Congress to increase corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. Due to
the delay of fleet composition to reflect the current market share of new vehicle sales, every
year of delay effectively impedes the realization of results a decade's time.
Despite the arguably optimistic scenarios depicted by our adoption model, deeply
embedded cultural and institutional mindsets preclude market leadership by domestic firms.
Rather, as I will argue shortly, the Japanese, and possibly even the Europeans, will beat the
Americans to the high-growth, high-margin segments of the market yet again. I attribute
this first to the architectural nature of innovation that auto firms must contend with as
discussed previously, and second to the cultural and organizational barriers that constrain
solution space and limit innovative capacity along these pathways.
6.2.1 THE "SHIFTING THE BURDEN" SYSTEM ARCHETYPE
The "Shifting the Burden" system archetype detailed by Peter Senge is one of nine
representative patterns of individual and organizational behavior noted in The Fifth
Discipline (1990). In basic form, this dynamic is composed of two balancing processes.
Both attempt to correct the same problem. The top process represents the symptomatic
intervention, commonly understood as the "quick fix" solution. While available
immediately for application, this method frequently yields benefits quickly in the short-
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term, but only temporarily. The bottom loop in Figure 6.2 below represents the
fundamental response to the problem. Although this response addresses the root cause of
the issue at hand, it typically involves considerable delay to implement and bear fruit.
Despite this delay, the fundamental response offers a much more permanent solution to the
initiating problem condition.
Senge explains that in shifting the burden structures there is an additional
reinforcing, or amplifying, loop created by a number of side effects instigated by
implementation of symptomatic solutions. He cites as an example the administering of
drugs to correct a health problem. If an unhealthy lifestyle initiated the problem, then the
fundamental solution lies in a change of lifestyle. The drugs represent the symptomatic
solution. Although they treat the symptoms effectively, they can lessen the pressure of
making the difficult changes of habit required to restore full health. A patient with a heart
condition might come to rely on the medication rather than altering his dietary intake or
exercise regimen, for example.
6.2.2 APPLYING THE SYSTEM ARCHETYPE TO U.S. AUTOMAKERS
The shifting the burden structure explains a wide range of behaviors where well-
intended short-term fixes contribute to worsening conditions in the long-term. This is easy
to imagine when the symptomatic solution is typically the most obvious and available
remedy. It offers the seductive qualities of demonstrating initiative to one's superiors that
the problem is being addressed and of achieving measurable progress within one's own
tenure. But Senge points out that addressing a problem in this "quick and easy" way also
reduces any perceived need to find more fundamental solutions. Even worse, over time a
fundamental solution becomes increasingly difficult to both identify and apply. First, once
instigated, people come to rely on the symptomatic solution. This is because the
symptomatic solution begins a march down a path requiring still more follow-on decisions
that inevitably involve the commitment of expensive resources that narrow design space
and "lock in" downstream decisions to a predetermined set of options. The further
downstream into the process, the less likely people are to challenge these assumptions, or to
consider divergent solutions. Thus, design space narrows over time as the firm commits
resources. Second, these solutions typically reward the manager with a feeling of having
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solved the problem. Ultimately, however, it diverts attention from the fundamental
problem and the burden shifts to increasing reliance on symptomatic solutions.
Lower goal for fuel
economy increase
Pressure to increase Strategic Drift
fuel economy
Fuel economy
increase actions
Figure 6.2 - The "Figure 8" and Strategic Drift
This structural shift, portrayed graphically by Figure 6.2, initiates "drift" in strategic
direction over time and comes at the cost of erosion in market share and competitive
position. Furthermore, once a firm embarks down this path it begins to cement and codify
certain mental models, organizational structures for problem solving, and channels of
communication. Furthermore, Senge cites the frequent appearance of the phenomenon of
"eroding goals" whereby the gap between the firm's goals and the current situation create
two sets of pressures: to improve the situation and to lower the firm's goals. Eroding goal
dynamics are a fundamental tenet of societies and are not only played out within firms but
amongst firms and amongst public and private entities (Senge, 1990).
Since the early 1960's domestic automakers lobbied against increases in fuel
economy or reductions in emissions. Frequently, their lobbying efforts succeeded in
diluting and delaying emissions standards and fuel economy targets. In some instances,
automakers successfully convinced Congress to "roll back" targets to the less stringent
terms of earlier model years. Typical arguments included the projected cost, increasing
- 166-
III
competition from foreign automakers, compromising of the nation's security posture [citing
the decline of American manufacturing and the importance of self-sustainability in
armaments production], and the widespread displacement of labor that would result from
these measures. Since the industry provided data that correlated automaking with roughly
one out of every seven jobs in the U.S., congressional representatives often cowed to the
implicit threat of layoffs conveyed by such arguments (Doyle, 2000).
Most fascinating is Peter Senge's comparison of these tendencies with the generic
dynamics of addiction. Almost all forms of addiction involve the shifting of burden to
other elements of the system. "All involve opting for symptomatic solutions, the gradual
atrophy of the ability to focus on fundamental solutions, and the increasing reliance on
symptomatic solutions." He correctly observes that by this definition, organizations and
entire societies are just as vulnerable to addiction as individuals. Insidiously, the symptoms
of this kind of addiction-like behavior tend to lie beneath the immediate surface, evolving
slowly over long periods of time. They surface occasionally in the form of periodic crises.
What persists, however, is a slow descent to lower levels of financial health for the firm or
the industry. The longer the deterioration, the more difficult it becomes for people to
challenge the fundamental causes and the more costly it becomes to alter the course. Thus,
the fundamental response loses steam while the symptomatic response gains in strength.
"Strategic Drift" consists of a number of patterns of behavior indicative of the
shifting of the burden system archetype. First is the "figure eight" effect, whereby in the
fuel economy game the tendency to lower the target serves to ease the pressure of
achieving a reduction in the fuel economy gap. This reduces the actions required of the
firm to increase fuel economy but in turn slows any progress toward closing the gap.
Slower progress toward closing the gap increases the pressure on the automaker to reduce
it. This pressure fuels further effort by the automaker to lower the bar for performance, and
thereby perpetuates the cycle indefinitely.
The shifting of the burden dynamic insidious is the subtle reinforcing cycle that it
fosters, placing increasing dependence on symptomatic solutions (Senge, 1990). Second,
the assault on CAFE via scores of Washington lobbyists diverts attention and resources
from the fundamental problem - product waste and design inefficiencies. And so begins a
gradual atrophy of the organization's ability to identify, focus on, and pursue fundamental
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solutions to the fuel economy and emissions problem. Consequently, pressures mount to
direct resources to further short-term problem solving. Automakers "game" CAFt
mandates, allowing them to hold to the letter of the law at the cost of defecting from the
intent of the law. For example, domestic automakers actually added weight to certain
medium-duty SUVs to deliberately exceed the gross vehicle weight jurisdiction of CAFE
truck mandates (Doyle, 2000). Doing so allowed them to sell an additional SUV and
collect on the generous profit margin it provided for each medium-duty truck that
successfully skirted the law.
CAFE
Decreasing fuel economy Strategic Drift
& increasing emissions
Adopt product ecology as
equivalent of 'Total Qualil'
Figure 6.3 - Strategic Drift and Emissions Regimes
As the auto firms embarked on a path of defecting from the intent and spirit of
CAFE law as depicted in Figure 6.3, the ability to alter course and revert to a more
fundamental approach to the problem grew in difficulty. As the average consumer's
appetite for increasing utility and vehicle size grew, American automakers invested heavily
in the skill and capital needed to deliver this performance attribute. They sought to cash in
on the enormous margins that such products promised but did so with a strategy completely
decoupled from the fuel economy and emissions conundrum. Rather, domestic firms
became ever more diligent in their lobbying efforts and more creative in ways to
circumvent CAFE restrictions. Consequently, one of the most promising technological
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solutions for achieving fuel economy targets - employment of advanced composites and
lightweight materials such as aluminum to reduce vehicle mass - faces a significant
roadblock in the form of trade-offs in vehicle safety. As trucks have risen in popularity and
grown to represent over 50% of the new vehicle market share, the average gross vehicle
weight of the fleet has risen as well. Thus, auto industry advocates have essentially closed
off, or have at least compromised, a potential avenue of solution space to the fuel economy
and emissions dilemma. Furthermore, earlier strategic decisions to defect from CAFE have
actually served to provide additional ammunition against advocates for regulatory
intervention. After all, federal fuel economy mandates could potentially compromise
vehicle safety, a sensitive subject to a legislator's constituency. The automakers know this,
and exploit it to their advantage by linking the two seemingly disparate subjects.
A final pattern of behavior indicative of strategic drift is the tendency of firms to
cite previous related failures as justification for the delay in committing resources toward
improving fuel economy and emissions performance. Oft-heard are the cries of
automakers having been stung once by investments in improving fuel economy at the
expense of investing in attributes the customer is willing to pay for. The past three decades
indicate that future movement in gas prices may prove volatile, but they will be temporary
and short-lived. Consequently, decision-makers will be inclined to delay investment in
improving fuel economy, preferring to defer instead to time to allow fuel prices to settle on
a stable equilibrium indicative of past decades. This is the preferred course for two
reasons. First, why commit when the past indicates that the spike will be temporary?
Secondly, why should the auto manufacturer bear the risk of future fuel price volatility
when that risk can be deferred to the customer? Notably, GM's unsuccessful introduction
of the first production electric vehicle, the EVJ, has proved a useful tool to justify the
claims of automakers that externally imposed mandates cannot deliver a market where one
doesn't exist. In essence, the EVJ experiment offers a convenient "I told you so" argument
to regulators and is frequently cited in statements to the media.
The development the EVi, a significant engineering feat in its own right, provides
an interesting case study of both perverse incentives and strategic drift acting in concert to
counter the more benevolent intent of GM's Advanced Technology Vehicles (ATV) Group
to deliver a profitable vehicle program to Corporate GM. In the mid-90's, even as ATV's
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engineers toiled away to meet cost, mass, and range targets, GM's corporate lobbyists were
hard at work in California and the Northeast. What were they doing? First, they attempted
to stall and derail efforts by the Northeastern states to adopt California's stricter emissions
mandates, most importantly the part mandating that ZEV sales comprise 2% by 1998, and
then 10% by 2003, of all new car sales. Second, with the deep pockets of Big Oil, they
threw all of their weight at CARB to convince the regulatory body to scrap, or at the very
least delay, the ZEV mandate. Now this begs the question: Why would an automaker, who
otherwise stood as the sole source provider of the only technology at hand to meet the ZEV
mandate, with the promise of capturing an uncontested share of the market, fight a law that
by fiat created the market for this product? Clearly, perverse incentives were at play.
Should California's mandate come to fruition unabated, GM stood ready to deliver the
product. Should the product prove successful, however, the Northeastern states would
jump on the ZEV bandwagon and this is what GM feared most. Simply stated, the
technology was not suited for the harsh climate of the Northeast. In fact, if the states
pressed and GM gave, the automaker believed the product would ultimately fail, opening
the firm to a torrent of product liability litigation. As GM corporate saw it, the only course
of action that could prevent this inevitability was to kill the ZEV mandate in California
(Shnayerson, 1996).
GM proved successful in its effort to forestall enactment of the ZEV mandate. In
the summer of 1996, as GM announced its launch of the EVJ to consumer markets in
California, CARB announced that it would suspend the 2% mandate for 1998, but that the
10% mandate for 2003 would stand unperturbed. Consistent with the history of U.S. auto
strategy, one could surmise that the 10% mandate would come under pressure next.
Important to note in this case are the countervailing forces involved. At one extreme, GM
granted the green light to one of the most far-sighted technological efforts ever embarked
on by the firm. At the other extreme, is that same firm's effort to derail its own trailblazing
project in the midst of a booming post-recession economic recovery. I argue that this "two-
faced" strategy is the product of strategic drift and is indicative of the insidious effect of
several decades of policy resistance. After all, could not have GM directed its lobbying
efforts toward convincing the regulatory bodies of the Northeastern states that their
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technological solution was not fungible and that the firm would have to pursue other
avenues to meet the unique demands of that market?
6.2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEVERAGE
The hard lesson learned of the EVJ episode, tips automakers to think twice before
investing. Burned once, firms resurrect the martyred failure to justify delay and to opt for a
more risk-averse competitive posture. Auto manufacturers argue that they have spent
hundreds of millions of dollars on fuel economy and emissions research largely in response
to government mandates rather than real consumer demand. They argue that these
regulations have tacked on hundreds of dollars to the cost of a car, weakened their
competitive standing with foreign imports, and cost them market share with little or no
return on their investment. And to add insult to injury, after nearly four decades gas prices
remain cheap and available while consumers clamor for increased performance, utility, and
size. If gas prices reflected the actual cost of supply, they argue, perhaps then consumers
would demand improvements to fuel economy and might actually prove willing to pay for
it when delivered.
Senge, however, argues that it is just this kind of behavior - a tendency to shift the
burden to other stakeholders - that underpins the mindset of a firm that has long since
departed from seeking fundamental solutions to the core problem. As fleet fuel economy
stagnated during the eighties and early nineties (prior to beginning its downturn in the mid-
nineties), the domestic automaker's customer base evolved toward those who were less
sensitive to poor fuel economy. This in turn meant that customers became more sensitive
to price and other vehicle attributes. But price-conscious customers typically prove less
loyal and more amenable to competitors offering lower prices. Furthermore, increased
price sensitivity meant that designers fell under increased pressure to control costs so as to
capture customers that might otherwise defect to the competition. Consequently, American
automakers risked drifting into the vulnerable position of being a low-quality, low-price
supplier of low margin vehicles.
In response, U.S. automakers pressed ahead with two strategies. First, they pushed
responsibility for the development of whole subsystems onto the supply chain. In so doing,
they hoped to shift the role of product innovation to the supply chain while focusing
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resources on their own core competency as vehicle systems integrators. Second,
automakers moved en masse away from "car" production to "truck" production. The
consuming public's insatiable appetite for bigger, tougher, utility-based vehicles was
indicative of growing real wealth in the boom of the mid- to late-90's. This growing
segment of affluent, less price sensitive, investment-savvy Americans provided a huge
boon of opportunity for capture of large rent margins by U.S. firms. Most domestic
automakers eagerly closed car plants across the world or converted them to truck shops to
gain the capacity to cash in on the SUV craze. But foreign competitors soon followed and
at the precipice of a new worldwide manufacturing recession, domestic automaker stand
poised and ready with new and fresh product to push to a confident consumer market. Post
9/11, and post 0 percent financing programs that artificially and temporarily propped up
capacity utilization figures for the industry, the future looks much more bleak. Despite a
wealth of new product, competitors will roll out more. Where can the domestics find new
horizons for competitive differentiation in such a tight market?
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY STRATEGY
6.3.1 A NEW VALUE PROPOSITION
In Chapter 5, we witnessed the progressive diminution of the propulsion platform
life cycle as technologies transitioned from ICE- to HEV and finally to FCEV- or EV-
based phases of technology dominance. In this section, I hypothesize that the acceleration
of propulsion technology life cycle stems from the accelerating pace of innovation in
complementary "ITEC" technologies: i.e. those derived from information,
telecommunications, electronic and energy sectors. To date, automakers have captured
only a small fraction of the potential of these technologies to improve manufacturing
processes, with the latest movement toward "lean" and the notion of "mass-customization."
Only in recent years, have automakers begun to consider the implications of incorporating
the breadth of ITEC innovations throughout the entirety of vehicle design, not only in
improving the process of design and vehicle development, but also to incorporate ITEC
technologies into vehicle design. Doing so offers the promise of realizing added value for
the customer while achieving competitive differentiation in the market. Although we have
witnessed the advent of telematics as a viable business opportunity, few other
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complementary technologies have trickled through. With the exception of more advanced
on-board electronics to monitor vehicle activities, vehicles today remain "dumb" relative to
other high-technology cousins such as aircraft. Rather, industry continues to view their
product as consumer durables vice high technology products and therefore design,
manufacture, distribute, and support their product as such.
The shortening of propulsion system life cycles portends a number of uncertainties
and risks for industry stakeholders and consumers. I have argued throughout this thesis
that the provision of personal mobility will continue to trend away from patterns consistent
with consumer durables markets and will take on an increasing flavor of high-technology
ones. If true, automakers must remain ever vigilant of such trends and nurture core
competencies in directions that allow them to capture value in the supply chain and value in
the consumer market from a system-wide perspective. Hax (2001) argues that to do so,
firms must reject imitation of competitors and a product-centric mentality that steers the
industry toward commoditization. Instead, Hax suggests that fins erect significant
barriers around the customer through "a unique customer value proposition based on deep
customer segmentation, and customer and consumer understanding." Rather than
benchmarking competitors as the central organizing principle for product strategy, firms
should concentrate on leveraging B2B and B2C technologies to nurture the integrated value
chain consisting of key suppliers, consumers, and complementors.
The end-goal of such a strategy for the OEM is system "lock-in," whereby
customers and suppliers operate from a base of trust and comfort to effectively "fold in" the
more radical and disruptive technologies abhorred by the sales and marketing arm of the
firm. It is instead crucial that sales and marketing take on a much more proactive and
involved relationship with the customer in the after-market. Today, these arms continue to
operate from a traditional consumer durables perspective: know your customer, push
product that the customer demands, and wait for them to come back to buy more product.
The long-view goal in this model is to achieve "best product" via aesthetic design, all else
being equal in an increasingly commoditized market.
But history bears out that since the entry of foreign competition and the emergence
of global markets, best product in the auto industry is a fleeting achievement at best. It is
window dressing with a 5-year lifespan in a business with the markings of the fashion
- 173 -
industry, but with a four-year delay in product delivery. The complexity, scale, and rigors
of global manufacturing necessitate standardization and repeatability. To do so,
automakers rely on a matrix organization divided into functional and product/program units
of interaction. Industrial science bears out the phenomenon of the swinging pendulum,
with firms involved in such complex manufacturing endeavors shifting in dominance from
one to the other. Few firms have discovered a means to avoid this tendency. Thus,
product-based excellence is a difficult, and tenuous goal to attain, and even more so to
maintain for a length of time that yields the level of return on investment necessary to
sustain the firm during leaner, functionally driven periods. The industry is ripe with
examples of firms that achieved temporary best product advantage only to find themselves
teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, or financially vulnerable to hostile acquisition. Such
examples include General Motors circa 1980, Chrysler (now Daimler Chrysler) circa 1997,
and Ford Motor Company circa 2002.
Christensen (2000) proclaims, "Advantage is Temporary." If so, is it more risky to
pursue advantage down a path with a proven track record of short-term temporary
advantage within your industry, with diminishing returns to invested assets? Or does it
make more sense to pursue strategies untried in the domestic market, but that have a proven
track record of success in adjacent high-tech industries such as business copiers or
operating systems? These case studies illustrate the potential of achieving more sustained
advantage derived from pursuing Total Customer Solutions as the key enabler for
achieving "System Lock-In" as a strategic goal of the firm? The latter offers a number of
benefits. First, because the strategy involves forging a close and deeply segmented
relationship with the customer, the customer becomes an asset to the firm in creating
additional value. More importantly, it offers the potential for firms to gain critical feedback
earlier in the design process, to test out early markets to gain insight, and to ensure that new
technologies breach the natural divide between adoption segments in the Technology
Adoption Life Cycle (Moore, 1999). Customers are less averse to the "shocks" of
disruptive change, when they trust the provider from the perspective that the vendor will
ensure the customer continues to receive uninterrupted transportation service that meets or
exceeds his expectations.
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Another key advantage of the Total Customer Solutions strategy is the relatively
high appropriability of the value created. Deep customer, supplier, and complementor
networks are not forged overnight. Rather, these value chains require a gestation period
before firms can capture the potential fruits of their efforts. Since the success of a BEV, for
example, hinges on the provision of energy to sustain a range acceptable to the customer,
the OEM must work with complementors to align interests and nurture adjacent and niche
markets that promise to lower the barriers to entry. The removal of barriers, and the
establishment of an entrenched complementary asset such as vehicle charging stations offer
the potential to create significant, long-term value to the firms best positioned with product
to take advantage of this infrastructure.
In sum, a much more advantageous and achievable goal for auto and energy firms
is to accept the changing nature of their industry. This entails a shift from the mindset that
the firm is operating in a purely consumer durables market and toward an acceptance that
the product is trending toward a market that will place higher value on high technology-
based systems with shorter product life cycles. Thus, the market will exhibit patterns of
behavior more representative of high tech markets than consumer durables. In order to
thrive in the high tech market, firms must abandon the notion that "best product" will
achieve lasting advantage in favor of an organizing principle that places "Total Customer
Solutions" at the fore of industry strategy. Doing so enables the firm to extend this unique
value proposition to new segments and to leverage adjacent technologies via
complementors. Thus, customers, suppliers, and complementors become part of a total,
systems-based, solutions package enabling complementor lock-in, competitor lockout, and
ultimately, "System Lock-In" (Hax, 2001).
6.3.2 EMPLOYING THE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE MODEL
Automakers today face the classic prisoner's dilemma. Simply, the basis for
competition is such that they must continue to pursue high margin vehicle segments to
sustain profitability. This translates to reliance on luxury segments that exploit flatter price
elasticities in order to skim higher margins. It also means that the firm's product portfolio
becomes skewed toward products positioned to chase margins in established segments
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rather than committing a balanced portion of the firm's product portfolio to the riskier
endeavor of seeding new markets.
Yet seeding new markets is a necessary ingredient for market leadership in
innovation that might enable the firm to capture first-mover advantages and lead market
rents. Rather, domestic automakers find themselves trapped in a highly risk-averse
business model with intense competitive pressures and thinning margins that offer little
financial tolerance for failure. U.S. automakers have responded with efforts to recapture
lost market share via a concerted revival of classic American automobile design. GM's
recent hiring of Bob Lutz as their Chief Designer attests to the firm strategy of beating the
competition on the basis of superior aesthetic design. Design, however, at best conveys
temporary advantage to the automaker for two critical reasons. First, design suffers from
weak appropriability; competitors can readily imitate it and rapidly bring it to market.
Thus, any increased rents from aesthetic superiority will be cannibalized by imitation
product in adjacent segments. Second, where complex manufacturing relies upon a matrix
organization, delivering superior product comes at the cost of sustaining the functional
proficiency of the firm. Like a pendulum that swings between product and functional
competence, at some threshold, a product-focused organization witnesses the dilution of the
functional depth of its engineers. The symptom emerges in the form of poorer product
quality and performance. Consequently, the firm's share slips to design imitators who
enter with product derived from a more functionally competent period. The early 1990's
witnessed the fabulous revival of Chrysler, thanks in large part to industry leading product
concepts such as "cab-forward" and Ram pick-up designs. But Chrysler succumbed to a
series of embarrassing product performance-based recalls and competitive entry by its
rivals who adopted similar design enhancements. In 1998, Chrysler's sagging sales and
poor financial position left it ripe for takeover. Shortly thereafter, German conglomerate
Daimler-Benz acquired the struggling firm. The lesson: a best product focus conveys
temporary advantage only.
To achieve a system-wide and persisting edge on competitors, a firm must pursue
more appropriable strategies. This section argues that building a deep customer
relationship, combined with finer segmentation that encompasses a broader value
proposition as depicted in Figure 6.4 is a necessary part of the equation. The firm must
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consider its installed customer base as an asset that, like the firm's plant and equipment
capital, must be employed toward providing a return to shareholders. Doing so enables
firms to leverage its installed customer base to lower risk-based innovation barriers and
"lock-out" competitors who might attempt to imitate (Hax, 2001).
Traditional Products: Personal Mobility
" 2-door commuters
" 4-door sedans
* Hatchbacks
" Convertibles Cruc&s
* Blazers
" Jeeps
* Light Duty Trucks
" Heavy Duty Trucks
* Sport Utility Vehicles
New Services:
" Commuting Solutions
* Military/Defense
* Fleet Solutions
" University Solutions
" Urban Solutions
" Disabled/Elderly
Solutions
" Hospital Solutions
" Youth Mobility
Solutions
Figure 6.4 - Expanded Value Proposition: Personal Mobility Solutions
To successfully navigate the introduction of advanced powertrain technologies to
wary markets, automakers must concede that the product they are trying to sell will look
less like a traditional consumer durables market, and more like a high technology market.
In other words, automakers should consider the traditional consumer market adoption
model (best characterized as "a car for every purpose and purse") in light of the
Technology Adoption Life Cycle advanced by Geoffrey Moore (1991). Unlike the Sloan
model, in which the automaker "owns" the consumer over the course of his life, providing
a car for every major life phase, the Technology Adoption Life Cycle paints a very
different portrait of adoption behavior. Both entail a relationship with the customer. The
latter, however, is rife with pitfalls that belie the complex and risk-laden characteristics of
high cost, higher turnover, high technology products.
Again, automobile history provides a useful starting point. Sloan understood that
people want things that are new, and only need a good reason to buy the new thing. So
Sloan introduced a wonderful new concept: the annual model changeover. The idea was to
provide different kinds of cars for different kinds of customers. Customers always bought
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more than just basic transportation - they bought style, performance, convenience and the
driving experience. Sloan recognized the necessity of capturing customer lifetime value
and building brand loyalty, offering a product for every price-range and life-stage. Today,
customers look to cars to provide much of the same, except that technology plays a much
greater role in delivering them.
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Figure 6.5 - Moore's Technology Adoption Life Cycle
Figure 6.5 portrays the Technology Adoption Life Cycle as a normal curve,
segmented by the psychographic adoption groups that comprise it. Gaps exist between
psychographic groups; therefore, every group will resist accepting a new product if it is
presented to them in the same way it was to the group to the immediate left. Each gap
presents the risk of loss of momentum and potential stagnation or death. To reach the Early
Adopters, the firm must present the customer with a "compelling application" that would
drive its acceptance over other, more established alternatives (e.g. the ability of a personal
digital assistant to play MP3s). According to Moore, the key to winning over this segment
is to demonstrate that the new technology "enables some strategic leap forward, something
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never before possible, which has an intrinsic value and appeal to the non-technologist."
Therefore, what are the "killer apps" provided by advanced powertrains and who is
positioned to best derive value from them: fleets, consumers, or some other segment?
To transfer technology from the Early Adopters in the fleet market to the Early
Majority, the firm must evolve the technology to be progressively easier to use. In contrast
to Moore's assumption that this divide rests between the Early and Late Majorities, I argue
that in the mainstream consumer automotive market, this divide comes much earlier in the
adoption life cycle and that the Early Adopters represent a much smaller population than in
the pure Technology Adoption Life Cycle Model. I equate this to two crucial differences
in the vehicle market. First, cars are evolving from a pure consumer durable to a hybrid
between a high-technology product and a consumer durable product. Secondly, individual
purchasers lack the kind of compelling business application that the promise of scale and
scope enable in industry. Thus, the Early Majority occupies a much larger area under the
normal curve, perhaps 1.5 - 2 standard deviations from the mean.
In order to bridge the gap between Early Adopters and the Early Majority (or from
fleet to consumer markets), the marketing arm of the firm should share responsibility for
the user interface with engineering in order to ensure that product design achieves the
desired consumer behavior and user experience. The design of the instrument cluster in
Toyota's Prius HEV model provides a perfect example of this effort in action. The center
of the cluster displays LED readout of the basic energy conversion pathways, and the
associated fuel economy, of the vehicle in real time. The user can thus visualize the effect
of his driving pattern on the efficiency of the vehicle. In many ways, the design attempts to
"lead the horse to water;" that is, to show the consumer the compelling application for the
vehicle technology. Secondly, the design creates an interactive experience between the
user and the vehicle, such that the user modifies his behavior to optimize the potential of
the technology.
The consumer durable/high-technology hybrid nature of automobiles means that a
hybrid approach to marketing is necessary in order to successfully move product up-market
from an initial niche to mainstream segments. Incumbent OEMs hold the key to reaching
the conservative Early Majority for several reasons. First, this group seeks out references
within its own group, creating a Catch-22 chicken-and-egg dilemma for producers.
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Therefore, the way to reach the group is via a trust-based relationship focused on service
and support from proven technologies. The Early Majority psychographic group is much
more price-sensitive and risk-averse. It would be a mistake to approach this group with a
risk-laden, strategic leap forward proposition. Secondly, in order to build this trust-based
relationship, OEMs should organize around a "total solutions," service-based value
proposition rather than one based on "best product" (Hax, 2001). Firms can thus focus on
their strategic core competencies. For example, automakers could, in concert with the
value chain, manage system-of-systems activities that span the spectrum necessary to
deliver "total customer solutions." This includes leveraging core OEM process
competencies in vehicle integration with value chain members responsible for customer
support. OEM's also bring their extensive distribution and sales networks to the
partnership in the effort to deliver "total" customer solutions.
Third, OEM's should structure joint venture and/or acquisition strategies to pursue
development of potentially "discontinuous" product innovations and then leverage the deep
customer trust-base of the service strategy to work these higher risk innovations into the
market. OEM's can achieve this via careful and deliberate strategies for growing
innovation. For example, firms can employ a range of strategic partnering relationships
that leverage the innovative capacity inherent of smaller firms. This outsourcing strategy
avoids the pitfall of in-house efforts that subject such projects to the scrutiny of corporate
resource allocation mechanisms. Such decision gates typically prove unreceptive to high-
risk projects that absorb company resources to pursue undefined markets with the promise
of fractional returns relative to the firm's mainstream product lines (Christensen, 1997).
The strategy also has a downside, however. Firms risk outsourcing those portions of the
supply chain that hold the greatest value (Fine, 1998). This again, is the "Intel Inside" risk
of the strategy. To hedge this risk, OEM's can take a variety of equity positions in these
firms.
Finally, the total customer solutions focus could enable traditionally risk-averse
OEMs to balance out their product portfolios as suggested in the generic Aggregate Product
Portfolio illustrated in Figure 2.7. Currently, the product portfolio of domestic automakers
is "bottom-right" heavy. This is a consequence of the current product-based paradigm that
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relies on the traditional financial levers of turnover and margins. Ideally, firm portfolios
should comprise a set of projects balanced along the diagonal from bottom-right to top-left.
Consumer Value
Perception
New Core New
Product Benefits Imnrnvmnmnt Vqriant
Very High-risk strategy Hi -risk process improvement
focused on winning sha and/or regulatory support
Radical via meeting or predicti quiring highly innovative
new Consumer needs echnology offering little
supported by Consumer benefit
Next technological Modt
Gcuato srnt Moderate risk throughbalanced technology
Enablingand brand
enoblongy strength ow risk through
Technology balanced
technology and
lnrnment High-risk brand strength
nrmntbrand image Very Low
projection risk strategy focused
vulnerable to fast- on maintaining share
Ras follower imitation through technological
stability
Figure 6.6 - Aggregate Project Portfolio - Consumer Technology Matrix/Risk Topography
A deep customer focus, rather than a product-centric mentality, confers a number of
advantages. First, it frees the firm from a fast-follower/imitator mindset that is driving the
industry toward commoditization. Second, it enables the firm to leverage a trust-based
relationship to not only erect barriers around the customer, but to employ the customer as a
firm asset in its effort to establish market leadership in innovative new technologies such as
advanced powertrains. Finally, the strategy establishes cohesive mechanisms for the
design, marketing, and sale of these products through deeply segmented consumer markets.
In sum, new technologies must be carefully and deliberately rolled out to the
appropriate market segment under a "total customer solutions" value proposition.
Continuing under best product paradigms will only serve to relegate domestic automakers
to the follower role that has witnessed the slipping of market share to foreign market
leaders.
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6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY
Achieving significant air quality improvements requires a multimedia approach to the
emissions issue. This means intervening to create economic incentives to enable desired
behaviors by affected stakeholders. A two front "war" is necessary. The first front involves
stimulating innovation in the most capable of industries and redistributing costs via programs
such as fee-bates to lower the entry price of cleaner technologies. The second front involves
regulatory interventions that catalyze technological innovation in the longer term to affect
more sustainable practices as well as the development of an infrastructure to perpetuate the
continued use of those practices.
Although the United States requires the use of state-of-the-art pollution control
devices, consistently low gas prices reduce the cost of vehicle ownership and thereby fail to
reflect the real cost, or externality cost, to society due to their increased usage. Therefore, little
incentive exists for consumers to modify behavior that is aligned with emissions and energy
dependence reduction goals. A good deal of the potential for vehicle emissions reductions
involves removing the fleet of "dirtier" vehicles from the road earlier. Unfortunately, the costs
imposed by the requirement for more fuel efficient vehicles has, in concert with factors such
as vehicle safety and crash worthiness, increased the real price of new cars, with consequences
that work counter to emissions goals. Higher purchase prices translate to lower turnover, as
consumers must amortize the higher cost over a longer period of ownership. Lower turnover
means the worse polluting vehicles stay on the road longer. To contend with this perverse
incentive, policies should work to increase the operating cost of the worst polluting vehicles,
including trucks, SUVs, and minivans, while simultaneously redistributing vehicle purchase
prices to reflect implicit externality costs. This can be achieved by levying an "emissions tax"
with annual vehicle registration and renewal. Authorities can then target these moneys, in
concert with point of sale fees, toward point of sale and registration-based rebates for
relatively cleaner vehicles.
In addition to policies that encourage diffusion of cleaner technologies, authorities
must incentivize behaviors beneficial to air quality in the longer term. Considerable air quality
gains can be achieved via the encouragement of higher-occupancy modes of transport. Most
importantly, however, authorities must provide transport mode choice to the public. Moneys
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collected from low-occupancy transit can be redistributed to expand the metro network.
Additionally, coordination at the metropolitan level must expand to comprise land use
planning activities that incentivize transit-oriented development efforts by offering tax-relief
and credits to builders who choose to build near strategic transit destinations. This also means
increasing taxation on those developers who choose to operate irrespective of development
guidelines. Such efforts can go far toward mitigating the air quality impacts of urban sprawl
in the longer term.
Another key enabler for public intervention is education and awareness.
Contemporary acceptance of harmful motor vehicle emissions bears striking similarities with
early efforts to understand and eventually curb tobacco use. As evidence from the medical
community implicated tobacco products and exposure to second-hand smoke with increased
incidence of lung disease and cancer, organizations such as the American Lung Association
and the American Cancer Society unleashed a sustained blitz of media campaigns to alert and
educate consumers to the hazards of smoking. Grass roots lobbying efforts further succeeded
in enacting laws and local statutes prohibiting smoking in public places. The recent shift in
research focus to understanding the adverse health impacts of motor vehicle emissions may
portend similar developments. With mounting epidemiological evidence coming to the
public's attention, awareness campaigns that warn of the hazards of motor vehicle use may
emerge to educate consumers and stimulate demand for cleaner propulsion technologies.
In summary, policies should use a multimedia approach to both enabling innovative
capacity and to modify consumer and industry behavior over time. Authorities should
target interventions that co-optimize economic growth with tangential benefits to air
quality. Establishing a fee-bate policy regime that redistributes costs to reflect externality
impacts away from high emission vehicle use and toward the combination of low emissions
vehicles and infrastructure-building activities that support higher-occupancy modes can
achieve this. For example, expansion of the metro network combined with tax incentives
and development waivers that favor transit-oriented development works on two fronts.
First, it can enable technological innovation that serves to "lock-in" a more desired future
by laying the mass-transit infrastructure network. Second, in so doing the inherent
architecture of the network encourages and shapes future behavioral patterns of the
consuming public in a direction beneficial to air quality.
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Variable Definitions (in Alphabetical Order)
(1) Air Pollution Cost[technology]=
Air Pollutant Cost per Kilo[technology]*Annual Pollutant
emissions[technology]
Units: $/car/Year
The cost of air pollution generated by each vehicle is the product of the
cost per kilo of pollutant generated and emissions.
(2) All Vehicle Pollutant Emissions=
Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions+Total Older Vehicle Pollutant
Emissions
Units: kilograms/Year
All Vehicle Pollutant Emissions equals the total pollutant emissions of criteria
pollutants by the entire vehicle fleet.
(3) Annual C02 emissions[technology]=
Annual Fuel Consumption [technology]*C02 emissions per
gallon[technology]
Units: kilograms/car/Year
Carbon dioxide emissions depend on fuel consumption per year and the
carbon density of fuel.
(4) Annual Fuel Consumption [technology]=
Vehicle Miles Traveled/Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology]
Units: gallons/car/Year
Fuel consumed per year is the vehicle miles travelled per year divided by
fuel economy: more miles per year or lower fuel economy raise fuel
consumptionand hence emissions.
(5) Annual Pollutant emissions[technology]=
Pollutant Emissions per Mile[technology]*Vehicle Miles Traveled
Units: kilograms/car/Year
Pollutants include NOx and particulates; the emission rate depends on fuel
consumption and the pollutant load per gallon of fuel.
(6) "Annualized All-Technology EDC"=
SUM(Annualized per Technology EDC [technology])
Units: $/Year
Annualized All-Technology EDC represents the cumulative environmental
damage cost created by all vehicles of all technology types on the road in
a given year.
(7) Annualized Environmental Damage Cost[technology]=
Air Pollution Cost[technology]+Greenhouse Gas Cost[technology]
Units: $/(Year*car)
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Annualized EDC is the Annual Cost of Environmental Damage borne by
society. This includes public health, climate change, accelerated species
extinction, and other externalities.
(8) Annualized per Technology EDC[technology]=
Annualized Environmental Damage Cost[technology] *Per Technology
Vehicle Fleet[technology]
Units: $/Year
Annualized per Technology On-Road EDC represents the cumulative
environmental damage cost created by all vehicles of a specific technology
type on the road in a given year.
(9) Attractiveness from Consumer Awareness[technology]=
Function for Attractiveness from Awareness(Consumer Fraction
Aware[technology]/Reference Awareness)
Units: Dmnl
Other sources of value catches all other vehicle attributes not
specifically broken out that the consumer factors into their purchase
decision. We assume for the model that all other sources of value are
equally shared by each of the vehicle propulsion/fuel system combinations.
(10) Attractiveness from Cost[technology]=
Function for Attractiveness from Cost(Lifecycle Vehicle
Cost[technology]/Reference Cost)
Units: Dmnl
Attractiveness from Cost is the utility, or value, that the consumer
expects for a given cost relative to a reference cost.
(11) Attractiveness from Environmental Impact[technology]=
(1 + Consumer Fraction Sensitive to Environmental Impact*(Function for
Attractiveness from Environmental Impact(Environmental Damage Cost
[technology]/Reference Environmental Impact) -1))
Units: Dmnl
Attractiveness from environmental impact is a function of environmental
damage cost. The higher the sensitivity to environmental impact, the
greater the affect of environmental damage on vehicle attractiveness (high
or low); sensitivity of zero implies no impact on atttractiveness.
(12) Attractiveness from Infrastructure Adequacy[technology]=
Function for the Attractiveness of Infrastructure
Adequacy[technology](Infrastructure Coverage Fraction
[technology]/Reference Infrastructure Adequacy)
Units: Dimensionless
Attractiveness from Infrastructure Adequacy is the utility, or value, that the
consumer derives from the level of infrastructure coverage associated with a
particular advanced fuel/technology system.
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(13) Attractiveness from Performance [technology]=
Function for Attractiveness from Performance(Performance of New
Vehicles[technology] /Reference Performance)
Units: Dmnl
Attractiveness from Performance is the utility, or value, that the
consumer derives from the level of performance offered by the vehicle
under consideration for purchase.
(14) Attractiveness from Product Availability [technology]=
Function for Attractiveness from Availability(Total
Availability[technology]/Reference Availability)
Units: Dimensionless
This parameter serves to modestly penalize those powertrain technologies
that have less than the reference availability of the ICE. Although lack
of availability can provide a market stimulus for the technology, it can
also encourage consumers to defect to more available product technologies.
(15) Attractiveness from Range[technology]=
Function for Attractiveness from Range(Range[technology]/Reference
Range)
Units: Dmnl
The Range function captures the utility derived by the customer as a
function of the vehicle's range between fuelings. The consumer tends to
attribute a significant preference penalty for any vehicle whose range
falls under approximately 200 miles on a single fueling. Attractiveness is
benchmarked against a reference range equal to 400 miles for an advanced
body vehicle.
(16) Attractiveness of Technology[technology]=
Attractiveness from Cost[technology] *Attractiveness from
Performance[technology] *Attractiveness from Range [technology]*
Attractiveness from Environmental Impact[technology] *Attractiveness
from Infrastructure Adequacy[technology]*Attractiveness from Product
Availability[technology]
Units: Dmnl
The Consumer Attractiveness for a given propulsion/fuel platform is the
product of the attractiveness of each attribute under consideration at the
point of purchase.
(17) Average Fleet GHG Emissions [technology]=
((Per Technology Late Model GHG Emissions[technology]+Per
Technology Older Vehicle GHG Emissions[technology])/(Late Model
Vehicles [technology]+Older Vehicles[technology]))
Units: kilograms/(Year*car)
Average Fleet GHG Emissions is the average per vehicle annual GHG
-205-
emissions of all vehicles, late model and older.
(18) Average Fleet Pollutant Emissions[technology]=
((Per Technology Late Model Pollutant Emissions[technology]+Per
Technology Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions
[technology])/(Late Model Vehicles[technology]+Older
Vehicles[technology]))
Units: kilograms/(Year*car)
Average Fleet Pollutant Emissions is the average per vehicle annual
Pollutant emissions of all vehicles, late model and older.
(19) Average Fleet Price[technology]=
((Total Late Model Price[technology]+Total Older Vehicle
Price[technology])/(Late Model Vehicles
[technology]+Older Vehicles[technology]))
Units: $/car
Average Fleet Price is the average annual per vehicle price of all
vehicles, late model and older.
(20) Average Fleet Range[technology]=
(Total Late Model Range[technology] + Total Older Vehicle Range
[technology])/(Late Model Vehicles[technology] + Older
Vehicles[technology])
Units: miles
Average Fleet Range represents the average range of the total fleet of
vehicles for a given technology.
(21) Average Fuel Economy[technology]=
(Per Technology Late Model Fuel Economy[technology] + Per
Technology Older Vehicle Fuel Economy
[technology])/(Late Model Vehicles
[technology] + Older Vehicles[technology])
Units: miles/gallon -
Average fuel economy of the portion of the fleet representing a particular
propulsion technology.
(22) Average Late Model Fuel Economy[technology]=
Per Technology Late Model Fuel Economy[technology]/Late Model
Vehicles[technology]
Units: miles/gallon
Average Late Model Fuel Economy is the average fuel economy of the fleet
of all late model vehicles of a particular propulsion technology on the road.
(23) Average Late Model GHG Emissions[technology]=
Per Technology Late Model GHG Emissions [technology]/Late Model
Vehicles[technology]
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Units: kilograms/(Year*car)
Average Late Model GHG Emissions is the average annual per vehicle
GHG
emissions resulting from the fleet of late model vehicles.
(24) Average Late Model Performance[technology]=
Total Late Model Performance[technology]/Late Model
Vehicles[technology]
Units: Dimensionless
Average Late Model Performance is the average performance of all late
model vehicles of a particular propulsion technology.
(25) Average Late Model Pollutant Emissions[technology]=
Per Technology Late Model Pollutant Emissions [technology]/Late Model
Vehicles [technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*car)
Average Late Model Pollutant Emissions is the average annual per vehicle
Pollutant emissions resulting from the fleet of late model vehicles.
(26) Average Late Model Price[technology]=
Total Late Model Price[technology]/Late Model Vehicles[technology]
Units: $/car
Average Late Model Price is the average annual per vehicle Price derived
from averaging the prices of the fleet of late model vehicles.
(27) Average Late Model Range[technology]=
Total Late Model Range [technology]/Late Model Vehicles[technology]
Units: miles
Average Late Model Range is the average range of the fleet of late model
vehicles
(28) Average Older Vehicle Fuel Economy[technology]=
Per Technology Older Vehicle Fuel Economy [technology]/Older
Vehicles[technology]
Units: miles/gallon
Average Older Vehicle Fuel Economy represents the average fuel economy
for a particular technology of the fleet of older vehicles.
(29) Average Older Vehicle GHG Emissions[technology]=
Per Technology Older Vehicle GHG Emissions[technology]/Older
Vehicles[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*car)
Average Older Vehicle GHG Emissions is the average annual per vehicle
GHG emissions resulting from the fleet of older vehicles.
(30) Average Older Vehicle Performance[technology]=
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Total Older Vehicle Performance[technology]/Older Vehicles[technology]
Units: Dimensionless
Average Older Vehicle Performance is the average performance of the fleet
of older vehicles for a particular technology.
(31) Average Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions[technology]=
Per Technology Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions[technology]/Older
Vehicles[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*car)
Average Older Vehicle Pollutnat Emissions is the average annual per
vehicle Pollutant emissions resulting from the fleet of older vehicles.
(32) Average Older Vehicle Price[technology]=
Total Older Vehicle Price[technology]/Older Vehicles[technology]
Units: $/car
Average Older Vehicle Price is the average annual per vehicle price
derived from averaging the prices of the fleet of older vehicles.
(33) Average Older Vehicle Range[technology]=
Total Older Vehicle Range[technology]/Older Vehicles[technology]
Units: miles
Average Older Vehicle Range is the average range of the fleet of older
vehicles
(34) Average Performance[technology]=
(Total Late Model Performance[technology] + Total Older Vehicle
Performance[technology])/(Late Model Vehicles[technology] + Older
Vehicles[technology])
Units: Dimensionless
Average Performance is the average performance of the total fleet
(35) Awareness from Marketing[technology]=
Normal Awareness Generation from Marketing*(Relative Strength of
Marketing Effort[technology])^Marketing Elasticity
Units: 1/Year
Awareness from Marketing is equal to the baseline awareness from
marketing, multiplied by the relative strength of marketing effort raised
to the marketing elasticity.
(36) Awareness from Public Ad Campaigns=
Normal Awareness Generation from Marketing*(Relative Strength of
Public Ad Campaign)^Marketing Elasticity
Units: 1/Year
Awareness from Public Ad Campaigns is equal to the baseline awareness
from
marketing, multiplied by the relative strength of the public advertisement
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campaign effort raised to the marketing elasticity.
(37) Awareness from Word of Mouth[technology]=
Effective WOM contacts per year*Technology Fraction in the
Fleet[technology]
Units: 1/Year
Awareness from Word of Mouth is equal to the Technology Fraction in the
Fleet multiplied by the Effective Word of Mouth contacts per year.
(38) Base Gasoline Price=1.43
Units: $/gallon
The Base Gasoline Price is set at $1.43 per gallon and are current as of
8/20/01(Source: EIA "Weekly U.S. Retail Gasoline Prices," Regular Grade
for 8/20/2001)
(39) Baseline Marketing Expenditure=I
Units: Dmnl/Year
Baseline marketing spending (e.g., 30,000,000/year) is sufficient to generate
awareness at the normal fractional rate.
(40) Change in Competitor Target Product Availability[technology]=
-Competitor Stimulus [technology]
Units: 1/Year
The Change in Competitor Target availability is equal to the negative of
the Competitor Stimulus. This indicates that the competitors are
fast-followers, responding to the competitor stimulus but not the market
stimulus.
(41) Change in Competitor Target Product Investment[technology]=
-Competitor Investment Stimulus[technology]
Units: 1/Year
The Change in Competitor Target availability is equal to the negative of
the Competitor Stimulus. This indicates that the competitors are
fast-followers, responding to the competitor stimulus but not the market
stimulus.
(42) Change in Fleet-
Fractional Growth in Fleet*Fleet
Units: cars/Year
Change in Fleet is equal to the annual fractional rate of fleet growth
multiplied by the size of the existing fleet of vehicles.
(43) Change in Fuel Capacity[technology]=
(Required Capacity [technology] - Fuel Capacity[technology])*Fuel
Capacity Improvement Rate[technology]
Units: gallons/Year
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Change in Fuel Capacity is the rate at which automakers desire to adjust
the fuel carrying capacity of a vehicle in order to achieve range targets.
(44) Change in Fuel Economy[technology]=
MAX((Required Fuel Economy[technology]-Fuel Economy of New
Vehicles
[technology])*Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[technology], 0)
Units: miles/gallon/years
Change in Fuel Economy is the rate of change of vehicle fuel economy as a
function of investment spending on technologies to improve fuel economy.
(45) Change in Infrastructure Coverage[technology]=
MAX(((Target Infrastructure Coverage[technology]-Infrastructure
Coverage Fraction[technology]))*Infrastructure Coverage Improvement
Rate[technology], 0)
Units: 1/Year
The Change in Infrastructure Coverage is determined by a goal-gap
relationship between desired and actual coverage, divided by the time
delay for building. This rate has a lower bound of zero, so that it is
only responsible for increases. Decreases in infrastructure are assumed
to be less constraining than increases, and so are excluded from the scope
of this model.
(46) Change in Performance[technology]=
(Target Performance[technology]-Performance of New
Vehicles[technology])*Performance Improvement Rate[technology]
Units: 1/years
Change in Performance is the rate of change of vehicle performance
relative to the gasoline ICE as a function of investment spending on
technologies to improve vehicle performance.
(47) Change in Target Product Availability[technology]=
MAX(Market Stimulus[technology],Competitor Stimulus[technology])
Units: 1/Year
The Change in Target Availability is equal to the maximum of either the
Market Stimulus or the Competitor Stimulus. This MAX formulation
indicates that their target availability responds either to the market or
to the competition, depending on which is a more positive signal.
(48) Change in Target Product Investment[technology]=
MAX(Investment Market Stimulus[technology],Competitor Investment
Stimulus[technology])
Units: 1/Year
The Change in Target Availability is equal to the maximum of either the
Market Stimulus or the Competitor Stimulus. This MAX formulation
indicates that their target availability responds either to the market or
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to the competition, depending on which is a more positive signal.
(49) C02 emissions per gallon[technology]=
11.514, 11.917, 12.312,25.805
Units: kilograms/gallon
The carbon density of each fuel is the number of kilos of C02 generated
per gallon equivalent. For electricity and hydrogen, the C02 emissions
per gallon gasoine equivalent depend on how the H2 or electricity are
generated (what primary fuels are used to generate them). Data are from
Weiss et al (2000)
(50) Competitor Investment Stimulus[technology]=
(Competitor Target Product Investment[technology]-Target Product
Investment [technology
])/Investment Reaction Time
Units: 1/Year
The Competitor Investment Stimulus is the difference between our target
investment and their target investment, divided by the time it takes to
change the target investment. It impacts Change in Their Target directly,
and the negative Competitor Stimulus impacts Change in Our Target.
(51) Competitor Market Share=0.5
Units: Dmnl
Competitor Market Share is assumed to be constant at 50% of the market.
(52) Competitor Product Availability[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE(technology=ICE, 1, DELAY3I(Competitor Target
Product Availability [technology], Time to Change Actual, 0))
Units: Dmnl
Competitor Availability represents the actual availability of a propulsion
technology on our competitor's cars. This availability delays the target
availability by a third-order delay based on the time it takes to change
actual availability. The initial competitor availability is assumed to be
zero for all technologies except ICE.
(53) Competitor Product Investment[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE(technology=ICE, 1, DELAY3I(Competitor Target
Product Investment[technology], Time to Change Strategy, 0))
Units: Dmnl
Competitor Availability represents the actual availability of a propulsion
technology on our competitor's cars. This availability delays the target
availability by a third-order delay based on the time it takes to change
actual availability. The initial competitor availability is assumed to be
zero for all technologies except ICE.
(54) Competitor Stimulus[technology]=
-211 -
(Competitor Target Product Availability[technology] 
-Target Product
Availability[technology])/Reaction Time
Units: 1/Year
The Competitor Stimulus is the difference between our target availability
and their target availability, divided by the time it takes to change the
target availability. It impacts Change in Their Target directly, and the
negative Competitor Stimulus impacts Change in Our Target.
(55) Competitor Target Product Availability[technology]=
INTEG (Change in Competitor Target Product Availability[technology],
IF THEN ELSE(technology-ICE, 1, 0))
Units: Dmnl
Competitor Target Availability represents the goal for the fraction of
cars that our competitors offer with a particular propulsion technology.
This target is a stock that integrates the Change in Competitor Target
availability. The initial target is 0 for all technologies except ICE
(which stays at a fraction of 1 throughout).
(56) Competitor Target Product Investment[technology]=
INTEG (Change in Competitor Target Product Investment[technology],
IF THEN ELSE(technology=ICE, 1, 0))
Units: Dmnl
Competitor Target Product Investment represents the allocation of the
vehicle technology investment budget relative to ongoing investment in ICE
at the outset for the model period. The fraction of the total budget
dedicated to a specific propulsion technology serves to accelerate
development of key product attributes for consumer acceptance. This
target is reflective of the competitor's technology strategy and is a
stock that integrates the Change in Competitor Target Product Investment.
The initial target is 0 for all technologies except ICE (which stays at a
fraction of I throughout).
(57) Component Cost[technology]=
(Initial Component Cost[technology]-Minimum Component
Cost[technology])*Learning Adjustment
[technology]+Minimum Component Cost[technology]
Units: $/car
The Component Cost of the technology is equal to difference between the
Initial Component Cost and the Minimum Component Cost, multiplied by
the
Learning Curve Effect, then added to the Minimum Technology Cost.
(58) Consumer Acceptance[technology]=
ZIDZ(Product Market Share[technology],Total Availability[technology])
Units: Dmnl
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Consumer Acceptance represents the sales realized for a given technology,
divided by the cars made available of that technology. The formula is
Technology Market Share (cars sold with technology i/total cars), divided
by total availability (cars available with technology i/total cars).
Consumer Acceptance must be a fraction between 0 and 1. ZIDZ means
"Zero
If Divide by Zero".
(59) Consumer Fraction Aware[technology]=
INTEG (+Increase in Awareness [technology]-Decrease in
Awareness[technology], Initial Awareness[technology])
Units: Dmnl
The Consumer Fraction Aware of the technology is represented as a stock
that integrates the rate of increase in awareness (Enlightenment) and the
rate of Forgetting and begins the accumulation of awareness from the
initial awareness level.
(60) Consumer Fraction Insensitive to Environmental Impact-
INTEG (-Increase in Environmental Awareness, 1-Initial Sensitivity to
Environmental Impact)
Units: Dmnl
Consumer Fraction Insensitive to Environmental Impact represents the pool
of consumers who do not factor in environmental considerations in their
purchase decision.
(61) Consumer Fraction Sensitive to Environmental Impact-
INTEG (+Increase in Environmental Awareness, Initial Sensitivity to
Environmental Impact)
Units: Dmnl
Sensitivity to Environmental Impact represents the degree to which
consumers consider negative air quality, health hazard, and other
environmental impacts in their purchase decision. Growth to unity in 2032
can be approximated via an initial value of 0.07 with a fractional growth
rate of .095. Initial Sensitivity is a scenario available and can be
adjusted.
(62) Consumer Fraction Unaware[technology]=
INTEG (+Decrease in Awareness[technology]-Increase in
Awareness[technology], 1-Initial Awareness[technology])
Units: Dmnl
The Consumer Fraction Unaware of the technology is a stock that integrates
the rate of Forgetting and the rate of increase in awareness
(Enlightenment) of the particular technology, starting from the initial
fraction unaware (represented by 1-Initial Awareness fraction).
-213-
(63) Cumulative Air Pollution Cost[technology]=
Air Pollution Cost[technology]*Vehicle Life
Units: S/car
Cumulative Air Pollution Cost is the total monetized cost of environmental
damage caused by a single vehicle over its lifetime.
(64) Cumulative GHG Cost[technology]=
Greenhouse Gas Cost[technology]*Vehicle Life
Units: S/car
Cumulative GHG Cost is the total monetized cost of environmental damage
from greenhouse gas emissions by a single vehicle over its lifetime.
(65) Cumulative Production Experience[technology]=
INTEG (Production Rate[technology], Initial Production
Experience[technology])
Units: cars
The Cumulative Production Experience of a technology represents the
aggregate experience in number of bars produced for a given technology.
This stock provides critical information to the learning curve.
(66) Decrease in Awareness [technology]=
Forgetting Fraction[technology]* Consumer Fraction Aware [technology]
Units: 1/Year
The rate of Forgetting is equal to a Forgetting Fraction multiplied by the
Consumer Fraction Aware of the technology.
(67) Desired Fuel Economy[technology]=
MAX((Fuel Price[technology]/Target Fuel Cost per Mile[technology]),
Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology])
Units: miles/gallon
The fuel economy consumers would like to achieve the target fuel cost per
vehicle mile at current fuel prices.
(68) Desired Infrastructure Coverage[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE(Technology Fraction in the Fleet[technology]<0.2,
Desired Infrastructure Coverage Function[technology](Technology
Fraction in the Fleet
[technology]), 1)
Units: Dmnl
The Desired Infrastructure Coverage represents a the desired fuel and
auxiliary serviceability level for the technology. The Desired
Infrastructure Coverage depends on the Desired Infrastructure Coverage
Function for the particular Technology Fraction in Fleet.
(69) Desired Infrastructure Coverage Function[ICE]
-214-
([(0,0. 8)-(0.2,1)],(0,1),(0.2, 1))
Units: Dmnl
The Desired Infrastructure Coverage Funciton relates Technology Fractions
in Fleet of less than .2 (20% penetration) to the corresponding Desired
Infrastructure Coverage; above 20% fleet penetration, coverage is 100%.
The table follows an s-shape correlation, indicating that there is a
threshold below which there is a disincentive to invest in infrastructure,
and above which infrastructure can really grow. For ICE,
coverage is 100% regardless of fleet fraction.
(70) Desired Infrastructure Coverage Function[hybrid]
([(0,0)-(0.2,1)],(0,1),(0.2, 1))
Units: Dnml
The Desired Infrastructure Coverage Funciton relates Technology Fractions
in Fleet of less than .2 (20% penetration) to the corresponding Desired
Infrastructure Coverage; above 20% fleet penetration, coverage is 100%.
The table follows an s-shape correlation, indicating that there is a
threshold below which there is a disincentive to invest in infrastructure,
and above which infrastructure can really grow. For ICE,
coverage is 100% regardless of fleet fraction.
(71) Desired Infrastructure Coverage Function[FCEV]
([(0,0)-
(0.2,1)],(0,0),(0.02,0.04),(0.04,0.1),(0.07,0.3),(0.09,0.5),(0.11,0.7),(0.14,
0. 85),(0.17,0.95),(0.2, 1))
Units: Dmnl
The Desired Infrastructure Coverage Funciton relates Technology Fractions
in Fleet of less than .2 (20% penetration) to the corresponding Desired
Infrastructure Coverage; above 20% fleet penetration, coverage is 100%.
The table follows an s-shape correlation, indicating that there is a
threshold below which there is a disincentive to invest in infrastructure,
and above which infrastructure can really grow. For ICE,
coverage is 100% regardless of fleet fraction.
(72) Desired Infrastructure Coverage Function[EV]
([(0,0)-
(0.2,1)],(0,0),(0.02,0.04),(0.04,0.1),(0.07,0.3),(0.09,0.5),(0.11,0.7),(0.14,
0.85),(0.17,0.95),(0.2, 1))
Units: Dmnl
The Desired Infrastructure Coverage Funciton relates Technology Fractions
in Fleet of less than .2 (20% penetration) to the corresponding Desired
Infrastructure Coverage; above 20% fleet penetration, coverage is 100%.
The table follows an s-shape correlation, indicating that there is a
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threshold below which there is a disincentive to invest in infrastructure,
and above which infrastructure can really grow. For ICE,
coverage is 100% regardless of fleet fraction.
(73) Discount Rate=
Function for Discount Rate(Relative Gas Price)
Units: Dmnl
The discount rate determines to what extent future operating costs are
internalized at the time of purchase. A high discount rate represents
that these costs are not internalized very much. The baseline 36%
discount rate would be considered high. The discount rate adjusts
dynamically with fuel price to better represent the weight of this vehicle
attribute in the consumer purchase decision at the point of sale.
(74) Effective Infrastructure Investment[technology]=
SUM(Infrastructure Investment[technology]*Infrastructure
Spillovers[technology,technology])
Units: $/Year
Effective R&D is the total R&D impact when spillovers to adjacent
technologies are factored in.
(75) Effective Production Experience[technology]=
SUM(Cumulative Production Experience[technology]*Production
Spillovers[technology,technology])
Units: cars
Effective Production Experience is the equivalent experience gained from
the production of similar technologies. There are some learning
spillovers from each propulsion technology to the others.
(76) "Effective R&D"[technology]=
SUM(Total Investment[technology]*"R&D
Spillovers"[technology,technology])
Units: Dmnl
Effective R&D is the total R&D impact when spillovers to adjacent
technologies are factored in.
(77) Effective WOM contacts per year=
2
Units: 1/Year
The Effective WOM contacts per year represents the fraction of awareness
gained through word of mouth for each percentage market share as
represented by the fraction of a given technology in the fleet. The
default fraction is 2 (e.g., two consumers gain awareness for every owner
of the technology per year).
(78) Elasticity of Indicated Fuel Economy=
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0.5
Units: Dimensionless
The sensitivity of the response of automakers' fuel economy targets
relative to the economy desired by consumers. 1= fully responsive. <1
indicates less responsiveness.
(79) Electricity Price=
1.62
Units: $/gallon
The Electricity Price is represented here as $/gallon gasoline equivalent.
An electricity price of $1.62/gallon is assumed for the calculations in
this model as consistent with Weiss et al (2000).
(80) Environmental Damage Cost[technology]=
(Cumulative Air Pollution Cost[technology]+ Cumulative GHG
Cost[technology])
Units: $/car
Units: Total environmental damage costs are the sum of the air pollutant
(NOx and
particulate) costs and greenhouse gas costs.
(81) Feebate Fraction[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE(technology=ICE, 1.2-Late Model Tech Fraction in
Fleet[technology], 1-Late Model Tech Fraction in Fleet [technology])
Units: Dmnl
This feebate regime establishes a fee or rebate as a percentage of the
differential in total environmental damage cost between incumbent
technologies and cleaner advanced powertrain alternatives. This scheme
attempts to redistribute EDC by starting at a relatively low level and
then modestly increasing fees on ICE to fund rebates on new technologies.
These rebates start high to help new technologies reach a market-clearing
level and then phase out of existence as they penetrate the market.
(82) Feebate Program[ICE]=
(Environmental Damage Cost[ICE]-Environmental Damage
Cost[hybrid])*Feebate Fraction[ICE]
Units: $/car
The Feebate Program represents a regulatory intervention that attempts to
redistribute externality costs to accurately reflect the "true" cost of
the vehicle to consumers.
(83) Feebate Program[hybrid]=
(Environmental Damage Cost[ICE]-Environmental Damage
Cost[hybrid])*Feebate Fraction[hybrid]
Units: $/car
The Feebate Program represents a regulatory intervention that attempts to
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redistribute externality costs to accurately reflect the "true" cost of
the vehicle to consumers.
(84) Feebate Program[FCEV]=
(Environmental Damage Cost[ICE]-Environmental Damage
Cost[FCEV])*Feebate Fraction[FCEV]
Units: $/car
The Feebate Program represents a regulatory intervention that attempts to
redistribute externality costs to accurately reflect the "true" cost of
the vehicle to consumers.
(85) Feebate Program[EV]=
(Environmental Damage Cost[ICE]-Environmental Damage
Cost[EV])*Feebate Fraction[EV]
Units: $/car
The Feebate Program represents a regulatory intervention that attempts to
redistribute externality costs to accurately reflect the "true" cost of
the vehicle to consumers.
(86) Feebate Switch=
0
Units: Dmnl
The Feebate Switch is a scenario variable that allows the user to turn the
feebate policy intervention on or off
(87) Fixed Operating Cost[technology]=
1238, 1238, 1238, 1238
Units: $/(car*Year)
The Fixed Operating Cost refers to the insurance and fees that are paid on
a yearly basis. The value of $1238/year is taken as common to all
technologies, based on data from Davis (2000).
(88) Fleet=
INTEG (+Change in Fleet, Initial Fleet)
Units: cars
Desired Fleet is the total quantity of vehicles desired of all households in the
market.
(89) Fleet Annual Oil Consumption=
Gasoline Fleet VMT/Fleet Average Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles
Units: gallons/Year
Fleet Annual Oil Consumption is the total volume of gasoline consumed by all
gasoline burning vehicles on the road.
(90) Fleet Average Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles=
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(Total Late Model Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles+Total Older Vehicle Fuel
Economy of Gas Vehicles)/Total Gasoline Vehicle Fleet
Units: miles/gallon
Fleet Average Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles is the average fuel economy of
the fleet of gasoline-burning vehicle technologies on the road.
(91) Forgetting Fraction[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE(technology=ICE, 0, 0.08)
Units: 1/Year
The Forgetting Fraction represents the fraction of aware customers that
forget about a technology over a year. This fraction is assumed constant,
and is 0.08 for all technologies except ICE (which is assumed to have no
forgetting).
(92) Fractional Cost Reduction per Production Doubling[technology]=
0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.15
Units: Dmnl
The Fractional Cost Reduction per Production doubling of a technology is a
critical input into the learning curve. Doubling is considered relative
to the initial production level. Base assumptions are 0.15, 0.3, 0.3, and
0.3 for ICE, hybrid, FCEV, and EV respectively. To turn off the learning
curve effect, set the Fractional Cost Reduction to zero.
(93) Fractional Growth in Fleet=
0.016
Units: 1/Year
Based on historical.estimates of Light Motor Vehicle Sales (cars and light
duty trucks) from 1970-1998 provided by the U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
(94) Fuel Capacity[technology]= INTEG (
Change in Fuel Capacity[technology],
Initial Fuel Capacity[technology])
Units: gallons
Fuel Capacity is the volumetric fuel carrying capability of a single
vehicle between fuelings.
(95) Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate[technology]=
Potential Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate[technology]*"Relative
R&D"[technology]
Units: 1/years
Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate is the rate of technological improvement of
vehicle fuel capacity as a function of automaker investment. The maximum
rate of improvement is the Potential Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate.
(96) Fuel Cost per Mile[technology]=
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Fuel Price[technology]/Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology]
Units: $/mile
The Fuel Cost per Mile for a given vehicle represents the fuel price
specific to the technology, divided by the fuel economy of the propulsion
technology.
(97) Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[technology]=
Potential Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[technology]* "Relative
R&D" [technology]
Units: 1/years
Fuel Economy Improvement Rate is the rate of technological improvement of
vehicle fuel economy as a function of automaker investment in technologies
to improve economy. The maximum rate of improvement is the Potential Fuel
Economy Improvement Rate.
(98) Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology]= INTEG (
Change in Fuel Economy[technology],
Initial Fuel Economy[technology])
Units: miles/gallon
Fuel Economy of New Vehicles represents the distance a new vehicle can
travel per volume of fuel.
(99) Fuel Price[ICE]=
Gasoline Price
(100) Fuel Price[hybrid]=
Gasoline Price
(101) Fuel Price[FCEV]=
Hydrogen Fuel Price
(102) Fuel Price[EV]=
Electricity Price
Units: $/gallon
Fuel Price represents an array of prices that correspond to the different
fuel propulsion regimes. For hybrid and ICE, the fuel price is the
gasoline price. The fuel cell electric vehicle and battery electric
vehicle fuel prices are those of hydrogen and electricity, respectively.
(103) Function for Attractiveness from Availability
([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.00917431,0.324561),(0.0366972,0.557018),(0.0917431,0.74122
8),
(0.174312,0.859649),(0.33945,0.960526),(0.498471,0.995614),(0.752294,0.99
5614),(1,1))
Units: Dmnl
Function for Attractiveness from Availability translates the availability of the
product to a consumer value. Attractiveness increases rapidly with increasing
availability and then diminishes at the margins.
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(104) Function for Attractiveness from Cost
([(0.6,0)-
(2.5,2)],(0.6,2),(1,1),(1.25,0.6),(1.5,0.3),(1.75,0.15),(2,0.05),(2.25,0.02
),(2.5,0))
Units: Dmnl
The level of attractiveness due to cost diminishes significantly with
increasing price relative to reference price. The reference price is the
price a consumer is willing to pay for a basket of attributes.
(105) Function for Attractiveness from Environmental Impact
([(0,0)-(2.5,2.5)],(0,2),(0.25,1.9),(0.5,1.7),(0.75,1.4),(1,1),(1.25,0.6),(1.5,0.3),(
1.75,0.2),(2,0.15),(2.25,0.125),(2.5,0.12))
Units: Dmnl
Function for Attractiveness from Environmental Impact translates the relative
"cleanliness" of alternative technologies to the ICE baeline into a consumer
value parameter.
(106) Function for Attractiveness from Performance
([(0,0)-
(2,1.1)],(0,0),(0.318043,0.0193),(0.477064,0.129),(0.58104,0.2557),(0.654434
0.4246),(0.770642,0.714),(0.911315,0.907),(1,1),(1.15596,1.066),(1.38226,1.0
81),(2,1.1))
Units: Dmnl
Units: The Performance Attractiveness Function, like that for range, is an
s-shaped function relative to the expected performance of an ICE vehicle.
Below this expected performance level, the value drops off significantly;
above it, value is added marginally.
(107) Function for Attractiveness from Range(
[(0,0)-
(2.5,1.22)],(0,0),(0.15,0.028),(0.25,0.084),(0.3,0.168),(0.4,0.37),(0.5,0.6),
(0.75,0.85),(1,1),(1.25,1.1),(1.5,1.15),(1.75,1.175),(2,1.2),(2.25,1.21),(2.5,1.22
Units: Dmnl
This function accounts for the significant penalty attributed to vehicles
with a range between fuelings less than 400 miles. The curve also
reflects diminishing returns to increased range.
(108) Function for Discount Rate
([(1,0.12)-(32,0.4)],(1,0.36),(2,0.24),(4,0.l18),(8,0.1I5),(16,0.14),(32,0.125))
Units: Dmnl
This function returns a discount rate based on increasing fuel cost as
indicated by relative gas prices.
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(109) Function for the Attractiveness of Infrastructure Adequacy[technology]
([(0,0)-
(1,1 )],(0,0),(0. 1,0.02),(0.174312,0.13 5965),(0.2263,0.403509),(0.287462,0.72
3684
),(0.394495,0.885965),(0.513761,0.969298),(0.681957,0.991228),(1,1))
Units: Dmnl
The Function for Attractiveness of Infrastructure Adequacy equates the
attractiveness of a particular platform to the available infrastructure to
support the fueling and service requirements of the platform. Unity
represents the same level of service as the gasoline ICE currently.
(110) Gasoline Fleet VMT=
Total Gasoline Vehicle Fleet*Vehicle Miles Traveled
Units: miles/Year
Gasoline Fleet VMT is the total vehicle miles traveled by all vehicles
that bum gasoline for motive force.
(111) Gasoline Price=
Base Gasoline Price + STEP(Gasoline Price Increase ,Time of Gasoline
Increase)
Units: $/gallon
The Gasoline Price is equal to the Base Gasoline Price plus any Gasoline
Price Increase selected for scenario creation.
(112) Gasoline Price Increase=
0
Units: $/gallon
The Gasoline Price Increase represents the amount by which gasoline prices
change, either due to taxes or supply and demand shifts. The baseline
assumption is a zero Gas Price Increase, but this is also a scenario
variable.
(113) GHG Cost per Kilo=
0.029
Units: $/kilo
GHG cost per kilo is equivalent to the greenhouse gas cost per kilogram
emitted (per Weiss et al).
(114) Greenhouse Gas Cost[technology]=
Annual C02 emissions[technology]*GHG Cost per Kilo
Units: $/carfYear
The cost of greenhouse gas emissions is the product of the unit cost per
kilogram of C02 and the emission rate.
(115) Hydrogen Fuel Price=
2.2
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Units: $/gallon
Hydrogen Fuel Price is expressed as S/gallon gasoline equivalent, and is
assumed to be $2.20/gallon, as consistent with Weiss et al (2000).
(116) Increase in Awareness[technology]=
Consumer Fraction Unaware [technology]*(Awareness from
Marketing[technology]+Awareness from Word of Mouth
[technology]+Awareness from Public Ad Campaigns)
Units: 1/Year
Enlightenment represents the rate of increase in awareness. This rate is
equal to the Consumer Fraction Unaware of the technology, multiplied by
the sum of awareness effects from Marketing and from Word of Mouth.
(117) Increase in Environmental Awareness=
Consumer Fraction Insensitive to Environmental Impact*Awareness from
Public Ad Campaigns
Units: 1/Year
Increase in Environmental Awareness is the product of the fraction of
consumers who are insensitive to environmental impact and the awareness
generated from public ad campaigns.
(118) Increase in Total Late Model Fuel Economy[technology]=
New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]*Fuel Economy of New
Vehicles[technology]
Units: (miles/gallon)*(cars/Year)
Increase in Total Late Model Fuel Economy is equivalent to the fuel economy
of new vehicles coming to market. It is the product between new vehicle sales
and the fuel economy of those new vehicles.
(119) Increase in Total Late Model GHG Emissions [technology]=
New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]*Annual C02
emissions[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*Year)
Increase in Total Late Model GHG Emissions is-the change in GHG emissions
due to movement of new vehicles into the market.
(120) Increase in Total Late Model Performance[technology]=
New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]*Performance of New
Vehicles[technology]
Units: cars/Year
Increase in Total Late Model Performance is equal to the product of new
vehicle sales and the relative performance of the vehicle technology to the
baseline ICE.
(121) Increase in Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions [technology]=
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New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]*Annual Pollutant
emissions[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*Year)
Units: Increase in Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions is the change in
Pollutant emissions due to movement of new vehicles into the market.
(122) Increase in Total Late Model Price[technology]=
New Vehicle Sales by Product [technology]*Purchase Price[technology]
Units: $/Year
Increase in Total Late Model Price is the change in vehicle price over
time due to movement of new vehicles into the market.
(123) Increase in Total Late Model Range[technology]=
New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]*Range[technology]
Units: miles*(cars/Year)
Increase in Total Late Mileage Range is the change in the late model
vehicle range attribute over time.
(124) Indicated Fuel Economy[technology]=
Reference Fuel Economy[technology]*(Desired Fuel
Economy[technology]/Reference Fuel Economy
[technology])AElasticity of Indicated Fuel Economy
Units: miles/gallon
Indicated fuel economy is the goal for economy the automakers should
strive for, given fuel prices and consumer goals for fuel cost per mile.
The sensitivity of the response depends on the elasticity. Elasticity = 1
implies linear response; elasticities < 1 imply automakers are less
willing to adjust target fuel economy goals than consumers would desire.
(125) Infrastructure Coverage Fraction[technology]= INTEG (
Change in Infrastructure Coverage[technology],
Initial Infrastructure Coverage[technology])
Units: Dmnl
Infrastructure coverage is a dimensionless fraction of the extent to which
technologies are supported by infrastructure for fuel, maintenance, and so
forth.
(126) Infrastructure Coverage Improvement Rate[technology]=
Potential Infrastucture Coverage Rate[technology] *Relative Infrastructure
Investment
[technology]
Units: 1/years
Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate is the rate of technological improvement of
vehicle fuel capacity as a function of automaker investment. The maximum
rate of improvement is the Potential Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate.
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(127) Infrastructure Investment[ICE]=
le+008
(128) Infrastructure Investment[hybrid]=
le+008
(129) Infrastructure Investment[FCEV]=
le+008
(130) Infrastructure Investment[EV]=
le+008
Units: $/Year
This is the average current annual R&D investment level for a given
platform.
(131) Infrastructure Spillovers[technology,technology]=
1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1; 0.3, 1, 0.4, 0.8; 0.2, 0.4, 1, 0.4; 0.1, 0.6 ,0.4, 1;
Units: Dimensionless
R&D Spillovers represents correlated technologies. That is, that
investment spending on one technology has applications in related
technologies. For example, moneys spent to develop electric motor systems
that support FCEVs will also be applicable to HEV drive systems.
(132) Initial Awareness[ICE]=1
(133) Initial Awareness[hybrid]=0
(134) Initial Awareness[FCEV]=0
(135) Initial Awareness[EV]=0
Units: Dmnl
Initial Awareness varies with technology, where I represents 100%
awareness. The initial awareness for ICE is one, while the alternative
technologies have zero initial awareness.
(136)- Initial Component Cost[technology]=
4770, 9000, 100000, 18000
Units: $/car
The Initial Component Cost represents the starting point for costs of the
propulsion technologies. The initial costs presented here are taken from
Weiss et al (2000) as 4770, 6666, 7658, and 12822 for ICE, hybrid, FCEV,
and EV respectively. While the propulsion costs are already assumed to be
appropriate for mass-production levels, I assume additionally that
learning can result in further cost reductions to some extent, defined by
the Minimum Component Cost. EV costs estimated from Schnayerson, p.
205.
(137) Initial Fleet=
2e+008
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Units: cars
Initial Fleet is the initial fleet of vehicles on the road at the outset of the
simulation period. It is equivalent to the approximate number of households in
the U.S. market multiplied by the average number of vehicles per household
(Census 2000 and Ward's Automotive Yearbook).
(138) Initial Fuel Capacity[technology]=
14,10,4,2
Units: gallons
Initial Fuel Capacity is the current volumetric fuel carrying capability
of a representative mid-size vehicle for each of the technology classes.
(139) Initial Fuel Economy[technology]=
22.4, 42.6, 72, 67.2
Units: miles/gallon
Initial Fuel Economy for representative powertrain technologies based on
Wang 2001.
(140) Initial Infrastructure Coverage[technology]=
1, 0.9, 0, 0
Units: Dmnl
Initial infrastructure coverage for a given propoulsion technology
represents the extent to which fuel and maintenance are available at the
start of simulation to seed vehicle demand. For FCEV and EV, this initial
coverage is a scenario variable, in that it can be increased to reflect
heavy investment in infrastructure prior to demand, which could be induced
by regulation. The default values for the FCEV and EV are non-zero at a
fraction of 0.01 (1% coverage).
(141) Initial Late Model Vehicles[technology]=
Fleet*(New Vehicle Life/(New Vehicle Life+Older Vehicle Life
))*Initial Vehicle Fractions[technology]+ Minimum Initial Fleet
Units: cars
Initial Late Model Vehicles represents the initial late model fleet
vehicle composition by technology/fuel combination.
(142) Initial Older Vehicles[technology]=
Fleet*(Older Vehicle Life/(New Vehicle Life+Older Vehicle Life
))*Initial Vehicle Fractions[technology]+ Minimum Initial Fleet
Units: cars
Initial Older Vehicles represents the initial older vehicle fleet vehicle
composition by technology/fuel combination.
(143) Initial Performancetechnology]=
1, 0.7, 0.6, 0.6
Units: Dmnl
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Initial Performance represents the current performance of today's vehicle
technologies relative to the gasoline ICE.
(144) Initial Production Experience[ICE]=3e+008
(145) Initial Production Experience[hybrid]=20000
(146) Initial Production Experience[FCEV]=100
(147) Initial Production Experience[EV]=10000
Units: car
The Initial Production Experience equals the number of vehicles that have
been produced with the given technology prior to start of simulation.
This number does not need to correspond literally to reality, but serves
as a representative starting point for the experience on a given
technology. As such, these initial production levels can affect the
steepness of the learning curve (see Sterman 2000).
(148) Initial Sensitivity to Environmental Impact=
0.05
Units: Dmnl
Units: Initial Sensitivity is a scenario available and can be adjusted.
(149) Initial Target Product Availability[technology]=
1,0.01, 0.01, 0.01
Units: Dmnl
Their initial target is represented as a scenario variable, where "they"
are the sum of our competitors. The default values for their initial
target are 1 for ICE and 0.01 for all other technologies.
(150) Initial Target Product Investment[technology]=
1, 0.2, 0.01, 0.01
Units: Dmnl
Their initial target is represented as a scenario variable, where "they"
are the sum of our competitors. The default values for their initial
target are 1 for ICE, 0.2 for HEVs and 0.01 for all other technologies.
(151) Initial Vehicle Fractions[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE(technology=ICE, 1, 0)
Units: Dimensionless
Initial Vehicle Fractions represents the extent by which each of the
propulsion/fuel system vehicle variants are represented in the current
(initial) vehicle fleet.
(152) Investment Adjustment Fraction[technology]=
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Investment Adjustment Function[technology](Consumer
Acceptance[technology])
Units: 1/Year
The Investment Adjustment Fraction is represented by the Adjustment
Function of Consumer Acceptance for the technology in question. This
represents the fraction by which Target Investment is to be adjusted in
response to Consumer Acceptance through the Market Stimulus.
(153) Investment Adjustment Function[technology]
([(0,0)-
(1,0.2)],(0,0),(0.134557,0.0105263),(0.2263,0.0263158),(0.302752,0.0429825
0.382263,0.0666667),(0.480122,0.102632),(0.584098,0.142105),(0.69113 1,0.
170175),(0.788991
,0. 187719),(0.896024,0.198246),(1,0.2))
Units: 1/Year
The Adjustment Function is a gently sloping s-curve that saturates at a
20% adjustment per year when Consumer Acceptance is 100%.
(154) Investment Market Stimulus[technology]=
(1-Target ProductInvestment[technology])*InvestmentAdjustment
Fraction[technology]
Units: 1/Year
The Investment Market Stimulus includes the effect of Consumer Acceptance
through the Adjustment Fraction, and increases Target Product Investment
accordingly. The Investment Adjustment Fraction serves as a limiter to
how much Target Investment can be adjusted at any time.
(155) Investment Reaction Time=
0.5
Units: Year
The Reaction Time is the time to change investment in response to the
Competitor Stimulus. This delay is assumed to be half a year, based on
the time to adjust targets based on realization of competitor activity.
(156) Late Model Tech Fraction in Fleet[technology]=
Late Model Vehicles[technology]/Total Late Model Fleet
Units: Dmnl
Late Model Technology Fraction in Fleet represents the fraction of late
mode platforms of a given technology in the total fleet of late mode
vehicles.
(157) Late Model Vehicles[technology]= INTEG (
New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]-Vehicle Aging [technology],
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Initial Late Model Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Late Model Vehicles is the total fleet of vehicles considered "new."
(158) Learning Adjustment[technology]=
SMOOTH3(Learning Curve Effect[technology], Learning Delay)
Units: Dmnl
The Learning Adjustment approximates a third order learning delay for the
learning curve effect to impact operations.
(159) Learning Curve Effect[technology]=
(Effective Production Experience[technology]/Initial Production
Experience[technology
])^Learning Elasticity[technology]
Units: Dmnl
The Learning Curve Effect equals the ratio of Cumulative Production
Experience to Initial Production Experience, raised to the Learning
Elasticity of the technology. See Sterman (2000).
(160) Learning Delay=
2
Units: years
The Learning Delay approximates the time lag for learning curve effects to be
recognized by personnel.
(161) Learning Elasticity[technology]=
LN(1-Fractional Cost Reduction per Production
Doubling [technology])/LN(2)
Units: Dmnl
The Learning Elasticity of a technology for the learning curve is equal to
the natural log of the Fractional Cost Reduction per Production Doubling,
divided by the natural log of 2 (representing doubling). See Sterman
(2000, p. 338) for learning curve formulation.
(162) Lifecycle Operating Cost[technology]=
(Variable Operating Cost[technology]+Fixed Operating
Cost[technology])*Operating Cost Multiplier
(Discount Rate)
Units: $/car
The lifecycle operating cost for a technology that is internalized at the
time of purchase is equal to the sum of the variable and fixed operating
costs,converted to present value assuming a constant discount rate and
constant (real) annual operating costs.
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(163) Lifecycle Vehicle Cost[technology]=
(Purchase Price[technology]+Lifecycle Operating Cost[technology])
Units: $/car
Lifecycle Vehicle Cost is the sum of the vehicle's purchase price and its
lifecycle operating cost.
(164) Market Stimulus[technology]=
(1-Target Product Availability[technology])*Adjustment
Fraction[technology]
Units: 1/Year
The Market Stimulus includes the effect of Consumer Acceptance through the
Adjustment Fraction, and increases Target Availability accordingly. The
Adjustment Fraction serves as a limiter to how much Target Availability
can be adjusted at any time.
(165) Marketing Elasticity=
0.7
Units: Dmnl
Marketing elasticity represents the percentage increase in awareness for
each percentage increase in spending effort. The default assumption is an
elasticity of 0.7.
(166) Marketing Expenditure[ICE]=1
(167) Marketing Expenditure[hybrid]=1
(168) Marketing Expenditure[FCEV]=1
(169) Marketing Expenditure[EV]=1
Units: DmnllYear
Marketing Expenditure is the annual marketing expenditures for each
platform.
(170) Minimum Component Cost[technology]=
4000, 4000, 4000, 4000
Units: $/car
The Minimum Component Cost is the minimum cost to build the propulsion
technology. This provides a lower boundary for the learning curve.
(171) Minimum Initial Fleet=
le-012
Units: cars
Minimum Initial Fleet is a dummy variable that eliminates the possibility
of an Initial Fleet with a quantity of zero, thereby preventing division
by zero in the model.
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(172) New Vehicle Life=
4
Units: years
New Vehicle Life is the average period of ownership once a consumer takes
possession of a new vehicle. After this period, the vehicle is considered
an "Older" vehicle.
(173) New Vehicle Purchase Time=
0.5
Units: Year
New Vehicle Purchase Time represents a delay reflecting the average period
between when a customer identifies a need for a vehicle and the actual
acquisition of that vehicle.
(174) New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]=
Product Market Share[technology]*Total New Vehicle Market
Units: cars/Year
New Vehicle Sales represents the number of vehicles sold per year by
propulsion/fuel system variant. It is a function of demand for new
automobiles, expressed as a function of Probability of Purchase.
(175) Normal Awareness Generation from Marketing=
0.05
Units: 1/Year
Baseline Awareness from Marketing represents the fraction of consumers per
year that become aware of a new product through baseline marketing
spending.
(176) Older Vehicle Life=
10
Units: years
Older Vehicle Life is the average life span of vehicles not considered new
and is based on estimates used by Weiss et al (2000) indicating total
average vehicle life of 14 years.
(177) Older Vehicles[technology]= INTEG (
Vehicle Aging [technology]-Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology],
Initial Older Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Older Vehicles represents the fleet of vehicles no longer considered "new"
or "late model."
(178) Operating Cost Multiplier
([(0,0)-
(1,15)],(0,14),(0.05,9.9),(0.08,8.24),(0.1,7.37),(0.15,5.72),(0.2,4.61),(0.3,
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3.25),(0.4,2.48),(0.5,1.99),(0.6,1.66),(0.7,1.42),(0.8,1.25),(0.9,1.11),(1,1))
Units: Year
The Operating Cost Multiplier correlates the specified Discount Rate to a
present value of Operating Cost over the lifetime of the vehicle (14 years). If a
different vehicle lifetime is assumed, this table function should be adjusted
according to the present value of $ 1/year over the new lifetime using different
discount rates.
(179) Other Variable Cost per Mile[technology]=
0.0517, 0.0517, 0.0517, 0.0517
Units: $/miles
Other Variable Cost per Mile represents the maintenance and tire service
costs incurred at periodic intervals along the vehicle age in mileage.
These costs are assumed to be 5.17 cents per mile, based on Davis (2000).
(180) Other Vehicle Cost[technology]=
15730
Units: $/car
Other Vehicle Cost represents the costs of the vehicle that do not vary
with propulsion technology. This cost is assumed to be $15,730/vehicle,
consistent with Weiss et al (2000).
(181) Our Actual Product Availability[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE (technology-ICE, 1, DELAY3J(Target Product
Availability[technology], Time to Change Actual, 0))
Units: Dmnl
Our Actual Availability represents the actual fraction of propulsion
technologies made available on the sedan platforms that our company
offers. This availability lags Target Availability by the Time to Change
actual availability in a third-order delay. The initial availability is
zero for all technologies except ICE.
(182) Our Actual Product Investment[technology]=
IF THEN ELSE (technology=ICE, 1, DELAY1I(Target Product
Investment[technology], Time to Change Strategy, 0))
Units: Dmnl
Our Actual Availability represents the actual fraction of propulsion
technologies made available on the sedan platforms that our company
offers. This investment lags Target Investment by the Time to Change
Investment Strategy in a third-order delay. The initial investment is
zero for all technologies except ICE.
(183) Our Market Share=
I-Competitor Market Share
Units: Dmnl
Our Market Share is equal to 1 minus Competitor Market Share, so that the
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total market is divided between us and them (our competitors).
(184) Per Tech Fleet Air Pollutant EDC[technology]=
Air Pollutant Cost per Kilo[technology]*Per Technology Fleet Pollutant
Emissions [technology]
Units: $/Year
Per Tech Fleet Air Pollutant EDC is the per technology environmental damage
cost due to emissions of criteria pollutants.
(185) Per Technology Fleet Pollutant Emissions[technology]=
Per Technology Late Model Pollutant Emissions[technology]+Per
Technology Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions [technology]
Units: kilograms/Year
Per Technology Fleet Pollutant Emission is the sum of both late model and
older vehicle annual pollutant emissions.
(186) Per Technology Late Model Fuel Economy[technology]= INTEG (
Increase in Total Late Model Fuel Economy[technology]-Reduction in Total
Late Model Fuel Economy from Aging[technology],
Late Model Vehicles[technology]*Fuel Economy of New
Vehicles[technology])
Units: (miles/gallon)*cars
Per Technology Late Model Fuel Economy is the average fuel economy of the
portion of the late model fleet representing a given propulsion technology.
(187) Per Technology Late Model GHG Emissions[technology]= INTEG (
Increase in Total Late Model GHG Emissions[technology]-Reduction in
Total Late Model GHG Emissions from Aging[technology],
Late Model Vehicles[technology]*Annual C02 emissions[technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Late Model GHG Emissions is the difference between the increase in
total late model GHG Emissions and the reduction in total late model GHG
emissions resulting from aging.
(188) Per Technology Late Model Pollutant Emissions[technology]= INTEG (
Increase in Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions[technology]-Reduction in
Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions from Aging [technology],
Late Model Vehicles[technology]*Annual Pollutant emissions [technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Units: Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions is the difference between the
increase in total late model Pollutant Emissions and the reduction in
total late model Pollutant emissions resulting from aging.
(189) Per Technology Older Vehicle Fuel Economy[technology]=
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INTEG (+Reduction in Total Late Model Fuel Economy from
Aging[technology]-Reduction in Older Vehicle Fuel Economy from
Scrapping[technology],
Older Vehicles[technology]*Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology])
Units: (miles/gallon)*cars
Per Technology Older Fuel Economy is the average fuel economy of the
portion of the older fleet representing a given propulsion technology.
(190) Per Technology Older Vehicle GHG Emissions[technology]=
INTEG (Reduction in Total Late Model GHG Emissions from
Aging[technology]-Reduction in Older Vehicle GHG Emissions from
Scrapping
[technology],Older Vehicles[technology]*Annual CO2
emissions[technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Older Vehicle GHG Emissions is the difference between the increase
in older vehicle GHG Emissions and the reduction in total older vehicle
GHG emissions resulting from scrapping.
(191) Per Technology Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions[technology]=
INTEG (Reduction in Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions from
Aging[technology]-Reduction in Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions from
Scrapping[technology], Older Vehicles[technology]*Annual Pollutant
emissions[technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions is the difference between the
increase in older vehicle Pollutant Emissions and the reduction in total
older vehicle emissions resulting from scrapping.
(192) "Per Technology On-Road Cost of Environmental Damage" [technology]=
Environmental Damage Cost[technology]*Per Technology Vehicle
Fleet[technology]
Units: $
Per Technology On-Road Cost of Environmental Damage represents the
cumulative environmental damage cost created by all vehicles of a specific
technology type on the road.
Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[technology]=
Late Model Vehicles[technology] +Older Vehicles[technology]
Units: cars
Vehicle Fleet is the sum of all Late Model Vehicles and Older Vehicles.
It is the total of all vehicles on the road.
(193) Performance Improvement Rate[technology]=
Potential Performance Improvement Rate[technology]* "Relative
R&D" [technology]
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Units: 1/years
Performance Improvement Rate is the rate of technological improvement of
vehicle performance as a function of automaker investment. The maximum
rate of improvement is the Potential Performance Improvement Rate.
(194) Performance of New Vehicles[technology]= INTEG (
Change in Performance[technology],
Initial Performance[technology])
Units: Dmnl
Performance of New Vehicles is the level of performance achieved by a new
vehicle of a given propulsion/fuel platform.
(195) Pollutant Cost per Mile[technology]=
0.0215, 0.0143, 0.0016, 0.0101
Units: $/mile
Pollutant cost per mile is the equivalent per mile cost of vehicle emissions for
a given technology (Source: Wang, 2001).
(196) Pollutant Emissions per Mile[technology]=
0.006649, 0.00431, 0.000309, 0.001929
Units: kilograms/mile
Estimates are derived from Wang (2001) and sum VOC, PM10, NOx, SOx, &
CO
emissions for a baseline conventional SI ICE/CG, SI HEV/FRFG2, and
EV/US
Grid Mix as computed by Wang for near-term technologies. For the FCEV,
estimate is based on long-term projections by Wang for FCV/H2, NG
Decentralized.
(197) Potential Fuel Capacity Improvement Rate[technology]=
0,0, 0.2,0.1
Units: 1/years
Potential Capacity Improvement Rate is the maximum improvement rate
achievable regardless of investment spending.
(198) Potential Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[ICE]=0.05
(199) Potential Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[hybrid]=0.15
(200) Potential Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[FCEV]=0. 15
(201) Potential Fuel Economy Improvement Rate[EV]=0. 15
Units: 1/years
Potential Fuel Economy Improvement Rate is the maximum improvement rate
achievable regardless of investment spending.
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(202) Potential Infrastucture Coverage Rate[ICE]=0
(203) Potential Infrastucture Coverage Rate[hybrid]=0.3
(204) Potential Infrastucture Coverage Rate[FCEV]=0.2
(205) Potential Infrastucture Coverage Rate[EV]=0.2
Units: 1/years
Potential Capacity Improvement Rate is the maximum improvement rate
achievable regardless of investment spending.
(206) Potential Performance Improvement Rate[technology]=
0.1,0.25,0.25,0.25
Units: 1/Year
Potential Performance Improvement Rate is the maximum improvement rate
achievable regardless of investment spending.
(207) Probability of Purchase[technology]=
Exp(Attractiveness of Technology[technology])/Total Utility of all Platforms
Units: Dmnl
The Probability of Purchase for a given technology is an exponential
function of Consumer Utility. This is based on the logit function, which
generates the mean of a logistic distribution using the exponent of
utility for a given technology divided by the sum of exponential utilities
for all the competing technologies.
(208) Product Market Share[technology]=
Technology Demand[technology]/SUM(Technology Demand[technology])
Units: Dmnl
Technology Market share normalizes New Vehicle Sales rather than Demand
so
that the sum of all New Vehicle Sales for each technology/fuel variant is
unity. Furthermore, the revised model intends to deliver both reinforcing
and balancing feedback components for all feedback mechanisms via
Technology Fraction in the Fleet, since this is a more representative
metric for gauging "market tip" phenomena.
(209) Production Rate[technology]=
New Vehicle Sales by Product[technology]
Units: cars/Year
Units: The Production Rate of a technology is assumed to equal the Sales
Rate for
each technology.
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(210) Production Spillovers[technology,technology]=
1, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1; 0.2, 1, 0.3, 0.5; 0.1, 0.3, 1, 0.5; 0.1, 0.5 ,0.5, 1;
Units: Dimensionless
Production Spillovers represents correlated production experience amongst
technologies. That is, production experience gained in one technology
translates in part to production experience in other related technologies.
For example, experience producing electric motor systems that support
FCEVs is shared to some degree by hybrid drive systems.
(211) Profit Margin[technology]=
0.05
Units: Dmnl
Profit Margin is specified as the fraction of cost that is added to give
vehicle price. The Profit Margin can be zero if the vehicle is to be sold
at cost, or it can be negative if the vehicle is to be sold at a loss.
The default assumption is a 5% profit margin for all technologies except
EVs (which are sold at cost because of their high Capital Cost). Profit
Margin is a scenario variable.
(212) Public Ad Expenditure=
0
Units: Dmnl/Year
The annual public sector marketing expenditures for each platform as a
function of the reference expenditure for marketing on established ICE
technology. We assume an absence of public sector intervention as exists
today. This is a scenario variable, however, and can therefore be
adjusted to reflect deliberate promotion of cleaner vehicle technologies
via public ad campaigns.
(213) Purchase Price[ICE]=
(Total Capital Cost[ICE]*(1 +Profit Margin[ICE]))+Feebate
Program[ICE] *Feebate Switch
(214) Purchase Price[hybrid]=
(Total Capital Cost[hybrid]*( 1+Profit Margin[hybrid]))-Feebate
Program[hybrid]*Feebate Switch
(215) Purchase Price[FCEV]=
(Total Capital Cost[FCEV] *(I1+Profit Margin[FCEV]))-Feebate
Program[FCEV]*Feebate Switch
(216) Purchase Price[EV]=
(Total Capital Cost[EV]*(l1+Profit Margin [EV]))-Feebate
Program[EV] *Feebate Switch
Units: $/car
-237-
The Purchase Price for a given propulsion technology is equal to the Total
Capital Cost plus an additional fee appropriate to the specified Profit
Margin.
(217) "R&D Spillovers"[technology, technology]=
1, 0.3, 0.1,0.1; 0.3, 1, 0.4, 0.8; 0.2, 0.4, 1, 0.6; 0.1, 0.6 ,0.4, 1;
Units: Dmnl
R&D Spillovers represents correlated technologies. That is, that
investment spending on one technology has applications in related
technologies. For example, moneys spent to develop electric motor systems
that support FCEVs will also be applicable to HEV drive systems.
(218) Range[technology]=
Fuel Capacity[technology]*Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology]
Units: miles
The Range represents the number of miles that can be traveled between
refuelings.
(219) Reaction Time=
0.5
Units: Year
The Reaction Time is the time to change target availability in response to
the Competitor Stimulus. This delay is assumed to be half a year, based
on the time to adjust targets based on realization of competitor activity.
(220) Reduction in Older Vehicle Fuel Economy from Scrapping[technology]=
Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology]*Average Older Vehicle Fuel
Economy[technology]
Units: (miles/gallon)*(cars/Year)
Reduction in Older Vehicle Fuel Economy from Scrapping results from the
gradual scrapping of older and more polluting vehicles as they retire from the
fleet. It is equal to the scrap rate times the average fuel economy of the older
vehicle fleet for a given technology.
(221) Reduction in Older Vehicle GHG Emissions from Scrapping[technology]=
Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology]*Average Older Vehicle GHG
Emissions[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*Year)
Reduction in Older Vehicle GHG Emissions from Scrapping is the decrease in
GHG emissions that results as the fleet of older vehicles reaches end of
service life and is replaced by vehicles with improved GHG emissions
characteristics.
(222) Reduction in Older Vehicle Performance from Scrapping[technology]=
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Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology]*Average Older Vehicle
Perfonrmance[technology]
Units: cars/Year
Reduction in Older Vehicle Performance from Scrapping is a function of the
product of the vehicle scrap rate and the average performance of the pool of
older vehicles on the road.
(223) Reduction in Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions from Scrapping[technology]=
Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology]*Average Older Vehicle Pollutant
Emissions[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*Year)
Reduction in Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions from Scrapping is the
decrease in Pollutant emissions that results as the fleet of older
vehicles reaches end of service life and is replaced by vehicles with
improved emissions characteristics.
(224) Reduction in Older Vehicle Price from Scrapping[technology]=
Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology]*Average Older Vehicle Price[technology]
Units: $/Year
Reduction in Older Vehicle Price from Scrapping is the change in price
that results as the fleet of older vehicles reaches end of service life
and is replaced by vehicles at different prices.
(225) Reduction in Older Vehicle Range from Scrapping[technology]=
Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology]*Average Older Vehicle Range[technology]
Units: miles*(cars/Year)
Reduction in Older Vehicle Range from Scrapping is the decrease in total
older vehicle range that occurs as the fleet of older vehicles reaches end
of service life and is replaced by vehicles with improved range
characteristics.
(226) Reduction in Total Late Model Fuel Economy from Aging[technology]=
Vehicle Aging[technology] *Average Late Model Fuel Economy[technology]
Units: (miles/gallon)*(cars/Year)
Reduction in Total Late Model Fuel Economy from Aging represents the
reduction in the stock of late model cars due to aging.
(227) Reduction in Total Late Model GHG Emissions from Aging[technology]=
Vehicle Aging[technology]*Average Late Model GHG
Emissions[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*Year)
Reduction in Total Late Model GHG emissions from Aging is the decrease in
GHG emissions that results as the Total Late Model fleet ages and is
replaced by new vehicles with improved emissions attributes.
(228) Reduction in Total Late Model Performance from Aging[technology]=
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Vehicle Aging[technology] *Average Late Model Performance[technology]
Units: cars/Year
Reduction in Total Late Model Performance from Aging refers to the decrease
in the stock of total late model vehicles resulting from aging of the late model
fleet.
(229) Reduction in Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions from Aging[technology]=
Vehicle Aging[technology] *Average Late Model Pollutant
Emissions[technology]
Units: kilograms/(Year*Year)
Reduction in Total Late Model Pollutant emissions from Aging is the
decrease in Pollutant emissions that results as the Total Late Model fleet
ages and is replaced by new vehicles with improved emissions attributes.
(230) Reduction in Total Late Model Price from Aging[technology]=
Vehicle Aging[technology]*Average Late Model Price[technology]
Units: $/Year
Reduction in Total Late Model Price from Aging is the decrease in vehicle
price that results as the Total Late Model fleet ages and is replaced by
new vehicles at diferent prices.
(231) Reduction in Total Late Model Range from Aging[technology]=
Vehicle Aging[technology]*Average Late Model Range[technology]
Units: miles*(cars/Year)
Reduction in Total Late Model Range from Aging is the decrease in total
late model vehicle range that occurs as the fleet ages and is replaced by
new vehicles with improved range attributes.
(232) Reference Availability=
1
Units: Dmnl
Reference Availability is equivalent to the baseline ICE availability, equal to
unity.
(233) Reference Cost=
38000
Units: $/car
Attractiveness of a given vehicle platform is benchmarked against a
reference cost. This cost represents the consumer's expected price for a
given basket of vehicle attributes.
(234) Reference Environmental Impact-
(235) Environmental Damage Cost[ICE]
Units: $/car
The reference value for annual environmental damage costs used in the
assessment of vehicle attractiveness.
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(236) Reference Fuel Economy[technology]=
20
Units: miles/gallon
The reference fuel economy level for the determination of target fuel
economy.
(237) Reference Infrastructure Adequacy=
1
Units: Dimensionless
Reference Infrastructure Adequacy is the baseline infrastructure coverage
expected by consumers and represented by the ICE, equal to unity.
(238) Reference Infrastructure Investment[technology]=
le+008
Units: $/Year
Reference R&D for a given technology establishes the rate by which
increased R&D spending will close the gap between the Potential
Improvement Rate and the Actual Improvement Rate.
(239) Reference Performance=
1
Units: Dmnl
This is the equivalent performance of the advanced baseline gasoline ICE.
It is the measure upon which the performance of all other propulsion/fuel
system combinations are based.
(240) "Reference R&D" [technology]=
1
Units: Dmnl
Reference R&D for a given technology establishes the rate by which
increased R&D spending will close the gap between the Potential
Improvement Rate and the Actual Improvement Rate.
(241) Reference Range=
400
Units: miles
Attractiveness is benchmarked against a reference range equal to 400 miles
for an advanced body vehicle.
(242) Relative Gas Price=
Gasoline Price/Base Gasoline Price
Units: Dmnl
Relative Gas Price is the current price of gasoline relative to the baseline
gasoline price of $1.43/gallon.
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(243) Relative Infrastructure Investment[technology]=
Effective Infrastructure Investment[technology]/(Effective Infrastructure
Investment[technology]+Reference Infrastructure Investment[technology])
Units: Dmnl
Relative R&D represents the degree by which Effective R&D is translated to
the rate of improvement of the targeted technology attribute; in this
case, fuel capacity.
(244) "Relative R&D" [technology]=
"Effective R&D" [technology]/("Effective R&D" [technology]+"Reference
R&D"[technology])
Units: Dmnl
Relative R&D represents the degree by which Effective R&D is translated to
the rate of improvement of the targeted technology attribute; in this
case, fuel economy.
(245) Relative Strength of Marketing Effort[technology]=
Marketing Expenditure[technology]/Baseline Marketing Expenditure
Units: Dmnl
The Relative Strength of Marketing Effort represents the amount of
marketing spending for a given technology divided by the baseline
marketing spending. The baseline marketing spending (e.g.,
30,000,000/year) is sufficient to generate 5% awareness in a year. The
default assumption is that all efforts are equal to baseline, but this is
a scenario variable that can be adjusted appropriately.
(246) Relative Strength of Public Ad Campaign=
Public Ad Expenditure/Baseline Marketing Expenditure
Units: Dmnl
The Relative Strength of the Public Advertisement Campaign Effort represents
the amount of public sector spending to promote a given advanced vehicle
technology divided by the baseline marketing spending by industry. The
baseline marketing spending (e.g., 30,000,000/year) is sufficient to generate
5% awareness in a year. The default assumption is that all efforts are equal to
baseline, but this is a scenario variable that can be adjusted appropriately.
(247) Required Capacity[technology]=
Target Range[technology]/Fuel Economy of New Vehicles[technology]
Units: gallons
Required Capacity is the required maximum volumetric fuel carrying
capability of a vehicle needed to achieve the target range between
refuelings.
(248) Required Economy Adjustment Delay-
4
Units: years
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The time required for automakers to adjust their target for fuel economy as
fuel prices and other conditions change.
(249) Required Fuel Economy [technology]=
SMOOTH3(Indicated Fuel Economy[technology], Required Economy
Adjustment Delay)
Units: miles/gallon
Required fuel economy is the operational goal of the automakers for the
economy they should strive for in their R&D and development programs. It
adjusts with a delay toward the indicated level based on fuel prices.
(250) Target Fuel Cost per Mile[technology]=
0.03
Units: $/mile
Target Fuel Cost per Mile is the consumers' target for fuel cost per mile, as a
function of the consumer's expected duration between fuelings and average
cost per fueling based on experience with the ICE.
(251) Target Infrastructure Coverage [technology]=
SMOOTH3(Desired Infrastructure Coverage[technology], Time to Build
Infrastructure)
Units: Dmnl
Target Infrastructure Coverage is the coverage desired of each of the
fuel/vehicle system combinations relative to current coverage. The target
coverage experiences a third order delay due to the time to build the
infrastructure.
(252) Target Performance[technology]=
I
Units: Dimensionless
Target Performance is the vehicle performance desired of each of the
propulsion/fuel system combinations relative to today's gasoline ICE
vehicle - shown as unity.
(253) Target Product Availability[technology]=
INTEG (Change in Target Product Availability[technology],
Initial Target Product Availability[technology])
Units: Dmnl
Target Availability represents our availability goal. This target
availability integrates the change in their target, and starts with
Initial Target Availability.
(254) Target Product Investment[technology]=
INTEG (Change in Target Product Investment[technology],
Initial Target Product Investment[technology])
Units: Dmnl
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Target Availability represents our availability goal. This target
availability integrates the change in their target, and starts with
Initial Target Availability.
(255) Target Range[technology]=
600
Units: miles
The target range is established as a rough approximation of the target that
automakers might pursue for a given technology based on improvements to
the benchmark gasoline ICE. This might be interpreted as the point where
automakers currently believe consumers derive a maximum of utility from
range. Increases beyond the target achieve only diminishing returns to the
automaker. This definition is in contrast to the original model based on
projections by Weiss et al to 2020. The Weiss et al (2000) report indicates
potential performance normalized ranges of 397,401;407,395;387,375;and
262. These are projected ranges at the year
2020 and are weighted based on EPA methodologies (55% city/45%
highway).
(256) Technology:
ICE, hybrid, FCEV, EV
Units: Four propulsion technology platforms are explored: internal
combustion
(ICE), hybrid, fuel cell electric (FCEV), and electric (EV). Each platform has
a variety of fuel sources to draw from.
(257) Technology Demand[technology]=
Probability of Purchase[technology]*Total
Availability[technology]*Consumer Fraction Aware[technology]
Units: Dmnl
Technology Demand is equivalent to the product of the probability of
consumer purchase, total product availability, and the fraction of consumers
aware the product exists for purchase.
(258) Technology Fraction in Fleet[technology]=
Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[technology]/Total Fleet
Units: Dmnl
The Technology Fraction in Fleet represents the fraction that each
technology comprises in the total vehicle fleet at a given time. The
fraction of an alternative propulsion technology in the fleet lags the
Technology Market Share because the fleet is much larger than the number
of new cars sold in a year.
(259) Technology Fraction in the Fleet[technology]=
Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[technology]/Total Vehicle Fleet
Units: Dmnl
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Technology Fraction in the Fleet is the portion of the total fleet of
vehicles represented by a particular propulsion technology.
(260) Time of Gasoline Increase=
2100
Units: years
The Time of Increase is represents the number of years after simulation
starts that a Gasoline Price Increase is imposed. The default assumption
is that the higher gasoline price takes place immediately, so time of
increase is zero.
(261) Time to Build Infrastructure=
2
Units: years
Time to Build Infrastructure is equivalent to the average period required to
install new infrastructure in the form of fuel extraction, processing, storage,
and distribution as well as training and certification of support personnel.
(262) Time to Change Actual=
4
Units: Year
Units: The Time to Change Actual availability is assumed to be 4 years,
representing the time to bring the technology through requisite development
and production steps to market.
(263) Time to Change Strategy=
1
Units: years
The Time to Change Strategy is assumed to be 1 year, representing the
approval process for investment funding for any given product
attribute/technology.
(264) Total Availability[technology]=
Competitor Product Availability [technology]* Competitor Market Share+Our
Actual Product Availability
[technology]*Our Market Share
Units: Dmnl
Total Availability is the sum of Our Availability and the Competitor
Availability, weighted by the respective Market Share of us and our
competitor.
(265) Total Average Fuel Economy=
(Total Late Model Fuel Economy+Total Older Vehicle Fuel Economy)/Total
Vehicle Fleet
Units: miles/gallon
This is the aggregate fuel economy of all vehicle technology fleets on the
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road.
(266) Total Capital Cost[technology]=
(Other Vehicle Cost[technology]+Component Cost[technology])
Units: $/car
The Total Capital Cost is equal to the sum of Component Cost of the
technology and Other Vehicle Cost.
(267) Total Fleet=
SUM(Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[technology])
Units: cars
Total Fleet is the sum of all vehicle fleets by fuel/vehicle system.
(268) Total Fleet Air Pollutant EDC=
SUM(Per Tech Fleet Air Pollutant EDC[technology])
Units: $/Year
Total Fleet Air Pollutant EDC is the total environmental damage cost resulting
from the sum of all fuel/vehicle systems in the fleet.
(269) Total Fleet EDC=
Total Fleet Air Pollutant EDC+Total Fleet GHG EDC
Units: $/Year
Total Fleet EDC is the total fleet environmental damage cost stemming from
emissions of both criteria air pollutants and greenhouse gases.
(270) Total Fleet GHG EDC=
GHG Cost per Kilo*All Vehicle GHG Emissions
Units: $/Year
Total Fleet GHG EDC is the total environmental damage cost resulting from
the greenhouse gas emissions of all fuel/vehicle systems on the road.
(271) Total Gasoline Vehicle Fleet=
Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[ICE]+Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[hybrid]
Units: cars
Total Gasoline Vehicle Fleet is the sum of all gasoline-burning vehicles on the
road.
(272) Total Investment[technology]=
Competitor Product Investment[technology] *Competitor Market Share+Our
Actual Product Investment[technology]*Our Market Share
Units: Dmnl
Total Investment is the sum of Our Actual Product Investment and the
Competitor Product Investment, weighted by the respective Market Share of
us and our competitor.
(273) Total Late Model Fleet=
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SUM(Late Model Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Total Late Model Fleet is the sum of all late model cars of all technologies on
the road.
(274) Total Late Model Fuel Economy= .
SUM(Per Technology Late Model Fuel Economy[technology])
Units: (miles/gallon)*cars
Total Late Model Fuel Economy is the average fuel economy of all late model
vehicles of all technologies.
(275) Total Late Model Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles=
Per Technology Late Model Fuel Economy[ICE]+Per Technology Late
Model Fuel Economy[hybrid]
Units: (miles/gallon)*cars
Total Late Model Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles is the average fuel economy
of the pool of late model gasoline-burning vehicles on the road.
(276) Total Late Model GHG Emissions=
SUM(Per Technology Late Model GHG Emissions [technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Late Model GHG Emissions is the sum of all greenhouse gas emissions
of all late model vehicles on the road.
(277) Total Late Model Performance[technology]=
INTEG (Increase in Total Late Model Performance [technology]-Reduction in
Total Late Model Performance from Aging[technology],
Late Model Vehicles[technology] *Performance of New Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Total Late Model Performance is the total performance of the portion of the
late model fleet that is representative of a given fuel/vehicle system.
(278) Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions=
SUM(Per Technology Late Model Pollutant Emissions[technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Late Model Pollutant Emissions is the total pollutant emissions of all late
model vehicles, regardless of fuel/vehicle system type.
(279) Total Late Model Price[technology]= INTEG (
Increase in Total Late Model Price[technology]-Reduction in Total Late
Model Price from Aging[technology], Late Model
Vehicles[technology]*Purchase Price[technology])
Units: $
Total Late Model Price is the difference between the increase in total
late model price and the change in total late model price resulting from
- 247 -
aging.
(280) Total Late Model Range[technology]= INTEG (
Increase in Total Late Model Range[technology]-Reduction in Total Late
Model Range from Aging[technology], Late Model
Vehicles[technology] *Range[technology])
Units: miles*cars
Total Late Model Range is the difference between the increase in total late
model range and the reduction in total late model range resulting from aging.
(281) Total Late Model Vehicles=
SUM(Late Model Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Total Late Model Vehicles is equal to the total number of late model cars on
the road.
(282) Total New Vehicle Market=
Total Vehicle Scrap Rate + Change in Fleet
Units: cars/Year
Total New Vehicle Sales is the sum of the total vehicle scrap rate and the
market growth differential.
(283) Total Older Model Vehicles=
SUM(Older Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Total Older Model Vehicles is equal to the sum of all older vehicles of all
technology types on the road.
(284) Total Older Vehicle Fuel Economy-
SUM(Per Technology Older Vehicle Fuel Economy[technology])
Units: (miles/gallon)*cars
Total Older Vehicle Fuel Economy is the average fuel economy of all older
vehicles of all technologies.
(285) Total Older Vehicle Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles=
Per Technology Older Vehicle Fuel Economy[ICE]+Per Technology Older
Vehicle Fuel Economy[hybrid]
Units: (miles/gallon)*cars
Total Older Vehicle Fuel Economy of Gas Vehicles is the average fuel
economy of the pool of older gasoline-burning vehicles on the road.
(286) Total Older Vehicle GHG Emissions=
SUM(Per Technology Older Vehicle GHG Emissions[technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Older Vehicle GHG Emissions is the sum of all greenhouse gas
emissions of all older vehicles on the road.
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(287) Total Older Vehicle Performance[technology]=
INTEG (+Reduction in Total Late Model Performance from
Aging[technology]-Reduction in Older Vehicle Performance from
Scrapping
[technology],
Older Vehicles[technology]*Performance of New Vehicles[technology])
Units: cars
Total Older Vehicle Performance is the total performance of the portion of the
older vehicle fleet that is representative of a given fuel/vehicle system.
(288) Total Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions=
SUM(Per Technology Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions [technology])
Units: kilograms/Year
Total Older Vehicle Pollutant Emissions is the sum of the criteria air pollutant
emissions of all older vehicle fuel/vehicle systems on the road.
(289) Total Older Vehicle Price[technology]= INTEG (
Reduction in Total Late Model Price from Aging[technology]-Reduction in
Older Vehicle Price from Scrapping[technology], Older
Vehicles[technology] *Purchase Price[technology])
Units: $
Total Older Vehicle Price is the difference between the increase in older
vehicle Price from aging and the reduction in total older vehicle price resulting
from scrapping.
(290) Total Older Vehicle Range[technology]=
INTEG (Reduction in Total Late Model Range from Aging[technology]-
Reduction in Older Vehicle Range from Scrapping
[technology],
Older Vehicles[technology]*Range[technology])
Units: miles*cars
Total Older Vehicle Range is the difference in range resulting from reduction
in total late model range due to aging and replacement, and the reduction in
older vehicle range resulting from scrapping.
(291) "Total On-Road Cost of Environmental Damage"=
SUM("Per Technology On-Road Cost of Environmental
Damage" [technology])
Units: $
Total On-Road Cost of Environmental Damage represents the cumulative
environmental damage cost created by all vehicles of all technology types on
the road.
(292) Total Utility of all Platforms=
SUM(Exp(Attractiveness of Technology[technology ]))
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Units: Dmnl
The sum of exponential utilities for all the competing technologies.
(293) Total Vehicle Fleet-
SUM(Per Technology Vehicle Fleet[technology])
Units: cars
Total Vehicle Fleet is the sum of all cars of all technologies on the road.
(294) Total Vehicle Scrap Rate=
SUM(Vehicle Scrap Rate[technology])
Units: cars/Year
The Total Vehicle Scrap Rate is the sum of all vehicles by propulsion/fuel
system reaching end of service life.
(295) Variable Operating Cost[technology]=
Vehicle Miles Traveled*(Fuel Cost per Mile[technology]+Other Variable
Cost per Mile[
technology])
Units: $/(car*Year)
The Variable Operating Cost incurred yearly for vehicle usage is equal to
the Vehicle Miles Traveled multiplied by the sum of Fuel Cost per Mile and
Other Variable Cost per Mile.
(296) Vehicle Aging[technology]=
Late Model Vehicles[technology]/New Vehicle Life
Units: cars/Year
Vehicle Aging is the rate by which new vehicles leave the fleet of vehicles
considered "late model" each year and is determined by the average new
vehicle life.
(297) Vehicle Life=
New Vehicle Life+Older Vehicle Life
Units: years
Vehicle Life is the sum of both New Vehicle Life and Older Vehicle Life and
is equal to 14 years.
(298) Vehicle Miles Traveled=
12000
Units: miles/(car*Year)
The Vehicle Miles Traveled per vehicle and year is NOT assumed to be
constant across propulsion regimes at 12,000 miles per vehicle-year. This is
consistent with Davis (2000) only when VMT Growth Rate is set to zero and
the initial VMT is set at 12,000 miles. The above relation is indicative of a 3%
decrease in travel demand for every 10% increase in gasoline price (Plotkin
1997).
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(299) Vehicle Scrap Rate [technology]=
Older Vehicles[technology]/Older Vehicle Life
Units: cars/Year
Vehicle Scrap Rate is the rate by which older vehicles reach their end of
service life and is dependent upon the average life of older vehicles.
Simulation Control Parameters
FINAL TIME =2032
Units: Year
Units: The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 2002
Units: Year
Units: The initial time for the simulation.
TIME STEP
Units: Year
Units: The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.125
Units: Year
Units: The time step for the simulation.
-251 -
